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Abstract 
 
Stories need to be told in such a way that they build and sustain a narrative 
momentum. We tend to think of the story as the art, and the telling of it as 
the craft of storytelling. The Russian formalists referred to them as the 
fabula, the stuff of the story, and szujet, the composition of the plot. This 
thesis is mainly concerned with the szujet, the praxis of telling a story, in the 
medium of drama. 
 
The dramatic performance of a story elicits from an audience a response 
that has much in common with the way we normally relate with other 
people. The principle difference between these two situations is with their 
motivation. We deal with other people for reasons and with motives of our 
own whereas we deal with dramatic performances for reasons and motives 
modulated and framed by someone else. These ulterior motives and reasons 
are usually masked from the audience by the conflict presented to them at 
the outset of the performance. The conflict evokes an emotional response 
from the audience and in this way engages them with the unfolding of the 
performed narrative. The emotional experience of an audience watching a 
dramatic performance is designed by the dramatist through a complex 
variety of dramaturgical techniques and devices employed in the narration. 
As long as this emotional engagement is sustained the audience responds to 
it as if the reasons and motives of the engagement are their own, thus giving 
rise to a mimetic illusion of verisimilitude that defines the medium of 
dramatic performance. To understand the medium it is important to 
understand how the emotional response in the audience is established and 
maintained.  
 
This two-part thesis considers this question by presenting a specific 
example of how it was done by the play Taking Liberty. The first part of the 
thesis is the script for Taking Liberty which serves to demonstrate some of 
these dramaturgical techniques. The contextual component of the thesis   4
seeks to illuminate how the complex emotional response in audiences is 
established and maintained. This contextual component has three chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 describes some of the dramaturgical techniques used in Taking 
Liberty.  Chapter 2 deals with the receptive activities triggered in an 
audience by the sort of dramaturgical devices described in Chapter 1 and the 
way that normal day to day methods of processing sensory data into 
information and "understanding" are recruited into narrative reception.   
 
Narrative reception requires psychic effort by an audience. The motivation 
for this effort is emotional.  Chapter 3 examines contemporary approaches 
to the emotions and their relation to narrative. Each of drama's great variety 
of dramatic situations is invented to evoke particular emotional responses. 
The design of emotional experience, its changes of valence and intensity, is a 
vital aspect of composing dramatic texts and creating a mimetic illusion.   
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Taking Liberty (draft 7) 
 
Characters and casting for eight actors:  
 
1 - John Bertrand      
2 - Ben Lexcen 
3 - Alan Bond 
4 - Warren Jones 
Major Peter Costello 
Press 
5 - Hugh Treharne 
RPYC Commodore 1 
Baron Bich  
Ted Turner 
Press 
6 - Newscaster  
Lex Bertrand  
Teacher 
RPYC Commodore 2  
Press 
John Cuneo  
Vic Romagna 
Grant "Maddog" Simmer   
7 -  Therapist  
 James Hardy 
"Ya" Smidmore 
An American judge 
8 - The "Commodore" 
Bill Lucas  
Bob McCulloch  
John "Chink" Longley  
 
The play could be performed by six but eight actors is preferred. 
The set should be multipurpose, dominated in the centre by a 12 
metre yacht, however that might be represented, with something 
corresponding to a helm with a steering wheel, two winches, a 
mast, a boom and various ropes and pulleys, such that the cast 
can approximate the activity of the crew during the race.  Also a 
generic office and a couple of telephones.   8
 Act One 
 
A blizzard of audio and visual media from the winning day: a 
nation celebrates its great victory.   
Amidst the sounds of cheering, clapping, crowds singing Waltzing 
Matilda and "Down Under" by Men at Work on the radio, come the 
voices of newsreaders and broadcasters: 
 
"Australia has won the America's Cup!" Etc. 
 
Lights come up on John Bertrand centrestage, on a platform from 
which he will deliver a motivational talk based on his book, Born to 
Win. 
 
JOHN -- Good evening.  I'm John Bertrand. 
 
Applause and cheers. 
 
JOHN -- Thank you.  Thanks.  As you know, I'm the man who 
skippered the boat that won the America's Cup. 
 
Applause and cheers. 
 
JOHN -- Thanks. If any of you can still afford it after paying for 
your tickets, my book's on sale in the foyer.  It tells the story in 
glorious detail.  But you're not here to buy a book. You want to 
know what it takes to win - against impossible odds.   
Alan Bond once told me once that trying to win the America's Cup 
was like climbing a mountain that is never been climbed before.   
But it was much harder than that. 
It was more like catching a rare butterfly. A big white butterfly.  
And then taming it. And riding it. That is what it felt like at the 
helm of Australia II.  
That amazing sailing machine was created by my good mate Ben 
Lexcen.   
 
Ben enters, looking a little lost. 
 
JOHN -- As you know Ben passed away a while ago.  At the funeral 
I found myself wondering... what would Ben say to… whoever it is 
that meets us at that last port of call…  
   9
Ben looks at the audience. 
 
BEN -- Is this it then, the last drop of the anchor? 
 
JOHN -- ...how would he explain…? 
 
BEN -- I'm done? 
 
JOHN -- ... what he did? 
 
BEN –  Oh, I …well, I designed the boat that won the America's 
Cup. 
 
JOHN -- ... And why he did it? 
 
BEN – Beats me. 
 
JOHN – And you probably heard about another old mate of 
mine….   
 
We hear the loud slam of a dungeon door resonating away into 
distant echo and lights come up on Alan Bond. 
 
JOHN -- ... I can well imagine what he’d say. 
 
ALAN – I'm Pissed Off!   
 
BEN – I’m not sure why. 
 
ALAN --  I’m not saying I shouldn’t be here. If they see fit to put 
me in jail for losing shareholders' money so be it.  
 
BEN – I don’t think I had a choice. 
 
ALAN -- That is not what I'm pissed off about. I’m talking about 
my medal!  
 
JOHN -- When something like that happens,…  
 
ALAN -- My Order of Australia.  For winning the America's Cup.   
 
JOHN --... You can't help wondering...   10
 
BEN – It is what I was born to do. 
 
ALAN -- They took it back! 
 
JOHN --... Was it worth it? 
 
BEN – It nearly killed me. 
 
ALAN -- As if it never happened. 
 
JOHN – But it was. 
ALAN - But it did.  
 
JOHN -- I know it was worth it. 
 
ALAN -- I won it! 
 
JOHN -- But how to explain … 
 
ALAN -- I had what it takes. 
 
JOHN -- The will... 
ALAN -- The will. 
 
BEN --   How do I start? 
 
JOHN -- The drive.... 
ALAN - The drive. 
   
JOHN --... where it comes from... 
 
ALAN -- You have to believe in yourself.   
 
JOHN -- ... the need… 
 
ALAN -- I always had that.   
 
A cockney teacher shouts. 
 
TEACHER -- Oy!  Alan Bond!  You come back here, you little brat! 
   11
BEN – Well,… 
 
ALAN -- (a sly child) You won't catch me!   
 
BEN -- I took my first breath in a bush camp near Boggabri,  
 
JOHN -- For me it begins…  
 
ALAN -- I'm going to Australia! 
 
BEN --  next to the Condamine River.  
 
JOHN -- with a toy boat...  
 
ALAN -- And I'm going to be rich.   
 
JOHN --  in the shallows of Port Phillip Bay... 
 
BEN -- Once, when the river was flooding,...  
 
We hear Frank Miller's voice. 
 
FRANK -- Hold on Bob. 
 
BEN -- ... my dad tried to carry me across... (remembering) I'm 
holding on dad. 
 
FRANK -- Hold on tighter, son.  The current's getting stronger. 
 
BEN -- I'm trying dad... 
 
FRANK -- Tighter, Bob, tighter son! 
 
BEN -- I can't!   
 
FRANK -- Bob!! 
 
BEN -- Sorry dad…!  And off I went, splish splash!  Swept away 
down the mighty Condamine.  
 
ALAN -- I hated it when I got here. 
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JOHN --  \ 
BEN --     /  The water felt like a cradle. 
 
ALAN -- The heat, the flies…  
 
BEN -- They found me on /the sand…  
 
ALAN -- …/the sand. 
 
BEN -- …half a mile downstream. 
 
ALAN -- I thought "my godfather…  
 
BEN -- Dad! 
 
ALAN --  …where am I?!" 
 
FRANK -- It is all right son, I've got you. 
 
ALAN -- But I soon learned to recognise opportunity when I saw 
it. 
 
BEN -- I was seven when I saw it.   
(As young Ben, in wonder) What's that dad? 
 
FRANK -- What's what, son? 
 
BEN -- That heuuuge dam. 
 
FRANK -- That is not a dam, you stupid little bastard. 
 
DOREEN -- (also a voice-over, lush and deep and beautiful) Don't 
be cross with him Frank, he doesn't know. That is the sea, Bobby. 
 
BEN -- The sea.   
 
JOHN -- When I was 12...  
 
BEN --What's that driving on it? 
 
JOHN -- My dad bought me my first real boat. 
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DOREEN – It is a boat.  And a boat doesn't drive, Bobby.  It sails.  
Isn't it beautiful. 
 
BEN -- That is when I started drawing boats. 
 
JOHN -- My very own VJ,... 
 
BEN -- Dad left us high and dry in Newcastle, 
 
JOHN -- … almost as fast as a Flying Dutchman. 
 
BEN -- and I never saw him again.  As for Mum...  
 
A kid calls out. 
 
KID -- Hey, Bobby Miller…. 
 
BEN -- well, I didn't see a lot of her either... 
 
KID -- … your mum's a slag! 
 
BEN -- No she's not! 
 
KID -- She roots American sailors!  (Kid runs away laughing.) 
 
BEN -- Maybe that is why I wanted to beat the Yanks.  Get my own 
back. 
                /When I was 13… 
 
JOHN --  /When I was 13 I was State Junior Champion. 
 
BEN --  …I left school  
 
ALAN -- I started my own business /when I was 16.  
 
BEN --                                               /When I was 16 I designed and 
built my own boat. A bright yellow Comet. 
 
ALAN --          When I was... twenty one 
JOHN -- (simultaneously)  When I was... twenty       /two 
BEN --              When I was... twenty               /three  
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ALAN --          I'd... 
JOHN -- (simultaneously)  I'd... 
BEN --              I designed a Flying Dutchman. 
 
JOHN -- ... won three National Championships... 
 
ALAN -- ... made my first million. 
 
Alan arrives in the office.  This time he sits behind the desk. 
 
ALAN -- Business was booming and my acquisitions were 
increasing exponentially.  
 
Bill Lucas and Warren Jones enter the office. 
 
WARREN -- /Mr Bond... 
LUCAS --     \Mr Bond... 
 
ALAN -- (still to the audience) I acquired all sorts of things. 
 
LUCAS --... you have a couple of farms I'm interested in buying. 
 
ALAN -- Property… 
 
WARREN --... I have a business I'm interested in selling. 
 
ALAN -- Businesses … 
 
LUCAS -- Unfortunately I don't have the ready cash right at the 
moment... 
 
ALAN -- All sorts of stuff. 
 
LUCAS -- But I do have a truly beautiful boat. 
 
ALAN -- A boat? 
 
LUCAS -- The Panamuna. She's the Queen of the fleet at the Royal 
Perth Yacht Club. 
 
WARREN -- That sounds like a good deal. 
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ALAN -- You reckon? 
 
WARREN -- Yacht clubs are full of business contacts, Mr Bond. 
 
ALAN -- You know a bit about boats? 
 
WARREN -- I know a bit about everything, Mr Bond. 
 
ALAN -- What's your name? 
 
WARREN -- Jones, Mr Bond.  Warren Jones. 
 
ALAN -- Listen, Warren, I've got a deal going with the Iranians.  
They want live sheep.  God only knows why. And frankly, I'd 
rather not.  But a lot of the sheep are getting sick on the way over 
there and the Iranians won't pay for sick sheep so we end up 
dumping half the cargo into the Arabian Gulf.  You sort it out for 
me and I'll buy your business.  (To Lucas) And I'll take that boat 
as well. 
 
WARREN -- And be sure to join the club, Mr Bond. 
 
Two yacht club Commodores pop up at the helm of the yacht. 
 
COMMODORE 1 -- Oh no, no, no, no.  Even if he has bought 
                                    /the Panamuna. 
 
COMMODORE 2 --  /The Panamuna is a fine boat.  But he's still 
not... 
 
COMMODORE 1 --   ... he's just not... 
 
WARREN -- What you want to be is...  
 
COMMODORE 1 -- \ 
COMMODORE 2 -- ...  a member of the club. 
            WARREN -- / 
 
Warren leaves. Ben approaches Alan. 
 
COMMODORE 2 -- Not the right sort at all. 
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BEN -- Mr Bond? 
 
COMMODORE 1 -- Not for the Royal Perth Yacht Club. 
 
ALAN – Yes? 
 
COMMODORE 2 -- The Panamuna might well be the biggest in the 
fleet... 
 
BEN – I hear you want a fast boat... 
 
ALAN – Not just fast.... 
 
COMMODORE 1 -- But Rolly Tasker sails... 
 
ALAN – I want 
 
COMMODORE 1 – ) 
COMMODORE 2 -- )  ... the fastest boat in the Royal Perth Yacht 
Club. ALAN    -- ) 
 
The Commodores leave.   
James Hardy approaches John. 
 
ALAN – Have you got a boat that fast? 
 
HARDY – Are you John Bertrand? 
 
BEN – Nope.   
 
JOHN – I am. 
 
BEN – I've got a real pretty picture though.  (He shows Alan his 
design) 
 
ALAN – Will it beat /Rolly Tasker? 
 
HARDY -- /Rolly Tasker tells me you're a good sailor on a fast 
boat. 
 
BEN – She'll beat anything with sails. 
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JOHN – You're Gentleman Jim Hardy. 
 
ALAN – How much will it cost? 
 
HARDY – Frank Packer wants to take another crack at the cup in 
1970. 
 
BEN – A hundred grand, give or take. 
 
JOHN – Which cup? 
 
HARDY – There's only one, lad. 
 
ALAN – Better be bloody fast then. 
 
BEN – She will be.  
 
JOHN – Got a boat? 
 
HARDY – Can't sail without a boat.  Gretel II.  She's a beauty. 
 
JOHN – Will she win? 
 
HARDY – Why don't you come and check her out. 
 
Ben, John and Hardy leave. 
 
*** 
 
ALAN – (to audience) Benny built me the Apollo.  And she beat 
the pants off Rolly Tasker and the snobs at the Royal Perth Yacht 
Club and I enjoyed it so much I took Ben and his boat to New 
York for a real boat race.  The Newport to Bermuda. 
 
Alan wanders around the hull. 
 
ALAN -- Next to where we docked the Apollo in New York, there 
was a beautiful looking boat I went over to have a look at.  And 
that is where it all began. 
 
Vic Romagna, wearing a Commodore's hat, pops his head up. 
   18
VIC -- Who the hell are you? 
 
ALAN – G'day!  I'm Alan Bond from Australia.  Who the hell are 
you? 
 
VIC -- I'm Commodore Victorio Romagna, from the New York 
Yacht Club, now get your fat arse off this boat.  How'd you like me 
to come and shove my face in your living room window?! 
 
ALAN -- I was only having a gander at ... 
 
VIC – You're trespassing, you cheating Aussie bastard, get the 
fuck off my boat before I call the cops. 
 
ALAN -- (backing off) Fuck you too, I'd bet I could buy and sell 
you 10 times over! 
 
Vic leaves.  Alan crosses to Ben. 
John steps up to the helm, as if for the first time. 
 
ALAN -- Jesus, Benny, what got up his jumper? 
 
BEN -- He probably thought you were spying for Gretel II.  
 
ALAN -- Gretel who? 
 
JOHN -- I was 22 when I stepped on board Gretel II…my 
               /first Australian challenger 
 
BEN  --  /The Australian challenger for the Cup.   
 
ALAN -- What cup? 
 
BEN -- The America's Cup. 
 
ALAN -- What's that?  
 
BEN -- What's that…?!  Bondy, mate, it is like sailing's version of 
the Ashes.  
 
JOHN -- I felt I was following the call of my seafaring heritage. 
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BEN -- Every sailor's wet dream is winning the America's Cup. It 
started in 1851 as some sort of goodwill race between the Poms 
and the Yanks.  Which the Yanks won, so Queen Victoria gave 'em 
the cup.  The whole bloody world's been trying to win it back off 
them ever since.  But nobody ever has. 
 
JOHN -- My great-grandfather helped to build the boats that Sir 
Thomas Lipton challenged with. 
 
BEN --  The Lipton teabags guy tried for 30 years. Five different 
times.  Each time in a boat called Shamrock.  But he never got 
lucky. 
 
ALAN -- Can anyone challenge? 
 
BEN -- Anyone with a 12 metre boat and a club to back him.  But 
before you can sail against the Yanks, you have to win the 
challenger's trials, and this year... 
 
JOHN -- In 1970... 
 
BEN --... there's us Aussies... 
 
John takes a position to the back and side of the helm. 
 
JOHN -- …the only other challenger was a French boat, 
 
BEN –... and that French bloke that makes the ballpoint pens. 
 
JOHN -- Financed and skippered by the impeccable Baron Bich. 
 
Baron Bich, proud and resplendent with white gloves and a long 
cigarette holder appears at the helm of his yacht. 
 
ALAN -- What are our chances? 
 
BEN -- I reckon we'll beat the frogs easily enough.   
 
BB –  Alle, alle! Toute suite! 
 
ALAN -- But we won't beat the Yanks? 
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BEN -- No one's done it yet. 
 
ALAN -- Is it possible? 
 
BEN -- Could be.  With the right boat and the right crew and a 
truckload of money.  You interested? 
 
ALAN -- (looks back at where he had the fight with Vic) Lets talk 
about it on the way to Bermuda. 
 
Ben and Alan leave. 
 
JOHN -- In our first three races we beat the French hands down.  
 
Baron Bich reacts to being thrashed with a chain of French 
expletives. 
 
JOHN -- Then in the fourth race... 
 
Baron Bich tries to peer through the fog, waving it out of his eyes 
and coughing. 
 
JOHN -- The Baron got lost in the fog... 
 
BB – Sacre Bleu!!  Where the merde are we?!! 
 
JOHN -- And had to be towed back to port. 
 
Baron Bich leaves the helm, grumbling in more French expletives. 
 
JOHN -- So we won the trials, which made us feel pretty good… 
 
The crew of Gretel II appear looking smart and efficient, James 
Hardy at the helm and John as port trimmer (on the left). 
 
JOHN -- … until... 
 
HARDY – There she is gentlemen... on starboard... 
 
The crew turn right to look across at Intrepid. 
 
JOHN -- ... our first real America's Cup race - against Intrepid.   21
 
HARDY -- ... the boat we're here to beat.  By God, she's coming up 
fast. 
 
JOHN -- I think we'd better tack. 
 
HARDY -- She won't try and cross our bow this close at that 
speed. 
 
JOHN -- Why not? 
 
HARDY -- It wouldn't be sports... man... like, dear God she is!  This 
is outrageous!  Paul, when you get a chance, hoist the protest flag.  
Gentlemen, we are tacking the boat!  Paul, you damn fool, I said 
when you get a chance, don't do it while we're tacking the... 
 
PAUL -- (off) Aaaagh!! 
 
VOICE -- (off) Man overboard! 
 
HARDY -- Oh Christ!  We'll have to go back!  Drop the spinnaker!   
 
JOHN -- I don't think we can. 
 
HARDY -- Why not, for God's sake? 
 
JOHN -- I think it is tangled. 
 
HARDY -- Christ!  Untangle the spinnaker!  But watch out for... 
 
VOICE -- (off) Aaaagh!! 
 
ANOTHER VOICE -- (off) Man overboard! Again. 
 
Crew freezes. 
 
JOHN -- We lost the first race under protest and the New York 
Yacht Club treated our complaint... 
 
HARDY -- (smarting)... like a patronising headmaster dealing with 
a bunch of naughty schoolboys.  
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JOHN -- So we weren't going to let them get the better of us in the 
second. 
 
Crew goes to work. 
 
HARDY -- Nicely timed, boys.  I make it 2 1/2 minutes to the 
starting gun and at this rate we'll cross the line in perfect time.   
 
JOHN – Intrepid's trying to squeeze us up to the committee boat.   
 
HARDY -- Steady as she goes. 
 
JOHN -- I think they're going to lee-bow us.  We'll have to tack. 
 
HARDY -- (stubborn) Steady as she goes. 
 
JOHN -- They're coming up under our bow. 
 
HARDY -- Damn them!  I'm not going to let them... 
 
There is a terrible crunching sound and everybody lurches forward. 
 
JOHN -- That was how we collided with the American boat. (Big 
splash) And our bow fell off. 
 
HARDY -- Oh shit. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) This time the Americans protested.  And 
won.  In the end... 
 
The America's Cup cannon fires. 
The crew slump. 
 
JOHN --... we lost the 1970 America's Cup.  Four races to one. 
 
The crew disperses. 
Hardy joins John 
 
HARDY -- Let this be a lesson to you, John lad. If they can't beat 
you on the water, they'll sure as hell beat you in the committee 
room. 
   23
Lights 
*** 
 
Alan and Warren in the office. 
 
WARREN -- Alan, we need to talk. 
 
ALAN -- Warren, how are you?  Before you start... 
 
WARREN -- Alan, the cash flow situation is... 
 
ALAN -- Warren, I appreciate your concern but you don't have 
to... 
 
WARREN -- This latest rate rise is going to raise our debt level… 
 
ALAN – Warren, Warren? Since when did we start worrying 
about carrying debt? 
 
WARREN -- Are you aware of the debt to equity ratio we're 
carrying at the moment? 
 
ALAN -- Warren, there's a ratio I like better - it is the debt to 
terror ratio - the bigger the debt, the more bloody terrified they 
are of calling it in.   
 
WARREN -- We're not that big yet, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Don't worry, Warren, we will be.  I've just bought out 
Taylor Woodrow's share of Yanchep. 
 
WARREN -- Yanchep? 
 
ALAN -- The Wydgee property. 
 
WARREN -- We needed Taylor Woodrow to pay for that 
development… 
 
ALAN -- No way, Warren.  It is too sweet a deal to let anyone else 
get a share. 
 
WARREN -- How much are you paying for it?   24
 
ALAN -- 1 1/2 million. 
 
WARREN – Where are we going to get...? 
 
ALAN -- I had the land revalued and Commercial Bank of Sydney 
gave me a couple of million based on my current equity in the 
property. 
 
WARREN -- 1 1/2 million?  For 10,000 godforsaken acres of semi-
arid scrub. 
 
ALAN -- 16 kilometres of glittering beachfront, Warren! 
 
WARREN -- Windblown sandhills... 
 
ALAN -- Warren!  That is no way to talk about Yanchep Sun City. 
 
Lights 
 
Ben approaches John. 
 
BEN -- John Bertrand? 
 
JOHN -- Bob Miller?  We met at the Olympics back in '68… 
 
BEN -- Actually I've changed my name, mate.  I'm Ben Lexcen 
now. 
 
JOHN -- Really?  Doesn't your family mind? 
 
BEN -- I haven't got one, mate. (beat) Listen, I'm designing a boat 
for the 1974 challenge for the America's Cup.  Wondered if you'd 
like to join the crew. 
 
JOHN -- You know I was port trimmer on Gretel II. 
 
BEN -- Don't worry mate, we won't hold that against you.  Alan 
wants you on the team. 
 
JOHN -- Alan who? 
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BEN -- Alan Bond.  He's the bloke with the money. 
 
JOHN – Does he know the odds against winning 
 
BEN -- I think he likes them.   
 
Lights 
Alan walks up to a microphone, a pipe band plays God Save the 
Queen at a distance. 
 
ALAN -- Giday ladies and gentlemen! Welcome to Yanchep Sun 
City! I'm very proud to welcome the Governor and the Premier 
here today for the launch of Bond Corporation's America's Cup 
challenge.  And it is a challenge I intend to win.  In 1977 the 
America's Cup will be held right here, at Yanchep Sun City, 
Australia's own Cote d'Azur.  By 1977, there will be a hovercraft 
ferry service linking Yanchep to Perth, a Grand Prix circuit and a 
new Disneyland.  Thousands of people are already lining up for 
the next land release, so if you're looking for your place in the 
sun, you'd better get in quick. 
 
JOURNALIST -- Mr Bond, Mr Bond! 
 
ALAN -- Yes? 
 
JOURNALIST -- Mr Bond... no-one's beaten the Americans to the 
America's Cup, ever, for over a century.  What makes you think 
you can? 
 
ALAN -- Because we have the best boat and the finest crew that 
money can buy.  Thank you, that is all.  
 
Lights 
 
Ben addresses the audience. 
 
BEN -- The boat I built for our first challenge in '74 was the 
Southern Cross.  And Alan made John Cuneo the skipper. 
 
John Cuneo, short and aggressive, prepares to address the crew 
who assemble (including Ben) on and around a bench in front of 
him.   26
 
BEN -- (he turns to speak to the audience) John was a brilliant 
sailor, and a very smart bloke, but, bless him, he wasn't very good 
with people. 
 
CUNEO -- Take a seat gentlemen or stand up, I don't mind, so long 
as you shut up, listen and do as you're told.   
 
BEN -- (to the audience) Like a lot of smart blokes... 
 
CUNEO -- Now then, what's the trick to winning the America's 
Cup... ? 
 
BEN -- ... He thought the rest of us were a bit stupid. 
 
CREW -- (a well-trained chorus) Out-think them. 
 
CUNEO -- ... out-think them! As well as out-sail them! So let's 
begin with the pre-start.  I want you to imagine you're racing for 
the cup.  Here's the course… 
 
He unfurls a map of the America's Cup course indicating the six legs 
of the course and the direction of the wind.  Each leg is marked; 
first, second, third etc. 
There are two boat icons, represented as being behind the starting 
line, one indicating sails on a starboard tack, the other on a port 
tack.  Dotted lines indicate that they are on a collision course.   
 
CUNEO -- Here we are at the prestart.  We're sailing into the wind 
on a starboard tack. So you see, there's the boom and the little 
sails sticking out of our boat (on our starboard side).  And here's 
the enemy on port tack, with their little sails sticking out (on 
their port side)… a both boats have reached the layline for the 
start.  Lexcen, layline? 
 
BEN --  Sorry...? 
 
CUNEO -- Come on son, even you must know what the layline is. 
 
BEN -- Oh, right, sorry... the final line of approach to the next 
mark. 
   27
During the following Cuneo turns away from his audience to look 
at the chart and the crew start to sneak away, eventually leaving 
Ben by himself. 
 
CUNEO -- So we're heading in this direction and the enemy's 
going in this direction - the smart ones among you will have 
noticed that the two boats are on a collision course!  Now, let's 
begin with the question -- who has to give way?  Us, on starboard 
tack, or them, on port? 
 
He turns to discover that only Ben is left. 
 
CUNEO -- Wha...Wha... where did they go? 
 
BEN -- I think they all had work to do. 
 
CUNEO -- We'll see about that!  (He heads off, calling.) Alan! 
 
BEN -- If you're after Bondy, he's not here. 
 
CUNEO -- Well, where the hell is he? 
 
BEN -- Gone to pick up Bertrand from the airport. 
 
Lights 
 
Alan greets John. 
 
ALAN -- Giday, John!  I'm Alan Bond, how are you?  Before you 
start, I've got the Rolls parked down the street, I'll show you 
some of the sites of Perth on the way. (They walk ) Look, see that 
building over there?  That is Exchange House, I own that.  And 
there's International House, I own that to.  And across the river 
over there, see, is Windsor Towers, I own that too... and... and I 
own…   
 
Alan becomes preoccupied with trying to remember a complete list 
of his assets. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) Driving north to Yanchep took us through 
endless rolling sandhills. I was just beginning to wonder if a 
burnoosed Arab wasn't going to come trotting into view on a   28
camel, when Alan parked the car and we climbed up to the top of 
a sandhill... and from the top, for as far as I could see...the hills 
were suddenly green!   
 
ALAN -- There she is - Yanchep Sun City! Location of the 1977 
America's Cup, and if all goes to plan, the 1988 Olympic games.  
(But keep that under you're hat for now.) 
 
JOHN -- Is that grass?  Have you put in irrigation? 
 
ALAN -- Nah!  Green paint, bitumen and grass seeds.  Looks 
fantastic in the brochures!  Let's go to the boat shed and meet the 
crew.  They're the best most experienced bunch of sailors in the 
country.  You know Cuneo don't you.  He seems to know what 
he's doing. 
 
John Cuneo and the crew assemble. 
Cuneo is holding two sailing ropes. 
 
CUNEO -- Now then boys, watch and listen.  This is a complex 
operation.  You probably think you already know how to tie a 
knot but... 
 
ALAN – 'Scuse me everybody. You all know John Bertrand, don't 
you. John's our new tactician. Looks like everything's going 
brilliantly.  (He gives them the thumbs up) Good work.  Keep it up. 
Gotta go. Things to see to. 
 
Alan leaves. The others greet John.  
 
CUNEO --  Save the greetings until after I am finished, thank you.  
Since Mr Bertrand is to be our tactician, perhaps we should 
introduce him to the course.  Once a day, Bertrand, we take a sail 
around the America's Cup course.  You might wonder how, since 
we are 18,000 miles away from Newport, Rhode Island.  What's 
the answer, boys....? 
 
CREW -- (chorus, not enthusiastic) One leg at a time. 
 
CUNEO -- One leg at a time! 
 
Lights.   29
 
Alan arrives back in the office. 
 
WARREN -- Alan... 
 
ALAN -- Warren, before you start, we need to organise transport 
to Newport... 
 
WARREN – Our issued capital currently sits at half a million 
dollars. 
 
ALAN -- I know, I know... 
 
WARREN – While our liabilities are heading towards 50 million... 
 
ALAN -- I know, we've got a bit of a cash flow problem... 
 
WARREN -- It is no longer a problem, Alan, it is a fucking crisis! 
 
ALAN -- Warren, don't exaggerate, our property holdings are... 
 
WARREN – We're mortgaged up to our eyeballs!  We've 
mortgaged the mortgages on our mortgages. 
 
ALAN -- The blocks at Yanchep... 
 
WARREN -- Are not selling, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- No, but when we win the cup... 
 
WARREN -- Alan, how are we going to win the cup if we can't 
even afford to send the crew to Newport, let alone the boat! 
 
ALAN -- Warren, have faith. 
 
WARREN -- The boys on the floor at the Sydney stock exchange 
are holding a sweepstake.  Did you know that? 
 
ALAN -- The Sydney stock exchange is a bloody sweepstake, what 
are you talking about? 
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WARREN -- The closest estimate to the date when Bond 
Corporation collapses, wins the pot.  Not if it collapses, mind you, 
but when. 
 
ALAN -- Don't you worry about those defeatist bastards, Warren.  
You wait till they see me on the telly.  Drinking champers with the 
Vanderbilts and the Rockefellers.  Representing Australia on the 
world stage.  They can't pull the pin on us now.  It'd make the 
whole country look bad.  
 
WARREN -- Alan, you won't be doing any of that if you can't 
afford to... 
 
ALAN -- It is not what you can afford, Warren, it is what they 
think you can afford.  It is all about perception, Warren. Sorry 
mate, got to go.  Press conference. 
 
Lights 
 
CUNEO -- (following the route on the map with a pointer) Once 
across the starting line we start the first windward leg, which we 
call...? 
 
CREW -- (chorus, embarrassed) Struggle street. 
 
CUNEO -- Struggle street!  The Newport Howler never fails to 
arrive after the firing of the 10 minute gun and the tacking is 
always harder than you expect.  Especially on starboard. Then 
down we go into the first power reach, spinnaker up, with the 
wind on the beam.  If the enemy's covered you all the way up the 
first leg, the second leg is your chance to get out from under.  And 
if you don't manage it down the second leg, there's always the 
third leg -- power reach number two -- the test of our spinnaker 
skills.  If they've still got you covered, the fourth leg becomes...? 
 
CREW -- (deeply reluctant chorus) The leg of despond. 
 
CUNEO -- (turning) The leg of despond! 
 
Lights. 
 
Alan enters the press conference.   31
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press... 
 
BEN -- This was 1974.  Not too many ladies in the press corps in 
those days. 
 
ALAN – ... all I need to tell you is - we have the boat, we have the 
crew and we have the technology.  The America's Cup is in the 
bag.  First we'll annihilate the French, then we'll beat the 
Americans!  Thank you, that is all. 
 
Alan leaves the press conference  
The rest of the crew (including Ben) assemble around Cuneo. 
 
CUNEO -- So much for the fifth leg blues.  Now for the perils of the 
final windward leg, where, for the last 123 years, every 
challenger's hopes of taking the America's cup have finally been 
dashed. (Turning) Remember that feeling Bertrand? I believe 
you've had the... Blast that Bertrand, where the hell's he gone 
now?! 
 
Elsewhere, Alan bumps into John. 
 
JOHN -- Bondy, I need to talk. 
 
BEN -- I think he's gone to resign. 
 
ALAN -- John!  How are you?!  Before you start, I just have to go 
and... 
 
JOHN -- I'm resigning. 
 
CUNEO -- Good riddance!  I never liked his attitude from the 
moment he got here. 
 
Lights down on Cuneo.   
Lights stay up on Ben. 
 
ALAN -- I see.   
 
Alan puts his arm over John's shoulder and they go for a little walk.  
   32
BEN -- (to audience) But you shouldn't take too much for granted 
when you're dealing with the greatest salesman in the world. 
 
ALAN -- Why don't you tell me what the trouble is? 
 
JOHN -- I can't work with Cuneo, Alan.  I'm sorry, I'm sure he's a 
decent bloke but... 
 
ALAN -- John!  John!  I understand... listen...  
 
They continue their walk off. 
 
Lights back up on Cuneo and crew. Alan and John join them. 
Alan addresses the crew. 
 
ALAN -- Boys, a moment.  After an amicable chat John Bertrand 
has decided to stay on.  As our mainsheet hand.  Which is just as 
important a job as tactician, isn't it, Cunesy? 
 
Cuneo nods. 
 
ALAN -- And how is our Southern Cross looking against the trial 
horses, Cunesy? 
 
CUNEO -- We beat them consistently, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Good stuff.   
 
JOHN -- But that is because you always put the best sails on the 
Southern Cross so she can't lose.  What sort of trial is that? 
 
ALAN -- Is that true? 
 
CUNEO -- Rubbish! 
 
ALAN -- Anyone else? 
 
The rest of the crew shrug sheepishly. 
 
ALAN -- Cunesy, mate, a word in your shell-like... 
 
CUNEO -- Look, we've wasted enough time already...   33
 
ALAN –   I once read that when Napoleon was starting to lose a 
few battles he took his best General, stood him in front of his 
troops and shot him.  And after that they started winning battles 
again.   
 
CUNEO -- I don't know what you're talking about... 
 
ALAN -- I was afraid you wouldn't.  Let me put it another way; 
you're fired. 
 
Lights.  
 
 Alan walks back to the office where Warren is waiting. 
 
WARREN -- Alan... 
 
ALAN -- Warren, before you start I need to make a couple of 
calls... 
 
Alan dials the phone. 
 
WARREN -- There are four sets of interest payments due on 
Friday. We've already had three extensions and the banks won't 
give us any more. I'm sorry, Alan, I really am, but we have no 
choice. We have to cancel the challenge. 
 
ALAN -- Warren, mate, I've got two words for you: Robe River. 
 
Pause. 
 
WARREN -- The ore company? 
 
ALAN -- The iron ore company.  (Into the phone.) Moira?  Alan 
Bond.  How are you, before you start, is Gentleman Jim at home? 
 
WARREN -- We can't... 
 
ALAN -- We can Warren.  (Into the phone.) Thanks love.  
 
WARREN -- What with??! 
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ALAN -- I paid the deposit out of my own funds.  150 grand. 
 
WARREN -- How does that solve our cash flow crisis? 
 
ALAN -- Now they're going to buy us.  
 
WARREN -- ? 
 
ALAN -- Reverse takeover.  They get Bond Corporation, lock stock 
and barrel, for 25 million, in full, by September. 
 
WARREN -- The Robe River board won't go for that. 
 
ALAN -- Don't have any choice.  Mineral Securities has a 
controlling interest. 
 
WARREN -- Mineral Securities are being liquidated. 
 
ALAN -- By Jim Jameson from Coopers & Lybrand.  We had a chat, 
and he's agreed to a $25 million buyout.  So, on the strength of 
that, Warren, I reckon you should be able to drum up enough 
credit to get the crew to Newport, don't you?  (Phone) Ah, Captain 
Hardy!  How are you, before you start, I've got a little proposition 
for you... 
 
*** 
 
The two New York yacht club commadores, Bob McCulloch and Vic 
Romagna arrive in the boardroom to hold a meeting.  They shake 
hands. 
 
VIC -- Commodore McCulloch.   
 
BOB -- How are you, Victor? 
 
BOB -- Shall I officiate? 
 
VIC – Please. 
 
BOB -- The tactics committee of the strategic subcommittee of the 
America's Cup defence committee of the New York Yacht Club is   35
now in session.  Commodore Robert McCulloch presiding, Vice-
Commodore Victor Romagna also present. 
 
Alan arrives for a press conference. 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, I said we would beat the French 
and we have done so, hands down. 
 
BOB -- What do you make of the Australian? 
 
ALAN -- Now we are closing in for the kill.  
 
VIC -- Arrogant, boorish, ill mannered little toad.   
 
ALAN -- The America's Cup is ours for the taking. 
 
VIC -- Made his money speculating. Wouldn't know a jib from a 
jibe.   
 
ALAN -- The Americans have accused us of turning the cup into a 
commercial enterprise.   
 
VIC --  His only reason for being here is to get attention for some 
grubby real estate deal he's got happening somewhere back of 
the boon-docks, down-under. 
 
ALAN --  Well, the "old money" people can look down their noses 
at my challenge if they want to, but the reason I want you all to 
know about Yanchep Sun City is only so you know where to go 
for the next America's Cup!  
 
BOB -- The press seem to think he can win. 
 
ALAN -- And just to make sure we win… 
 
VIC -- The press wouldn't know if their nuts were on fire.  
 
ALAN --  I've decided to join the crew myself. 
 
The Australian crew take their positions.  Hardy takes the helm.  
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Treharne, as tactician stands to his right. John, as mainsheet hand, 
stands by the mast. Chink takes his position at one of the winch 
grinders, Alan takes his position at the other.  
 
ALAN -- Take a good look at the opposition boys; you won't be 
seeing them again, they'll be too far behind us!   
 
HARDY -- (through binoculars) Who's that kid at the helm, Hugh? 
 
HUGH -- Dennis Conner.   
 
ALAN -- I have already checked him out. He's an arrogant little 
smartarse. 
 
HUGH -- He's ruthless and a genius at timing the start.   
 
ALAN -- Don't worry about him!  We'll wipe the smug smile off 
his face soon enough, eh, boys? 
 
HARDY -- We'll do what we can, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Hope you can keep up with me on the winches Chink, 
mate. 
 
CHINK -- I'll do my best, Alan. 
 
Chink shares a look with John.  Checks his watch. 
 
CHINK -- 10 minute gun. 
 
The 10 minute gun fires. 
 
HARDY -- Sheet on, gentlemen. 
 
The crew go to work raising the mainsheet and then freeze. 
 
ALAN -- (to audience) The important thing about the prestart 
manoeuvers is getting your timing right.  Each boat wants to be 
ready to cross the line as soon as the starting gun fires, and if that 
means getting in the other boat's way, so much the better.  The 
starting line runs between the America's Cup buoy over... (looks 
for the buoy) over there, and the committee boat, over there.    37
They always put the line at right angles to the wind.  So you 
always have to sail across it into the wind on a port or starboard 
tack. 
 
The crew go to work. 
 
HARDY -- Where is he, Hugh? 
 
HUGH -- On our leeward hip, skipper. (Up stage left) We've got 
him covered. 
 
The crew freeze. 
 
ALAN -- When the other boat is leeward, it means they're 
downwind of you, so if you're sailing into the wind, that means 
you're in front and you've "got a cover on them", in other words 
you're blocking their wind.  Any wind they do get is all chopped 
up. Sailors call it "giving them your dirty air".  And the only way 
for the enemy to get out of your "dirty air" is to tack away, 
sacrificing speed and distance.  
 
The crew go to work. 
 
HUGH -- Courageous is tacking, Jim. Do you want to cover him? 
 
The crew freeze. 
Alan demonstrates with his hands. 
 
ALAN -- ... and the best way to stay ahead of them is to tack with 
them and keep them covered, so they're still stuck with your 
dirty air. 
 
The crew go to work. 
 
HARDY -- How are we on the line? 
 
HUGH -- Pretty good.  A couple of seconds to spare. 
 
HARDY -- Let's go for it.  Tacking the boat! 
 
 The starting gun fires. 
The crew move in slow motion.   38
 
ALAN -- There goes the starting gun.  And we're winning already.  
It is like I said.  All you need is a halfway decent crew, a fast boat 
and a bit of Aussie know-how.  This is going to be a cinch, boys! 
 
HUGH -- There's activity on Courageous.  I think they're going to 
tack again.   
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) The helmsman has to concentrate on 
steering his own boat, so he needs a tactician to watch what the 
enemy's doing.   
 
The crew goes back to work. 
 
HUGH -- They're coming back at us. 
 
JOHN -- Christ. 
 
ALAN -- What?  What's happening? 
 
CHINK -- They're going to try to lee-bow us. 
 
ALAN -- (to audience) To lee-bow someone is...um... hang on.  (To 
Chink) What's that? 
 
Chink explains using his hands, flat and vertical, thumbs 
representing sails . 
 
CHINK -- We're here (the right), they're there (left, to the rear), 
they're going to get in underneath our bow, tack back, slide in 
front of us and steal our wind. 
 
ALAN -- But if he misjudges his tack he could.... 
 
CHINK -- He could collide with us (illustrates with his hands) and 
he'd be disqualified.  But once he's crossed our bow he gets right 
of way, so if we sail into him... 
 
ALAN -- We get disqualified. 
 
CHINK -- Unless we tack or duck his stern and let him pass. 
   39
HARDY -- We have to squeeze up higher and pick up enough 
speed to stop him getting under our bow.  John, how's the wind 
looking to weather. 
 
Alan looks leeward. 
 
CHINK -- (to Alan) Weather is that way, Alan, where the wind's 
coming from. 
 
ALAN -- I have sailed on a boat before, thanks Chink.  I was 
keeping my eye on the other bloody boat. 
 
CHINK -- Sorry Alan. 
 
Alan looks to weather. 
 
ALAN -- So let's pick up some steam then, eh cap'n?! 
 
Hardy ignores him. 
 
JOHN -- I can't see anything over there Jim. 
 
HARDY – Then trim the mainsheet, man!  I need another 5°. 
 
JOHN -- Any tighter and she'll stall. 
 
HUGH -- Here they come. 
 
The crew watches horrified as Courageous crosses from the left, 
goes in front of them and then tacks back across. 
 
HUGH –They have successfully lee-bowed us, Jim. 
 
The sails begin to flap. 
 
CHINK -- There goes our wind. 
 
ALAN –Why did we let that happen?! 
 
HUGH -- The American boat points higher and moves faster in the 
water. 
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ALAN -- What do you mean by that? 
 
HUGH -- Their boat's better than our boat, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Who are you again? 
 
HUGH -- Hugh Treharne, I'm the tactician. 
 
ALAN -- Yes, of course, I remember, I remember.  Well, you're not 
any more.  You're fired!  
 
Beat 
 
HUGH -- You want me to leave right away? 
 
ALAN -- Very funny. Captain Hardy? 
 
HARDY -- What? 
 
ALAN -- Did you know that when Napoleon lost a few battles he 
took out his best general... 
 
HARDY -- ... and shot him.  I know, I know.  Do you really think 
that little parable is going to make me want to win this race any 
more than I already do? 
 
ALAN -- Just doing my best to motivate the team.  No offense, 
Cap'n. 
 
HARDY -- Just let me sail the damn boat.    
 
HUGH -- We're going to have to tack, skipper. 
 
HARDY -- Blast and bugger! Tacking the boat! 
 
The crew go to work in slow motion. Alan and Chink grind away at 
the winches. 
Ben is standing to one side watching through binoculars. 
 
BEN --  Courageous slides away downwind and wins the first race 
by five minutes.  
   41
The crew slouch, beaten and exhausted.  Alan, gasping for breath, 
practically collapses. Hardy stays at the helm. 
 
BEN -- She points higher and moves faster.  We're fucked. 
 
John and Hugh in a bar, perhaps a couple of pints of beer. 
 
JOHN -- I'll be sorry to see you go Hughie. 
 
HUGH -- I was only doing my job, John. 
 
JOHN -- I know, Hughie. 
 
HUGH -- A tactician has to... 
 
JOHN --... tell it how he sees it. Of course he does.  Hughie, if I was 
ever to skipper a challenge, I'd be lucky to have a tactician half as 
good as you, mate. 
 
BEN -- Courageous takes the second race by one minute, 11 
seconds. 
 
Alan heads for the telephone.   
 
HUGH -- You don't have a hope against Courageous, John. Not 
with Conner at the helm. 
 
JOHN -- Alan doesn't understand that yet, Hughie.  It is only his 
first race.  He hasn't learnt to read the writing on the water. 
 
ALAN -- (on the phone) John Cuneo?... Cunesy, mate! How would 
you like to come back on board?! 
 
HUGH -- He's in for a big shock when he does. 
 
ALAN -- Don't worry about that Cunesy, mate!  I just sacked 
myself as well! 
 
Alan puts down the phone and joins Ben with a pair of binoculars. 
 
BEN -- Courageous wins the third race 5 1/2 minutes to the good. 
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HUGH – Never mind, John, there's always next time. 
 
JOHN -- Not for me. After a lifetime of dreaming about it, Hughie, 
I've learned the hard truth about challenging for the cup.   
 
BEN -- And Southern Cross just keeps struggling. 
 
JOHN -- Whoever might be standing at the helm, it is the man 
with the money who sails the boat. 
 
ALAN -- (wit is end) Christ almighty, do I have to sack the whole 
damn a lot of them?!! 
 
HUGH –You just have to learn to outmanoeuvre him. 
 
JOHN -- I just want to win at the Olympics.  That is where the real 
champions race. Anyway, he might not challenge again. 
 
HUGH – I think he'll be back. 
 
JOHN -- I think you might be right. 
 
The America's Cup cannon fires for the end of the final race. 
The crew gives up sailing, exhausted and utterly beaten. 
 
BEN – Courageous won the last race by four minutes.   
 
ALAN -- They killed me!   
 
BEN -- It is all over.  I suppose that is something to be grateful for.  
 
ALAN -- They sliced me into pieces and had me for breakfast! 
 
BEN -- Alan, I...  
 
ALAN -- Sorry mate, can't talk right now. I've got to face a press 
conference. 
 
BEN --  It was my fault.  I'm sorry, Alan. I thought I could design 
the perfect challenger on my first go.   
 
ALAN -- Don't worry mate.  We'll give them a run next time, eh?   43
 
BEN -- Not with me Alan.  My competition days are over.    I've got 
a dodgy ticker, mate.  I can't take another year like that. I'm not 
up to it. 
 
ALAN -- Don't worry Benny, you'll feel better in a few weeks. 
We'll catch up back in Sydney and... 
 
BEN -- No we won't, mate.  I'm off to Europe. No one'll touch me 
in Australia anymore.  Not after this fiasco. 
 
ALAN -- Course they will!  You go and spend some time back with 
your family... 
 
BEN -- I don't have a bloody family, Alan, I thought you knew that. 
 
ALAN -- Yes, I did.  Sorry.  Look, you go back to Oz and I'll ring you 
in a month or two and we'll talk about it then, eh? 
 
BEN -- No we won't Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Okay, well I'll ring you anyway and see how you feel 
about it. 
 
BEN -- Alan, mate, it is over!  Okay? 
 
ALAN -- Sure, sure. 
 
BEN -- I mean it. 
 
ALAN -- See how you feel in a month or two... 
 
BEN -- I SAID I MEAN IT!  It is over!  I don't even want to think 
about it ever again.  Roger that, Alan? 
 
ALAN -- Sure, sure.  No worries Ben.  We'll talk later. 
 
BEN – Aaaaaaagh!!   
 
Ben leaves. 
 
ALAN -- (confused) Wonder what got up his pyjamas?   44
 
Alan turns to face the press, fists raised in triumph. 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press.... 
 
PRESS 1 -- Mr Bond, how do you feel about presiding over 
Australia's worst ever America's Cup defeat? 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen... 
 
PRESS 2 -- Mr Bond, do you wish now that you'd spent more time 
sailing and less time bragging? 
 
ALAN -- I haven't... 
 
PRESS 1 -- Mr Bond, is this the last straw for Bond Corporation? 
 
ALAN -- Don't you believe it.  Everybody watching this challenge 
has learnt all about Yanchep Sun City.  And I've learnt a lot about 
the America's Cup.  It isn't just another yacht race.  This is a race 
against the might of America.  We'll be back in '77 and we will 
win.  And for your information, Bond Corporation is very healthy.  
We'll be in receipt of a letter of credit very soon, from a major 
American bank for $100 million, and we will be refinancing all 28 
companies in the Bond Empire, top to bottom. 
 
PRESS -- Mr Bond... 
 
ALAN -- That is all thanks. 
 
Alan crosses to Warren. 
 
WARREN -- What hundred million dollar letter of credit?! 
 
ALAN -- Just playing for time, Warren.  What we need to do now 
is set up another company to organise and manage the challenge 
in '77. 
 
Warren groans. 
 
WARREN -- Why?  Why?! 
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ALAN -- The cachet, Warren! The cachet!  You know what I've 
learnt from this, Warren? Men who want to be rich and powerful 
go to the America's Cup to be with men who are already rich and 
powerful.  To make real money, you have to go where the real 
money lives.  You know what your suntan socialist says about the 
Americas Cup?  "It is just a rich man's hobby".  Well, maybe 
they're right.  But listen to the names, Warren: Sir Thomas Lipton, 
the Earl of Dunraven, Harry Sopwith, the Morgans, the 
Vanderbilts.  Men like that don't just make money, Warren.  They 
make history. 
 
*** 
 
The aisle of a supermarket in Cowes.  Ben with shopping trolley. 
 
BEN -- After the disaster of the '74 challenge, I moved to Cowes, 
to try and get some work designing boats for the jet set.  But 
nobody was interested.  I was in a supermarket, down to my last 
few francs, when, just as I was reaching for a packet of cocoa 
pops, a head popped out from the end of the aisle. 
 
Alan appears. 
 
ALAN – 'Ello Ben! 
 
BEN -- Jesus Christ. 
 
ALAN -- Now then Benny, you know you shouldn't take the Lords 
name in vain.  You've got no money, have you? 
 
BEN -- Yes I have. 
 
ALAN -- No you haven't.  You're flat stony broke.  Aren't you. 
 
BEN -- No I'm not. 
 
ALAN -- Yes you are.  I want you to design another 12 metre. 
 
BEN -- Why? 
 
ALAN -- Because you're a visionary Ben.  Like me!  When 
someone says it can't be done, you just have to prove them   46
wrong. Now you know how not to design a 12 metre, you prove 
to the bastards that you can. What do you say?  Come on, Benny, 
come back to Oz.  Come home and give it another shot. 
 
BEN -- I don't have a home, Bondy.  Never have had. 
 
ALAN -- There's always a room for you at my place!  In fact 
there's half a bloody dozen.   
 
BEN -- At your place? 
 
ALAN – Yeah, come and live at our place, it'll be great. 
 
BEN -- Look, Alan, I don't think... 
 
ALAN -- Come on Benny, Red thinks of you as part of the family 
already. And the kids think you're the bee's knees.   
 
BEN -- I don't… I'm a bit messy. 
 
ALAN -- You're a lot messy, who cares, we'll get a cleaner. 
 
BEN -- I don't... 
 
ALAN -- What? 
 
BEN -- I don't understand why... 
 
ALAN -- I need you, Benny. You're a good influence. You keep me 
honest. And you're the only one I trust to make me a boat that'll 
beat the pants off ‘em in '77...  
 
Alan wheels away the trolley. Ben goes to a telephone and starts 
dialling. 
 
BEN -- Well, needless to say, they kept their pants on in '77... But 
it wasn't my fault this time.  
 
Ted Turner climbs onto the podium, very drunk, carrying a bottle of 
Bourbon. 
 
TT -- (deep southern accent) Ladies and gentlemen of the press.   47
 
BEN --  Australia was a bloody good boat  
 
TT -- My name, in case some of you folks ain't heard it before,... 
 
BEN -- But John didn't come and the outfit was a shemozzle.  
 
TT --... is Ted Turner. 
 
BEN -- We didn't even have sailmaking facilities.  They thought 
they could just bung up the same crappy sails every day, 
whatever the weather.   
 
TT -- And I've been compet'n against the guys from Downunder. 
 
BEN -- I don't think Alan never expected to win. He knew we 
didn't have a hope. 
 
TT -- And those Aussies are the best of the best.  The best of the 
best! 
 
BEN -- He knew we didn't have a hope. 
 
TT -- Which is why I take such pride in announcin' that with 
absolutely no damn help at all from the good burghers of the New 
York Yacht Club,... 
 
BEN -- The crew tried to stay positive. 
 
TT --... that... I have... scuse me... (he takes a big swig from the 
bottle) 
 
BEN -- But eventually you reach that tricky point when you know 
in your heart that hope is just another word for self-deception. 
 
TT --.I have just...hic... 
 
Ben puts the phone down.  Alan joins him to watch Ted. 
 
TT -- (after a big breath and with unadulterated pleasure) I have 
just won the Amer…hic…a's…hicca's…hic.  I do believe… I 
am…drrrr...   48
 
Ted collapses. 
 
ALAN – Never mind Ben, we'll be back next time.  With a new 
boat!  And then we'll... 
 
BEN -- Bugger getting a new boat!  We could have done it with 
this one if you'd given it have a bloody chance.  All it needs is 
decent sails and a tactician who knows what he's doing. 
 
ALAN -- Got someone in mind? 
 
BEN – I sure have! 
 
Lights 
*** 
 
Newsreader, perhaps as a voiceover or else an actor into a 
microphone. 
 
NEWSREADER --... Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer announced 
yesterday that in light of the Soviet Union's reprehensible actions 
in Afghanistan, Australia will be joining our allies, the Americans 
and the British, in a complete boycott of the 1980 Olympic games 
in Moscow... in the meantime, the Australian challenge for the 
1980 America's Cup continues its preparation in Newport, Rhode 
Island... 
 
Lights. 
We hear a doorbell and a front door opens. 
Lights up.  John has just opened the door to Alan. 
 
JOHN -- Alan?  Jesus.  I thought you were in Newport. 
 
ALAN -- I had to come to Melbourne for business.  Thought I'd 
look you up. I'm sorry about the boycott... 
 
JOHN –I'm sorry you wasted your money. 
 
ALAN -- Not your fault the Commies invaded Afghanistan.  And, I 
wouldn't have given it to you if I didn't think you'd win. But now 
you can come and join the crew for the 1980 challenge....   49
 
JOHN -- Bondy, mate, don't go any further, I'm sorry but... 
 
ALAN -- We need you, John.  We can't win it without you. Look at 
what happened last time. 
 
JOHN -- Bondy, stop it.  It is too late, mate.  You're halfway 
through the trials... 
 
ALAN -- It is never too late, John.  It is never too late.  Come as 
tactician.  You'll be Jim Hardy's 2 I.C. 
 
JOHN – How's Jim doing? 
 
ALAN -- He's doing fine but he needs you, John.  We all do.    We 
are really in with a chance this time.  With you as tactician we can 
win it.  I know we can. Come on John! Come and join the team.  
It'll be great.  Listen, I've got to go, but I'll get Warren to ring you 
with your itinerary.  See you over in Newport. 
 
Lights.  
Alan crosses to Warren in the office. 
 
ALAN – Warren, listen; Burmah oil's in trouble.  They want to sell 
Santos. I talked to Campbell Anderson at Burmah and he says we 
can have Santos for 27 million.  A complete buyout.  What you 
think? 
 
Warren is too astonished to speak 
 
ALAN -- Warren, that is an operating oil company for 27 million 
bucks.  
 
WARREN -- … Only 27 million.   
 
ALAN -- And they only want a million for the deposit.  
 
WARREN – Only a million?   
 
ALAN --  And 90 days to get it.  
 
WARREN -- 90 days.   50
 
ALAN -- Warren, why do you keep repeating everything I… 
 
WARREN -- We don't have a million!!!  We don't have one brass 
fucking razoo!  All we have is debt, Alan. D.E.T. Debt!  And, in case 
you hadn't heard we're right in the middle of a... 
 
ALAN -- Don't say it, Warren, don't say it... please... 
 
WARREN – Credit Squeeze.  
 
Alan groans. 
 
WARREN -- We don't have enough to maintain the Cup challenge.  
I'm sorry Alan, but this time we really don't.  We're going to have 
to close it down. 
 
Lights 
John walks onto the Australian challenge dock, where the crew are 
busy with preparation and maintenance on the boat. John sees 
Chink. 
 
JOHN -- Chink!  Good to see you on board again. 
 
CHINK -- Hello John.  What are you doing here? 
 
JOHN -- I'm your bloody tactician, mate! 
 
CHINK -- ? 
 
Jim Hardy enters. 
 
HARDY -- Hello John.  Good to see you. What are you here for? 
 
Ben comes running in with a newspaper.  He doesn't see John. 
 
BEN -- Chink!  Chink!  Have you seen today's New York Post?  It 
says John bloody Bertrand's going to be tactician on the 
Australian challenge. 
 
JOHN -- It is not wrong, Ben. 
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Ben swings around. 
 
JOHN -- Have you got a problem with that? 
 
BEN – Yeah!  I've got a bloody problem. (Heads off) Bondy!! 
 
JOHN -- What's got his arse on fire? 
 
HARDY -- He's been our tactician for six months John.  And doing 
a fine job of it. To tell you the truth, I'm surprised you think it is a 
wise idea to turn up like this… 
 
Alan enters, sees the situation and immediately turns round and 
heads off. 
 
JOHN -- Bondy!!! 
 
John goes after Alan. 
 
Lights 
The office. Alan, Warren, Ben, John and Hardy. 
 
BEN -- So you forgot to mention that you were firing me. 
 
ALAN -- I'm not necessarily firing you. 
 
BEN -- You don't bloody need to now, do you. The signals are 
pretty bloody clear. 
 
ALAN -- Ben, it is all a misunderstanding. 
 
BEN -- What's he bloody doing here then?! 
 
ALAN -- I want John to be our port-trimmer. 
 
JOHN -- Port trimmer!?? 
 
ALAN -- John, mate, before you start, I need to ask all of you a 
very important question.  Do you think we can win? 
 
Pause. 
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Can we beat Dennis? 
 
Pause. 
 
Question answered. 
 
BEN -- If we got hold of the pom's bendy mast… 
 
JOHN -- Bendy mast?! 
 
BEN -- It is brilliant.  Gives you extra sail area without breaking 
the rules.  They made it out of rubber and fibreglass.  But I could 
make a better one. 
 
 ALAN -- Have you got enough time? 
 
BEN – There's never enough bloody time but I reckon I can come 
up with something.  As long as I get everything I need. 
 
ALAN -- How much? 
 
BEN -- Twenty... maybe thirty grand.  No more than sixty. 
 
WARREN -- $60,000?! 
 
ALAN -- Go to it Benny. 
 
BEN -- Uh... what about... 
 
ALAN – Ben, you're doing a great job.  Keep it up mate. 
 
Ben leaves. 
Pause. 
 
JOHN -- Port trimmer? 
 
ALAN -- Look, John, what can I say?  Without you, the team isn't 
complete.  You'll still be Jim's right hand man.  Think about it.  
Talk to Jim. 
 
Alan shares a look with Hardy.  
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HARDY -- (to John) I'll show you what we've done with the sails. 
 
Hardy leaves.  John follows. 
 
WARREN -- Do they know how close we are to... 
 
ALAN -- Warren, listen. I've had a look through the books at 
Santos. Do you know how much they spend on insurance every 
year?  4 million bucks.  $4 million!  So I had a word with Brian 
Coppin at Western Underwriters.  He's only too happy to invest a 
couple of million bucks for a guarantee of 4 million dollars worth 
of business later on.  That gives us a million for the Santos deposit 
and another million to cover running costs in Newport. Now do 
me a favour.  Go and organise the cash Benny needs for his bendy 
mast. 
 
The crew assemble, Hardy at the helm, Ben as tactician, John as 
port-trimmer.  
Alan faces the press. 
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) Ben was a better tactician than I 
expected. 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, 1980 is going to be our year. 
 
BEN -- (as tactician) She's dead downwind of us, Jim.  Tack now, 
mate. 
 
ALAN – We'll flatten the French all over again. 
 
JOHN -- He was brilliant against the Baron's boat. 
 
HARDY -- (to the crew) Tacking the boat. 
 
The boat tacks to port, leaving the French behind. 
 
BEN -- (to the French boat) Taste my spray, Monseiurs! 
 
The crew freeze. 
 
ALAN – We'll pummel the poms! 
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JOHN -- And he did a fine job against the British. 
 
Crew go to work. 
 
BEN -- Sail fat and fast Jim, there's more pressure ahead! 
 
Hardy adjusts the wheel 
 
BEN – Beautiful.  Feel that lift.  (informing Hardy ) Passing the 
poms on starboard. 
 
The crew watch the English boat as they pass close to it. 
 
BEN -- (calling) I say chaps, have you tried rowing? 
 
ALAN -- And then...  
 
Lights fade on Alan. 
 
JOHN -- But then...  
 
ALAN -- ... finally... 
 
HARDY -- What's our course Ben?   
 
JOHN -- ... We came bow to bow with Dennis Connor. 
 
ALAN -- ... we'll see to the Yanks. 
 
HARDY -- Ben? 
 
JOHN -- And Ben Lexcen... 
 
HARDY -- Ben?! 
 
JOHN -- ... the great Aussie iconoclast... 
 
HARDY -- Are we going to cross her, or what?! 
 
JOHN --... turned into a puppy. 
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BEN -- Look at that. Jesus, Dennis Connor knows how to sail a 
boat. 
 
Lights 
Alan arrives in the office where Warren is waiting. 
 
WARREN -- We're losing. 
 
ALAN -- I heard.   
 
WARREN -- And the South Australian Parliament just held a 
special sitting.  Passed an Act, The Santos Act, just for us. Limiting 
our stakeholding to 15%. 
 
ALAN -- They've given us time to offload. 
 
WARREN -- 20 days. 20 days! To sell 60% of our holding?  It is a 
fire sale. We'll be lucky if we get back a fraction of what we paid. 
We're stuffed. You're not going to squeeze out of this one. 
 
Beat 
 
ALAN -- It is already taken care of, Warren. 
 
WARREN --  ? 
 
ALAN -- I had a chat to Rupert Murdoch.  He's taking half.  And 
Peter Ables is buying the other half. 
 
WARREN -- You've already sold it? 
 
ALAN -- I finalised it this morning. 
 
WARREN -- How much did we lose?   
 
ALAN -- Lose?  Warren. You've been so busy in Newport you 
haven't seen what's been happening to our share price. We made 
$500 million, give or take.  So Bond Corporation can consolidate 
its finances, and you, Warren can finally get a decent night's 
sleep.   
 
Lights   56
The crew on deck. 
The America's Cup cannon fires for the end of the last race of 1980. 
The crew slump.  Alan leaps on board. 
 
ALAN -- Don't be glum boys, you gave it your best.   
 
BEN -- I'm sorry, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- We weren't ready.  That is all.  But next time... next time... 
Will we be ready next time John? 
 
JOHN -- I hope so, Alan. 
 
ALAN -- Course we will!    Sharpen your pencil Benny, it is back to 
the drawing board for you. Time to go home, boys.  We've got 
work to do. 
 
Alan and the crew freeze.  John steps forward. 
 
JOHN – So we all went home, to prepare to come back three years 
later, to take on Dennis Connor and the New York Yacht Club 
Commodores, and try to win the America's Cup all over again. 
 
 
End of Act One 
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Act Two: 
 
John and Alan. 
John unfolds the designs for the new yacht with the winged keel. 
 
JOHN -- Oh Christ, here we go again. 
 
ALAN -- Before you start... 
 
JOHN – Alan, what did I say?  No more gambles. 
 
ALAN -- I know, but... 
 
JOHN -- A trustworthy boat with perfect sails.  No more of Ben's 
tricks.    Just a bit of faith in me and the crew. 
 
ALAN -- John, John, a bit of faith in me, mate.  We're building two 
boats.  Like I said.  A conventional 12 metre, just for you.  And this 
one.  Ben's wet dream. 
 
JOHN -- I know what that means.  We'll spend the next two years 
trying to make this one seaworthy and by then it'll be too late for 
the other one. 
 
ALAN – Oh, ye of little faith. 
 
JOHN -- When will they be ready for testing? 
 
ALAN -- We've been testing this one for six months already.  Why 
do you think we're going to Holland? 
 
JOHN -- Six months?  Why didn't you tell me?!! 
 
ALAN -- I can't imagine. 
 
Lights 
 
Alan, John and Benny at the testing tank. 
 
JOHN -- Anything fallen off? 
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BEN -- Everything mate, everything.  The rig collapsed, chain 
plates pulled out and the mast fell over.  For a while I was 
thinking, "Jesus, these Dutch fellas don't have a clue," but it all 
came good and we've been feeding the data on the effect of water 
on the air foil based on maximum volume relative to wetted 
surface... 
 
ALAN -- Just give us the results, Benny.  Are they any good? 
 
BEN -- Good? Bondy! Mate! They're fucking amazing!  We're not 
just going to win the bloody Cup, we're going to win it by miles! 
 
Alan and Ben dance.   
 
ALAN -- That is what I wanted to hear, Benny.  I knew you could 
do it.  I knew it! 
  
JOHN -- Have you tested it in the slop? 
 
Beat 
 
BEN -- What? 
 
JOHN -- I'm glad she does well in a water tank, Benny, but out on 
Rhode Island Sound it can get a bit choppy. 
 
BEN --??! 
 
Lights 
Bob McCulloch at the New York Yacht Club reading a big leather 
bound rule book. 
 
John and Alan back in the car.  John looking at the design again. 
 
ALAN -- Look, I know he could be over-stating the advantages.  
He's an optimist.  Like me.  But don't forget the psychological 
advantage of a secret weapon. 
 
JOHN -- Our last secret weapon was a bendy mast.  Much good it 
did us. 
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ALAN -- Dennis is a control freak.  Like Warren. Hates the 
unpredictable. That is what the keel does. See?  Takes Dennis out 
of his comfort zone. It'll freak him right out. We'll hoist him with 
his own... thingumybob. 
 
Vic arrives for a meeting with Bob.   
 
VIC -- Commodore.   
 
BOB – Ah, Victor.  (Opens a large leather bound book) Have a look 
at this. 
 
JOHN – You're sure it fits the 12 metre formula? 
 
ALAN -- Of course it does. 
 
JOHN -- You know what Jim Hardy says,  
 
BOB -- Rule 27. 
 
JOHN --"If they can't beat you on the water they'll take you to 
court and beat you there."   
 
VIC -- (Reading) "If from any peculiarity... clause, clause, clause... 
 
ALAN -- Warren knows the rule book backwards and as far as 
he's concerned the keel fits the formula.   
 
VIC --... the measurer shall be of the opinion... clause, clause, 
clause... 
 
ALAN -- And don't forget the court of public opinion. We'll always 
get a good hearing there. 
 
JOHN -- What makes you think that? 
 
ALAN -- What makes you think we wouldn't? 
 
JOHN -- When you first went to Newport, Alan, you attracted a lot 
of attention … and I know why, but …  
 
ALAN -- Meaning?   60
 
VIC -- ... if the yacht does not comply with these rules... clause, 
clause, clause... 
 
JOHN -- It wouldn't hurt to be...a bit more…  
 
VIC --... he shall report these concerns to the National authority... 
 
JOHN --  ... circumspect 
 
ALAN -- I'm leaving Warren to orchestrate the press campaign, 
does that make you feel better? So I'll need Chink to manage the 
day-to-day. 
 
JOHN -- He'll probably appreciate the rest.  But I'll need another 
man.  I'll see if Hugh Treharne's available. 
 
ALAN -- The guy I fired in 74? 
 
JOHN --  Problem? 
 
ALAN -- He's a pessimist.  It is infectious.  Before you know it the 
whole crew picks it up. 
 
JOHN -- You can't blame Hugh for 74, Alan.  Christ.  Nobody 
believed we could win in 74. 
 
ALAN -- I did. 
 
JOHN -- It was your first challenge. You still thought it was ... 
 
ALAN -- ... just another boat race.  
 
JOHN -- But you must have known, in 77, and last time, that we 
didn't have a hope.  This is the first time we've really been in a 
race.  
  
ALAN -- You reckon? 
 
JOHN -- Yeah. 
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ALAN -- I wish you'd told me.  I could have saved myself about 20 
million bucks. 
 
BOB  -- We wish to be as accommodating as possible towards 
technological innovation. 
 
ALAN -- You really think this is our chance? Before you've even 
been on the boat? 
 
JOHN -- If it is a dud we'll use Challenge 12. 
 
ALAN -- You're not that different from Ben.  
 
BOB -- However,... 
  
ALAN -- For you it is your crew, for him it is his keel, 
 
JOHN -- It isn't a keel yet Alan.  It is an idea.   
 
BOB --... we draw the line at controversial.  
 
JOHN -- Let's see if it floats. 
 
Lights down on Alan and John. 
 
BOB -- And the word on Lexcen's new boat is controversial. 
 
VIC – I understand it has a bulb keel, with fins. 
 
BOB -- If there is any question of an unfair technological 
advantage, then, as the steward of the great sporting tradition 
that is the America's Cup, the New York Yacht Club is under an 
obligation to mount an impartial investigation. 
 
VIC -- Officially? 
 
BOB -- Let's keep our powder dry for the time being.  But stay 
abreast, and keep me informed.   
 
Lights. 
 
Ben and John at the helm of Australia II.   62
 
JOHN -- Ben, I'll be honest with you.  I'm not sure. 
 
BEN -- You said she pirouettes. 
 
JOHN -- She does, mate.  She's a bloody ballerina.  She whips 
around faster than any boat I ever sailed. 
 
BEN -- But...? 
 
JOHN -- She's slow in the chop.  Already.  And Port Phillip Bay's a 
bloody millpond compared to Newport. 
 
BEN -- You haven't got the feel of her yet.  She's delicate. 
 
JOHN -- She's a temperamental bitch.  I can never second-guess 
her. 
 
BEN -- She's like any work of art, John.  It takes a while to 
understand her.  You have to learn to ride her in the rough 
patches.  Like a big butterfly.  You're used to those heavy bastards 
that crush the wave for you.  This girl dances over them.  Like a 
dolphin. 
 
JOHN -- Make up your mind, Benny.  What is she?  A work of art, a 
butterfly or a fucking dolphin? 
 
Lights. 
 
Alan sitting in his office.  Warren enters carrying a newspaper.  
Alan gets up to shake his hand. 
 
ALAN -- Warren, you're early, good to see you, how are you, 
before you start... 
 
WARREN – You said you'd service the debt. 
 
ALAN -- ... Warren, I want you to know what a great job you're 
doing... 
 
WARREN -- Don't….You said no more acquisitions. 
   63
ALAN -- I know, I know... listen, Chink says we should have an 
anthem.  I was thinking of "Pennies from Heaven".  What do you 
think? 
 
WARREN -- Pennies from Heaven? 
 
ALAN -- "so when you hear it thunder..." 
 
WARREN -- "don't run under a tree", I know. What’s it got to do 
with a boat race? 
 
ALAN -- It is my mum's favourite song. 
 
WARREN -- Oh. 
 
ALAN -- Got a better idea? 
 
WARREN -- Pick what you like.  So long as it is not Six Months in a 
Leaky Boat.  Alan, the Bond Corporation is a minerals and land 
development company.  Why are we buying a bloody brewery? 
 
ALAN -- Have you seen the share price? 
 
WARREN – I had to read about it in the paper.   
 
ALAN -- You've been busy. 
 
WARREN -- I'm twice as busy since you put Chink back on the 
boat. 
 
ALAN -- John needed him to run the foredeck.  Chink's a tyrant on 
the foredeck.  I know.  I've been there. 
 
WARREN – But I managed to get a moment with Peter Beckwith - 
and found out about all the other acquisitions.  Skipper Caravans, 
Hope Island Casino, South Melbourne football club, Simplicity 
Patterns... 
 
ALAN -- Warren, it is only the beginning. 
 
WARREN -- You've tripled last year's debt. How long do you think 
the banks'll wait for their interest this time?   64
 
ALAN -- (the boss) Warren, why are we having this conversation? 
 
Pause 
 
ALAN -- Your job, Warren, is the America's Cup.  I don't want you 
worrying about this side of the business anymore.  I've got 
Beckwith and Oates to worry about that. 
 
WARREN -- Beckwith and Oates don't worry enough. 
 
ALAN -- You wanted us to have a reliable income stream. When 
we win the cup... 
 
WARREN -- If we win it. 
 
ALAN -- When we win, Warren, Bond won't be just the name of a 
signwriter who got rich flogging sandhills to suckers.  When we 
win the cup, Bond will be a brand.  That people trust.  And you 
know how much banks want to be associated with a brand like 
that.  That is when you get real cash flow.  Pennies from Heaven 
Warren! "We'll see our fortune falling all over town".  And every 
acquisition we make now, Warren, is just like another umbrella 
"turned upside down". 
 
WARREN – Oh, bloody hell. 
 
ALAN – This time, Warren,... 
 
WARREN -- Oh Christ. 
 
ALAN – ... this time we have to win. 
 
WARREN -- You're gambling the house. 
 
ALAN – Kit and caboodle. 
 
Beat 
 
WARREN -- What if we... 
 
ALAN -- Don't!  Warren.  Don't.   65
 
WARREN -- But what if? 
 
ALAN -- If … if we lose, Warren… we're fucked. 
 
Pause 
 
ALAN -- That is why it is important that we win, Warren. 
 
*** 
 
Vic and Bob. 
 
BOB -- 10 wins in 10 starts. 
 
VIC -- Against the French and the Italians. 
 
BOB -- Nevertheless... 
 
VIC -- They lost one against the British. 
 
BOB -- And won four.  I think it is time to draft a letter to the 
Measuring Committee. 
 
VIC -- Might look like poor sportsmanship. 
 
BOB -- Could the Canadians be persuaded to deliver it? 
 
VIC -- Perhaps. 
 
BOB -- Invite them to dinner at the Vanderbilt's. 
 
Lights 
Crew and management arrive for breakfast at Founders Hall. 
Warren clinks his teacup for attention.  It is already customary for 
the crew to take the piss out of Warren every morning. 
 
WARREN -- Gentlemen.  Order.  Order! 
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) Days at Newport began with breakfast 
at Founders Hall. 
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WARREN -- It is now 27 minutes to eight and… 
 
CREW -- "No, it is not, it is 23 and a half minutes to eight!" "No it 
isn't!  It is 25 minutes and 34 seconds."  Etc  
 
The crew find all this hilarious. 
 
WARREN --... and we have an important race against the 
Canadians today. . . 
 
CREW -- "Have we really?" "Christ, I'd forgotten all about it!" Etc 
 
WARREN -- Order!  Order! 
 
CREW -- All right Warren, don't get your knickers in a twist.  Etc. 
 
WARREN -- Shut up!! 
 
CREW -- Warren, what time was it again? 
 
Crew laugh hysterically. 
 
WARREN -- It is like a damned sixth form in here!  Listen, you 
may have noticed that the press are getting themselves in a lather 
over the legality of our keel.  But that is my department, not 
yours.  Take my word for it, we are perfectly legal and there will 
be no disqualifications in Newport this summer.  So you just take 
care of the water and I'll take care of the dry end.  Now, Sir James 
Hardy will give us the weather. 
 
Crew cheer. 
 
HARDY -- Gentlemen, it is my profound honour to tell you the 
weather forecast this morning. 
 
Crew cheer. 
 
HARDY -- We are expecting strong winds from the North, gusting 
between 20 and 25 knots, with a heavy swell.  So, keep a weather 
eye, and God be with you all. 
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WARREN – Bondy's flown back from London to talk to you this 
morning so I hope you'll show your appreciation by giving him 
your full attention. 
 
Crew cheer. 
 
ALAN -- Boys, I don't want you to feel bad about losing against 
the poms the other day.  You're still doing pretty well.  But we've 
all got to feel as if... as if... the boat was part of us.  As if... as if... 
well, I'm not sure what but let's get out there and sail our arses 
off and drive the bastards mad and it is all going to be terrific.  
Just... terrific. 
 
Crew cheer and disperse.  Alan catches up with John. 
 
ALAN -- John, John.  What the hell is going on?  Why did you let 
the poms win? 
 
JOHN – We're still ahead of them in terms of... 
 
ALAN -- Jesus H. Christ! If the poms can beat you, so can Liberty.  
When you're up against the Americans it is a completely different 
calibre of competition. You know that.  It is not just an old silver 
mug we're fighting for, John.  This isn't just another bloody yacht 
race! 
 
JOHN -- I've got a boat to sail. 
 
John leaves.  Alan finds Warren. 
 
ALAN -- Why haven't you released that telex yet? 
 
WARREN -- Haven't needed to. 
 
ALAN -- Warren... 
 
WARREN -- While they're busy worrying about our keel, they're 
not campaigning their boats, are they. Did you read Vic 
Romagna's memo? 
 
ALAN -- 34 bloody pages on fax paper? No I didn't.  But I know 
what it says. What've you done about it   68
 
WARREN -- I issued a press release.  Here. 
 
ALAN -- (Reading) "We Australians are brought up to abide by the 
umpire's decision.  Members of the New York Yacht Club 
obviously went to a different school."  Warren, you're priceless.  
"As far as we're concerned the measuring committee has made its 
decision and that is an end to it."  So why are they coming to talk 
to us?  Has McCulloch got something else? 
 
WARREN -- No idea. 
 
ALAN -- If he's coming over in person he must think it is 
dynamite.  Have you got the telex? 
 
Warren pats his pocket. 
Lights 
There is a blast of the song, Down-under, by Men at Work. 
John on deck. 
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) On the tow out to the middle of Rhode 
Island Sound the crew go below and lounge on all the folded sails 
for a couple of hours, it is down there, that we are finally left to 
ourselves.   
 
John goes below deck. 
Bob and Vic have joined Alan and Warren.   
Alan and Warren reading a bundle of papers. 
 
BOB -- Are we trying to influence the outcome of the 
competition?  No - fastest boat wins -- that is our philosophy.  But 
it is in nobody's interest to allow an illegal boat into the contest 
and, as you see, under rule 27 - that is in the second document, if 
you'd like to read it for yourselves...  
 
John talking to the Crew below deck. 
 
JOHN -- Gentlemen, I know it is a damned irritating distraction 
but this so-called keelgate business can only be good for us. If 
they think we're sailing a super-boat with an unbeatable magic 
keel, so much the better. It spooks the competition.  We know the   69
truth of the situation, but until we've won our last race I suggest 
we keep it to ourselves. 
 
Lights. 
 
BOB -- ... since the wing tips of your keel give your boat an 
increased draft and uplift which wasn't accounted for by the 
International Measuring Committee's first inspection… 
 
Warren continues to read while Alan begins his furious harangue. 
 
ALAN -- Let me make something perfectly clear to you, Bob.  If 
you expect ... 
 
Alan continues but his voice is drowned out by the roar of a great 
wind. 
Hugh and John. Both in wet weather gear. 
 
JOHN -- (yelling over the howling wind) Can we steady the 
mainsail Hughy?  
 
HUGH – The halyard seems to be jammed. 
 
JOHN -- Christ! 
 
The wind calms for a moment and we hear another snatch of Alan's 
harangue. 
 
ALAN --... to let a bunch of old straw-hats with a wad of trumped 
up bullshit... 
 
More wind. 
 
JOHN -- It is only 10 minutes to the start, Hughie. Scotty's going to 
have to go up. 
 
HUGH – It is bloody rough John, and it is 95 ft. to the top.  The 
mast swings over an arc of more than 60 ft. up there 
 
JOHN -- Scotty knows the risk.  And if he doesn't go up we're 
screwed. We don't have any choice. 
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Back to Alan at the end of his harangue. 
 
ALAN -- ... we will drag you through so much mud, the names of 
the Commodores of the New York Yacht Club will go down in 
history as the biggest pack of cheats ever to claim the title of 
sportsmen. 
 
BOB -- (getting up to leave) If you've quite finished your little 
tantrum Mr Bond, I don't think we have anything further to 
discuss, so... 
 
WARREN -- Before you go, Bob, you might like to take these with 
you. 
 
BOB -- Mmm? 
 
WARREN -- It is a copy of a telex sent by one of your own Cup 
defence syndicates to the director of our testing tank in Holland. 
Perhaps you'll recognise it.  You haven't seen this yet have you, 
Alan? 
 
ALAN -- No.  Thanks.  "Dear Mr van Oossanen, We understand 
you and your team are responsible for design of the keel for 
Australia II.  We would like to build same design under one of our 
own boats.  We will keep this confidential so as not to jeopardise 
your agreement with Alan Bond..." Oh dear, oh dear.  Talk about 
red faces. 
 
VIC -- Since you bring up the issue... 
 
ALAN -- Hypocrisy? 
 
VIC -- Responsibility for the design… 
 
Wind. There is a great crash from above. John and Hugh at the 
helm.  
 
JOHN -- What the hell was that? 
 
HUGH -- I think Scotty's in trouble. 
 
JOHN -- Oh Christ.   71
 
Wind calms. 
 
VIC -- According to the cup's Deed of Gift, there is a country-of-
origin requirement of the designer of the boat. 
 
ALAN – Ben's as ocker as prawns on a barbie. 
 
VIC -- No doubt.  However, it stands to reason that Mr Lexcen, for 
whom I assure you, we all have the utmost respect, but who, 
famously, does not have a formal education, let alone a degree in 
naval architecture, and so, frankly, could not possibly have 
conceived and designed a keel concept as sophisticated as the 
device on the base of Australia II without a considerable enough 
contribution from the Dutch scientists to qualify them as the 
principal designers… 
 
Wind. 
Lights down on the meeting. 
 
HUGH -- I think his arm's trapped under the crane. 
 
JOHN -- How the hell are we going to get him down? 
 
HUGH -- He's on the only halyard that goes to the top of the mast.  
We don't have a contingency plan for this situation, John. 
 
JOHN – Oh Christ. 
 
Wind calms. 
Lights up on Ben and Warren 
 
BEN -- They're accusing me of cheating!!?  The same guys who 
raced Courageous in 74, which, by the way, was the most 
incredibly illegal boat in the history of the cup, they are standing 
up and telling the world that my boat isn't mine!? 
 
WARREN -- Did you design it Ben? 
 
BEN -- I...I... how can you...?   
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WARREN -- This is a telex from Peter van Oossanen.  It says "any 
suggestion that Ben Lexcen was not solely responsible for the 
design of Australia II is completely incorrect.  I find the New York 
Yacht Club's position to be deeply disturbing and offensive.  I 
hope they will have the good sense to desist from any further 
untrue charges." Has he got it right? 
 
BEN -- Blood oath! 
 
WARREN – Good, because, actually, I wrote it myself.  The thing is 
Ben, before I release this to the press, I need to be sure that it 
doesn't say anything van Oossanen wouldn't say himself.  There's 
no problem, is there? 
 
BEN -- Of course not!!  
 
WARREN – You're absolutely sure? 
 
BEN --  I... it is... it is preposterouuuuuugh... 
 
Ben collapses. 
 
WARREN -- Ben?  Ben?! 
 
Lights 
 
*** 
 
Alan talks to the press 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen of the press, this is a letter from the 
Measuring Committee saying that under the guidelines of the 12 
metre rule the winged keel concept was and is legal. Copies of the 
letter are being handed round now. I hope that finally puts this 
matter to rest. Because the New York Yacht Club is hereby put on 
notice that if they continue to pursue this smear campaign, we 
will take them back before the International Yacht Racing Union 
with indisputable evidence that they have contravened rule 42 of 
the America's Cup rule book, which refers to unacceptable levels 
of Bad Sportsmanship!  Thank you. 
 
Alan and John   73
 
JOHN -- I never heard of rule 42 before. 
 
ALAN -- They'll've printed the headlines before anyone bothers to 
check it.  How's Scotty? 
 
JOHN -- His arm's broken but he'll mend.  How's Ben? 
 
ALAN -- It is his heart.  We're still waiting to hear from the 
hospital.  But it doesn't look good, John, not good at all. Why the 
hell did you let the poms beat you again? 
 
JOHN -- Alan, we won the trials.   
 
ALAN -- Of course you won. For Christ's sake, you're sailing the 
fastest 12 metre that is ever been built, how could you not win?   
 
JOHN -- Alan, don't you realise that... 
 
ALAN -- What?  
 
JOHN -- Never mind.  We need a new light air mainsail.  The old 
one's had it 
 
ALAN -- Costing? 
 
JOHN -- $18,000. 
 
ALAN -- Christ.  Well, I suppose you'd better bloody get it then. 
 
Warren arrives. 
 
WARREN -- They're here. 
 
ALAN -- All right, let's see what they're trying on this time. 
 
JOHN -- I thought they'd capitulated. 
 
ALAN -- So did I. 
 
Bob and Vic arrive. 
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BOB -- Gentlemen, congratulations.  It seems once again that it is 
finally down to you and us. 
 
ALAN -- No "seems" about it Bob. 
 
BOB -- We are only too happy to race you Alan.  All we ask now is 
that you sign a Certificate of Compliance.  I have a few copies if 
you'd care to peruse them. 
 
Bob hands out papers.  Warren reads.  The others skim. 
 
ALAN -- Warren? 
 
Warren shrugs.  Keeps reading.  The phone rings. 
 
ALAN -- (on phone) I said no calls....  What?...Oh, right.  Yes of 
course.  Send him in. Jesus.   
 
JOHN -- What? 
 
Warren looks up from reading. 
 
WARREN -- What? 
 
Ben enters.  He doesn't see Bob or Vic. 
 
BEN -- Bondy!  John!  Congratulations guys.  We finally got to the 
start.  (Beat) 
What? 
 
JOHN -- Are you all right? 
 
ALAN -- Jesus Christ, Benny. 
 
BEN – (realising) Oh. Didn't they tell you?  Bloody Newport 
doctor had the leads from the cardiogram the wrong way round.  
Turns out it was just a bit of the old high blood pressure, that is 
all.  
 
Ben sees Bob and Vic. 
 
BEN -- I thought all the legal bullshit was over.   75
 
ALAN -- So did we.  But Bob and Vic have just brought us this. 
 
BEN -- What is it? 
 
WARREN -- Essentially, Benny, it is an affidavit they want us to 
sign declaring, under penalty of perjury, that you and only you 
designed the boat and that in every other detail we have 
complied with the rules governing the races. 
 
BOB -- It is a formality, but I think, under the circumstances, it is 
appropriate. 
 
ALAN -- And only three pages this time?  A very neat little 
package.  I suggest you go and stick it up your... 
 
WARREN -- I really don't think we're obliged to sign anything, 
Bob.  But if you're going to refuse to race us on those grounds, by 
all means... 
 
ALAN -- Go ahead! (He tears up the papers.) But whether you're 
there or not, we'll be at the starting line tomorrow and so will 
CBS and NBC and every other TV station and newspaper in the 
whole bloody world.  All ready and waiting to announce that the 
Commodores of the New York Yacht Club are the biggest 
spoilsports in history. So if you don't mind, we've got stuff to deal 
with.  Go on, off you go.  See you later.  
 
Bob and Vic leave. 
 
ALAN -- What do you think Warren? 
 
WARREN -- They wouldn't dare. 
 
Beat. 
 
ALAN -- You're right Benny, we finally got to the start. 
 
Lights 
 
*** 
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RACE 1.  Score; 0:0 
 
Another blast of "Down under" drowned out by the sound of strong 
winds and heavy seas as the lights come up on the crew in their wet 
weather gear. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) Overnight a cold front arrived with blustery 
winds and heavy seas, so it was a wet ride out.  Water crashing 
over the bow pours down the mast to below deck where all the 
sails are folded, dozens of them, ready to be dragged out and 
clipped to the halyard, so the winch grinders can haul them 90 ft. 
up the mast.   
 
CHINK –Genoa's ready!  
 
JOHN --  Hoist the jib! Where's the red boat Chink? 
 
CHINK -- (pointing down stage right) One boat length ahead and 
to leeward.   
 
JOHN – We'll go up his bum and duck through to leeward. 
 
CHINK -- Starting gun in...5,4,3,2,1... 
 
Gunshot 
 
HUGH -- He's late.  Nice start, John.  We've got him covered. 
 
JOHN -- Our stern's swinging around like a duchess in high heels. 
(To crew) Too much weather helm.  Ease the mainsheet.  Too 
much!  Come on, let's settle it down.  Better.  Better.   
 
MAD DOG -- Speeds off point three of a knot. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) "Mad dog" Simmer, my navigator.  He has to 
try to maximise our speed relative to the angle and speed of the 
wind. His equipment gives him an ongoing digital readout of 
boatspeed and windspeed.   
 
HUGH -- He's getting out from under us.  We need more speed, 
John. 
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JOHN -- We haven't got any!  It is too choppy.  God damn Benny 
and his bloody tank tests!  I told him!  I bloody told him! 
 
HUGH -- Job at hand, John.   
 
MAD DOG -- Wind shifting. 3, 4, 5°.  In our favour.  We're up five.  
Up five and looking good. 
 
HUGH -- We're doing fine.  Just need her a little bit faster.  We 
need 7.7, that is our target. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) I'm holding her on a knife edge - if I aim her 
a fraction of an inch closer to the wind, our speed drops.  A 
fraction of an inch the other way and we gain speed but head 
further away from the mark.  
 
CHINK -- Red boat coming up underneath us. 
 
HUGH -- We only need two points of a knot, John. 
 
JOHN -- We haven't got it Hughie.  Jesus, I didn't think he was 
going to be so fast. 
 
CHINK -- Here he comes. 
 
They watch the other boat pass on their right. 
 
MAD DOG -- There he goes. 
 
JOHN -- This never happened in the trials.  We could always hang 
onto our lead before. 
 
CHINK -- Coming up to the mark. 
 
JOHN -- This is bad, Hughie, this is bad. 
 
HUGH -- Job at hand, John. 
 
JOHN -- Mad dog, are you sure we've got the right spinnaker up? 
 
MAD DOG -- Yep, it is fine. 
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JOHN -- What d'you think Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- Activity on the red boat.  She's jibing to starboard.  
Heading straight towards us on port.  She's got full rights, John. 
 
JOHN -- If we jibe with her we don't have the boat speed to catch 
her up. 
 
HUGH – We can take her stern now and try for an inside overlap 
as we come round the mark. 
 
JOHN -- You reckon?  (Beat) Hughie?  Your call, Hughie, but make 
it soon before she hits us.  Hughie? 
 
Beat. 
 
HUGH -- Take her stern. 
 
JOHN -- Here we go... 
 
John slams the wheel hard over.   
Crew freezes. 
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) On a 20 tonne boat in a 20 knot wind 
with a 90 ft. sail, turning the rudder that hard puts incredible 
pressure on the steering system.  So I really should have expected 
what happened next.  But I didn't.  
 
Crew goes to work.  
There is a loud explosive Bang, like a pistol shot. 
 
JOHN -- Christ! 
 
CHINK -- Shit. 
 
MAD DOG -- Holy fuck!  What was that? 
 
John starts turning the wheel with no effect. 
 
JOHN -- The fucking steering's gone! 
 
CHINK -- We've lost the spinnaker.   79
 
The crew scramble to maintain control of the boat. Chink 
disappears down the hatch. 
 
HUGH -- The red boat just gained three boat lengths. 
 
Chink reappears. 
 
CHINK – We've sheared a pulley right out of the side of the hull.  
You'll have to try to steer with the trim tab while we lash it up. 
 
Crew freezes. 
 
JOHN -- So Liberty slips the hook.  And crosses the finishing line 
one minute and 10 seconds to the good. 
 
Lights 
 
Crew are docking the boat.  Alan leaps aboard. 
 
ALAN -- Well done boys!  Brilliant sailing.  There's no contingency 
for equipment failure.  Ben and Kenny reckon they can fix the 
problem tonight.  So don't worry. We'll win the next four.  Now I 
want as many of you as possible to come down to the press 
conference with me so you can hear me tell them what a brilliant 
bloody crew you all are. 
 
MAD DOG -- If we're that brilliant maybe you could shout us a 
beer as well, since you're only paying us 12 bucks a day. 
 
ALAN -- $12.50 smart boy.  And tell me if there's anywhere in the 
world you'd rather be right now than on this boat. 
 
MAD DOG -- Nope. 
 
ALAN --  Nope.  So you should be paying me.  But you can shout 
me a beer instead, cheeky bastard.  Come on. 
 
Alan and Crew leave Hugh and John aboard. 
 
HUGH -- It was my fault, John.  I should have known it'd put too 
much strain on her.     80
 
JOHN -- The buck stops here, Hughie. Faced with Dennis on a 
faster boat, I lost my nerve and I asked you to call it.  Hardly the 
act of a man in control of himself and his crew, was it.   
 
HUGH -- He was faster today.  But we've got the manoeuvrability.  
It gives us a big starting advantage.  If you can win the start, John, 
the race is yours to lose. 
 
Lights 
 
Score =  Liberty – 1,  Australia II – 0 
 
RACE 2.   
 
The crew at work.  
 
HUGH -- Seven minutes to the starting gun, John.  We can lock 
them up whenever we want. 
 
JOHN -- Let's give it another minute or two, Hughie.  I don't want 
to have to hold Dennis under cover for more than five minutes.  If 
we end up in a luffing situation we could drift into them.  Let's 
take our girl for another spin.  Tacking the boat! 
 
The crew go into tacking mode.  There is another loud bang from 
above.  The crew look up. 
 
JOHN -- Oh dear God, what now? 
 
MAD DOG -- It could've been one of those aircraft? 
 
HUGH -- It came from the top of the mast. 
 
CHINK -- The mainsail's falling down. 
 
They watch for a moment. 
 
JOHN -- She's sailed thousands of miles without a hitch.  Why 
does she have to fall apart on us now?! 
 
CHINK -- It is stopped slipping.   81
 
MAD DOG -- For now. 
 
There's another loud bang as the boom hits the deck. 
 
MAD DOG -- Boom just hit the deck. 
 
JOHN – Jesus. 
 
HUGH -- If we can crank the mast forward with the hydraulics we 
could lift the boom and get some tightness back into the sails. 
 
JOHN -- How long to the start? 
 
CHINK -- Four minutes. 
 
JOHN -- Let's do it. We're not giving up. We're going to start this 
fucking race.   
 
Lights 
Gunshot. 
Lights 
The crew at work. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat just crossed the starting line.  (Down stage left) 
 
MAD DOG -- And... 3,2,1, the good guys cross the line. 
 
HUGH -- They're only five seconds ahead.  But we're falling in on 
them, John. And they've got rights.  Two more boat lengths and 
we'll have to tack. 
 
JOHN -- Let's go now.  Tacking the boat! 
 
The crew tack the boat.  (Putting the red boat down stage left) 
 
JOHN -- Nicely done, gentlemen. 
 
MAD DOG -- Wind shift.   
 
JOHN -- How strong? 
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MAD DOG -- Big. It is big; a big right-hander. 
 
The wind picks up. 
 
CHINK -- Jesus, we're catching up. (They watch the red boat up 
stage left) 
 
JOHN -- We're still in this, fellas.  We can beat them if we keep this 
up. 
 
MAD DOG -- Wind shift to starboard. 
 
HUGH -- We should catch it, John. They've still got boat speed on 
us but we can gain some if we tack back. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat! 
 
Crew tacks the boat. 
 
HUGH -- Dennis has seen it to.  They're tacking back over, on our 
tail.  Looks like he wants to push us into a tacking duel. 
 
JOHN -- He knows we're in trouble.  He's trying to put as much 
stress as he can onto our gear. 
 
HUGH – It is the logical thing to do. Here he comes.  Tack her now, 
John, now. 
 
JOHN -- Hit the winches again, fellas, tacking the boat! 
 
Crew goes into tacking mode in slow motion. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) Time and again the big red boat comes 
knifing through the water, looking for all the world as if she 
might cut us in half.  And each and every time we slap a cover 
back on them.  Every man in this crew is driving himself to the 
limit, dragging every ounce of speed we can from our wounded 
boat.  After nine tries Dennis comes back at us for a 10th, and 
again the winches scream under the efforts of the grinders, sweat 
pouring off them, shoulders pumping, lungs heaving, and their 
poor bloody aching, bandaged hands flying around in endless 
murderous circles.    83
 
Crew shifts into realtime. 
 
MAD DOG -- Shit, here they come again. 
 
HUGH -- And again, John.  Now. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat! 
 
Crew tacks again. 
 
JOHN -- Don't slow down now, boys!  Spit blood! This is the fight 
we were born for! 
 
 They go back into slow motion. 
 
JOHN -- And on she goes, Ben's big butterfly, crippled but still 
going, still fighting, and by some sort of miracle, still in front.   
 
HUGH -- Jesus, they're going to... they couldn't... Christ, they're 
tacking back!  We've got rights, John, but if we don't tack back 
we'll collide.  Tack now.  Tack now! 
 
JOHN – Shit!  Tacking the boat! 
 
Crew tacks the boat.  (Liberty passes across from up stage left to 
down stage right.) 
 
CHINK – They just got three boat lengths on us...  
 
HUGH – Break out the protest flag.  (Shouts across to the other 
boat) We're protesting. 
 
VO -- (off) Acknowledged. 
 
MAD DOG -- Polite bunch of wankers, aren't they. 
 
JOHN -- We've been behind before, boys.  Hang in there.  We 
could still find some pressure. 
 
CHINK -- Can't see any. 
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Lights. 
Alan and a judge in the protest room. 
 
ALAN -- Gentlemen, we have television footage which shows, 
without a shadow of a doubt, that Liberty's dangerous and 
reckless tactic would have resulted in collision if Australia II had 
not, to her own disadvantage, but for the safety of all concerned, 
tacked out of the way.  Our bowman was also... 
 
Bob McCulloch enters. 
 
BOB -- Before you go any further, Alan, I don't think the court is 
officially in session yet, is it Lloyd? 
 
JUDGE -- Not quite yet, Bob. 
 
BOB -- Because if you're free tomorrow afternoon, Lloyd, a few of 
us are planning a little golf at the Vanderbilt's, if you're free... 
 
JUDGE -- I'd be delighted, Bob.  Thank you.  Now then, let's get 
this protest deliberated shall we.  Jury is in session. 
 
BOB -- Well, first of all, your honour, I should explain that the 
television footage Mr Bond was referring to was shot on a 
telephoto lens which, as I'm sure you know, always makes things 
look a lot closer together than they actually are. 
 
JUDGE -- I have always found that to be the case, Bob. 
 
Lights 
 
Score =  Liberty – 2,  Australia II – 0 
 
RACE 3   
 
Third leg, spinnaker is up. The crew's hard at work. 
 
MAD DOG -- Four boat-lengths to the mark, John. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) Today... I'm afraid to say it in case I jinx it 
but... heading towards the third mark, things finally seem to be 
going our way.   85
 
CHINK -- Two boat-lengths. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat's getting closer, John.  But she's still a good 50 
yd. behind.  
 
MAD DOG – Bow's at the mark.   
 
JOHN -- Spinnaker down!  Jib in!  Hit it guys!   
 
(The mark goes by along the left side of the boat.) 
 
JOHN -- And heading upwind.  Hoist the mainsail! 
 
The crew tacks round into the second windward leg, pulling in the 
spinnaker and raising the mainsail. 
 
JOHN -- We come round the leeward mark and start the second 
windward leg 42 seconds in front.  We may be two races down 
but we're not beaten yet.   
 
HUGH -- As soon as they come round the mark slap a hard cover 
on the bastards.  They'll throw tacks at us all the way up the leg 
but we have to keep him covered, John. 
 
JOHN -- It is nothing we haven't dealt with before.  Prepare to 
lock a hard cover on them. 
 
HUGH -- Here they come. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat! 
 
The crew tacks the boat. 
 
JOHN -- How many is that? 
 
HUGH -- 20.  And it won't be the last. 
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) Now the grinders are entering the red 
zone.  The pain is so intense that only a trained athlete can 
tolerate it.  But they knew they were bound to reach this point 
and Chink has a couple of tricks to deal with it.   86
 
CHINK -- This one's for Hughie.  Make it the best. 
 
The crew tacks the boat. 
 
JOHN -- It is called the dedicated tack. And away they go again 
with new resolve. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat's tacking again. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat! 
 
CHINK -- One for the skipper!  Fast hands! 
 
The crew tacks the boat. 
Lights 
In the dark we hear the cannon marking the end of the race 
followed by the roar of a distant victorious crowd singing Waltzing 
Matilda. 
Lights come up on the victorious crew, sagging over their 
equipment, looking slightly astonished. 
Lights. 
 
Score =  Liberty – 2,  Australia II – 1 
 
RACE 4 
 
In the dark we hear the clinking of a glass.   
Lights up on Warren at breakfast. 
 
WARREN -- Order! Order. It is now 26 minutes to eight, and today 
we have another America's Cup race to sail.  
 
CREW -- "No, we don't, do we?"  "I'm just here for the shopping." 
Etc  
Once again the crew give him heaps. 
 
WARREN --... Order!  As we all know, yesterday Benny's keel 
finally proved its worth.  There he is over there.  How about a 
round for Benny. 
 
Applause.  Benny gives a big two thumbs up.   87
 
Lights 
 
Lights up on John below deck. 
 
JOHN -- Gentlemen, I know it feels like it is taken us forever to 
win that one race... it certainly feels like it to me... but now I want 
you to forget it.  Forget it happened.  Because we're still one 
down. We can't afford any mistakes.  And we can't afford to lose 
the start.  Not in this weather.  What was it Cuneo used to say in 
weather like this? 
 
CREW -- (together) "He who wins the start, wins the race". 
 
Lights out. 
 
In the dark we hear: 
 
CHINK -- 10 seconds to the starting gun! 
 
HUGH -- She's going to cross us, John! 
 
JOHN – Oh, Christ, I raised the sheets too late!  
 
MAD DOG – 5,  
 
JOHN – I got us moving too late. 
 
HUGH – 4,  
 
JOHN – Too late. 
 
CHINK – 3,  
 
JOHN –   Too late! 
 
MAD DOG – 2... 
 
The starting gun fires. 
Lights up 
They watch Liberty go past. 
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MAD DOG --  Thar she goes. 
 
CHINK -- The rusty Dutch barge crosses the starting line. And she 
tacks. 
 
HUGH -- She's covered us. 
 
MAD DOG -- And there goes all the air in our sails. 
 
JOHN – We'll never get out from under. Oh, Bertrand!  You stupid. 
stupid bastard! 
 
Lights 
 
John and Alan at the press conference. 
 
PRESS -- (American) John! John! Now you've confounded 
everybody's expectations by losing again today, do you think it 
might be time to change your strategy? 
 
JOHN – Nothing'll change because nothing has changed.  
Yesterday we had three more races to win and we still have three 
to win. 
 
PRESS -- But Dennis only has to win one. Alan, how do you feel 
about the New York Yacht Club already ordering the champagne. 
 
ALAN -- Don't write us off yet.  We will win, and win gloriously, 
just like our boys at Gallipoli. 
 
Lights 
 
Score =  Liberty – 3,  Australia II – 1 
 
RACE 5 
 
Breakfast. 
 
WARREN -- (clinking glass) Gentleman, the time is 18 minutes 
and 45 seconds to eight and today...  
 
Alan jumps up from his chair and interrupts him.   89
 
ALAN -- … You've lost three times! I've given you a boat that is 
capable of winning -- and you keep cocking it up. You break down 
and you stuff up the bloody tactics and... all that other stuff.  So it 
is not the boat anymore, and it is not me anymore.  It is you lot, 
and you alone.  For Christ's sake, if you let them win again, it is 
over!  I'm not coming back again.  Do you understand?  If you lose 
today... it is all over. 
 
Lights 
Crew at work on deck. 
 
CHINK -- Two minutes to the starting gun. 
 
JOHN -- Ease the mainsheet.  I don't care if we start luffing. The 
slower we are the better. Where is she, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- Quite close, two boat lengths to weather.  (Up stage 
right)  No, she's bearing away on a port tack.  (Further up stage)  
She might be planning to come round us.  We could follow her... 
 
JOHN -- Not this time.  The leeward end of the line looks good. I'm 
right where I want to be.  We're going to win this start if it kills 
me. 
 
HUGH -- Watch your time on distance, John.  We don't want to 
cross the line before the gun. 
 
CHINK -- A minute to the gun. 
 
HUGH – The red boat's tacking again.  She's setting herself up to 
the windward end of the line. 
 
JOHN -- That is good, that is good.  We'll go for the leeward end. 
 
HUGH -- Head her up a bit more, John, we don't want to get any 
closer to the line than we already are.   
 
JOHN -- Get ready to tighten that sheet.  Timing is crucial. 
 
CHINK -- 30 seconds.  I reckon we're early. 
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JOHN -- Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- Burn some more time, John.  Head her up a fraction 
more. We're only a boat length from the line. 
 
JOHN –  Yeah, but it'll take us forever to get her moving again.  I'm 
not going to let that happen again . 
 
CHINK -- 20.  We're early. 
 
HUGH -- We've got to burn more time, John. 
 
CHINK -- 15.   
 
JOHN -- Main on, Major.  Jib in, Skip! 
 
HUGH – We're only half a boat length from the line.   
 
CHINK -- 10 seconds to the gun.  And definitely early. 
 
HUGH -- Head her up, John, head her into the wind. 
 
JOHN -- I'm pushing her up, Hughie.  I'm almost head to wind. 
 
CHINK -- five seconds to the gun... We're going to be over…4. 
 
JOHN -- Please God, no. 
 
CHINK -- three... We're over. 
 
HUGH –  We've crossed the line, John. 
 
CHINK -- /2.... 
 
JOHN --  /Too fucking soon... 
 
CHINK -- One. 
 
JOHN -- Noooooooo! 
 
The starting gun fires. 
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JOHN -- AAARRGH!!! 
 
HUGH -- Easy, John.  Steady.   
 
MAD DOG -- Red boat crosses the line, in perfect time. 
 
HUGH -- It can happen to anyone.   
 
JOHN -- Not to me!  Not to me!! 
 
HUGH -- (calm) We have to duck back and start again.  John, drive 
the boat.  We can still catch her up.  Job at hand, John.  Job at 
hand. 
 
JOHN -- Bearing away! 
 
The crew eases the sails away. 
 
CHINK – We're round the mark. 
 
HUGH -- And the red boat looks a bit off the pace. 
 
JOHN -- Tighten up the main! 
 
CHINK -- All clear on the line. 
 
HUGH -- 37 seconds behind the red boat. 
 
MAD DOG -- But we're at the favoured end. 
 
CHINK -- And that is good. 
 
HUGH -- We're still in the race, John. 
 
JOHN -- (To the crew) They haven't won yet, guys.  You know 
what Churchill used to say was the secret of winning: Never give 
in! Never give in! Never give in! 
 
MAD DOG -- Wind shift, 5° to port. And here comes a lift.   
 
HUGH -- Bottom end of the groove, John, we're right back in it! 
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JOHN -- What are they doing? 
 
HUGH -- Still on port. 
 
CHINK -- They're looking for a starboard shift. 
 
JOHN -- We're back in the race. 
 
MAD DOG -- But not out of the shit yet, Bertrand. 
 
HUGH -- They're tacking back.   
 
MAD DOG -- On a collision course. 
 
HUGH -- Standby to tack, John. 
 
JOHN -- Can we lee-bow them, Hughie? 
 
HUGH – I think we can.   
 
CHINK -- Five boat lengths. 
 
JOHN -- Boat speed? 
 
MAD DOG – 7:4 
 
HUGH -- Too slow.   
 
CHINK -- Four boat lengths. 
 
JOHN -- Boat speed? 
 
MAD DOG –7:5 
 
HUGH -- Still too slow.  We need 7:7 
 
MAD DOG – 7:6.  Any closer to the wind and we'll stall. 
 
HUGH -- Tack now, John. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat! 
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Crew tacks the boat. 
 
MAD DOG -- Red boat on our weather hip. 
 
JOHN – How are they looking, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- We're giving her dirty air, John.  And it looks like they 
have a mast problem. 
 
JOHN -- I smell blood, Hughie. 
 
HUGH -- Not there yet, John. 
 
Lights 
 
The America's Cup cannon fires.  We hear the roar of the victorious 
Australian crowd.  Perhaps distant strains of Waltzing Matilda 
 
Lights up on the crew tying up to the dock.  Alan and Ben come 
aboard.  Alan calls to the unseen security guards behind him. 
 
ALAN -- I don't want anyone on this dock that isn't crew, family 
or richer than me.  (To the crew.) Boys!! Boys!!! What a pack of 
brilliant bloody bastards!  As for that start, Bertrand, you almost 
gave Ben a bloody heart-attack!  Come on, I want you all at the 
press conference.  Even if I have to shout you another drink. 
 
Alan leads the crew off and away leaving Ben and John. 
 
BEN -- Well done, mate.  Jesus, I... well done, well bloody done! 
 
JOHN -- Thanks, Benny. 
 
BEN -- Just a couple more and we're home. 
 
JOHN -- I hope so, mate. 
 
There is another roar of celebration from the crowd. 
 
BEN -- They sure can make a big bloody fuss about a silly bloody 
boat race, can't they. 
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John smiles, nods. 
 
BEN -- John, I... 
 
JOHN -- What, mate? 
 
BEN -- I.... I missed most of it.  After you broke the line I couldn't 
watch anymore.  I had to go below. 
 
JOHN -- I understand, Benny. 
 
BEN -- But I came up for the last leg. 
 
JOHN -- We were a pretty safe bet by then.  Even the Newport 
slop couldn't help Liberty with her starboard jumper stuffed. 
 
BEN -- Yeah, but... 
 
JOHN -- What, Benny? 
 
BEN -- The chop's only a problem if you resist it, mate.  She'll sail 
through it if you let her. You... you don't have to try so hard.  Give 
the boat a chance to work for you.   
 
JOHN -- I've been keeping this to myself till now Benny, because it 
keeps Dennis on the back foot, but sometimes your miraculous 
fucking keel hangs off the belly of this boat like a 3 tonne bloody 
pendulum and it takes a crew this good, working like clockwork, 
to compensate for it. 
 
BEN -- If you get into her rhythm, John, there wouldn't be 
anything to compensate for. 
 
JOHN -- I know you mean well Benny, but I don't really need this 
conversation right now. 
 
John leaves Ben alone. 
 
Lights 
 
Score =  Liberty – 3,  Australia II – 2 
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RACE 6 
 
Alan and Warren aboard the Black Swan, watching the race 
through binoculars. 
 
ALAN -- Benny!  Benny!  The starting gun's about to go. 
 
Ben comes on deck.  The starting gun fires. 
 
ALAN --  Oh, Jesus Christ, Bertrand's lost the start again! 
 
BEN – That is it then.  We've had it.  I'm going to lie down. 
 
WARREN – They've split tacks.  It is not over yet. 
 
BEN – How's he going to win if he doesn't know how to sail the 
bloody boat? 
 
WARREN -- He's won two races, Benny.  First to do it since 
Tommy Sopwith.  Give the man a break. 
 
BEN -- He could have taken home the cup by now if he trusted the 
bloody boat.   
 
ALAN -- He's catching up. 
 
BEN -- Is he? I… I can't watch it. Jesus, I don't know if I care any 
more.  I can't even remember why winning it was so important. 
 
ALAN -- Because it’ll give us access to unlimited global finance, 
Benny, unlimited. 
 
WARREN -- What Alan means, Ben, is that if we win, the doors of 
every major lending institution in the world will open up to us 
and men with very deep pockets will come running out, begging 
us... 
 
ALAN -- On their hands and knees… 
 
WARREN -- ...to reach in and take their money.  
ALAN – And not just the banks, Warren. Everyone in the whole 
bloody country’ll want to give me their money.   96
 
BEN -- You mean lend you their money. 
 
ALAN – Course I do. That is what I mean. Good onya Benny, I told 
you I need you to keep me honest. 
 
BEN -- So in the end it is really all about what's good for 
business? 
 
ALAN -- And the honour of winning.... 
 
WARREN -- That is good for business. 
 
ALAN -- And the fame and adulation. 
 
WARREN -- Fame and adulation isn't bad for business either. 
 
Alan and Warren share the joke and lift their binoculars again.   
 
ALAN -- Is that what I think it is? 
 
BEN -- What? 
 
WARREN -- Has Dennis seen it? 
 
ALAN -- Doesn't look like it. 
 
BEN -- What!? 
 
WARREN -- Big wind shift on the left. 
 
ALAN -- I don't care what you say Benny, I reckon he's sailing that 
boat like bloody champion. 
 
WARREN -- It is a header!  We've taken the lead. 
 
Ben looks through his binoculars. 
 
BEN -- Jesus! Come on, John, ease her up on the swell. That is it.  
Ease and retrim.  And rebalance. That is it.  That is it.  And again.  
And again.  Ease, retrim, and squeeze.  Come on, mate, and again.    97
Ease, retrim, and....  Jesus Christ, I think he's finally learnt to sail 
the bloody boat.  Look at that. 
 
WARREN – Australia II pulls ahead. 
 
BEN -- She's romping along.  I think we're going to win it. 
 
WARREN – It is ours to lose. 
 
ALAN -- I can already smell the money. 
 
Lights 
 
Score: 3:3 
 
Race 7 
 
A busy, but subdued crew at breakfast.   
Lights up on Warren dinging his glass.  
 
WARREN -- Order, order. 
 
He's a bit surprised to find that there is almost immediate silence. 
 
WARREN -- Thank you.  It is 14 1/2 minutes to eight. (He waits 
for the response, but there is one.)  And today we have an 
America's Cup yacht race to sail. 
 
Pause.  Silence. 
 
WARREN -- Okay, well...erm, you'll notice that we have some 
extra security today.  Apparently we're making headlines around 
the world. They're calling it "the race of the century" and the FBI 
don't want some idiot trying to make a name for himself by 
blowing us up before it starts.  If you would do me the favour 
today of winning it, I'd appreciate it.  Enough said. Sir James? 
 
James Hardy stands up and addresses them. 
 
HARDY -- Gentlemen, it is my profound honour to tell that we are 
expecting an eight to 10 knot south-south-westerly.  It is one of   98
those shifty Newport breezes, so keep a sharp weather eye.  God 
be with you all. Here's Alan. 
 
Alan jumps up. 
 
ALAN -- Listen, you've won three races so you're already in the 
history books.  But the last page of the history book is still open. 
Don't stuff it up this time. Get out there and win the bloody race.   
 
Lights. 
Distant cheering and the final strains of "Down under". 
Lights up on John below deck talking to the crew. 
 
JOHN -- Apparently, gentlemen, we've been keeping half the 
population of Australia awake these last few nights.  Well, 
tonight, they'll all be awake.  They will be speaking our names in 
every household in the nation.  And for the rest of their lives they 
will remember the night they watched us win the America's Cup.  
Today we sail into history, gentlemen, but we also sail together 
for the very last time.  So make this one the best, for yourself and 
for your shipmates.  
 
Lights 
Lights up on the crew sailing the boat. 
Alan and Ben raise their binoculars and watch from the tender. 
The starting gun fires. 
 
JOHN -- Well, we won the start, Hughie 
 
ALAN -- Bertrand loses the start again! 
 
HUGH -- He's a few seconds in front, John. 
 
JOHN -- Yeah, but to leeward. 
 
BEN -- Liberty looks a lot lighter in the water. 
 
ALAN -- They took 1500 lbs. of lead out of her keel last night, 
cheating bastards. 
 
BEN -- Not against the rules. 
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ALAN -- They make them to suit themselves. 
 
JOHN -- She's faster in the water today, Hughie.   
 
CHINK -- Wind shift coming. 
 
HUGH -- We need more boat speed, John.   
 
JOHN -- Mad dog? 
 
MAD DOG -- 7.4. That is good.  Try for 7.5.  Good.  Good.  7.6.  
Looking good. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat is tacking back. 
 
JOHN -- How do we look, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- I'd say we'll have about two boat lengths on them when 
they cross.   
 
BEN -- That looks better. 
 
HUGH -- Here they come.  They're taking our stern. 
 
ALAN -- That is it Bertrand.  Now tack on top of them. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat. 
 
The boat tacks. 
 
ALAN -- Now stay on top of them. 
 
CHINK -- Wind swinging to the right. 
 
HUGH -- Let's take it, John. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking the boat. 
 
The boat tacks. 
 
ALAN -- No!  Stay where you are, you bloody fool.  Shit. 
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BEN -- They're hitting the chop from the spectator fleet. 
 
CHINK -- Wind shift to the left. 
 
JOHN -- Shit, Hughie, this is trouble. 
 
HUGH -- Let's get her back over there, John. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking! 
 
The boat tacks. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat's caught up, John. 
 
BEN -- Shit, that was bad luck. 
 
ALAN -- Bloody stupid. 
 
JOHN -- Let's not do anything rash.  Just hang in, stay close, keep 
focused, stay in contact.  We'll get our chance. 
 
ALAN -- Dennis is thrashing us already. 
 
BEN --  That is it, I can't stand it. Tell me when it is over. 
 
Ben exits. 
 
ALAN -- Come on Bertrand!  Will you pull your bloody finger out, 
for Christ's sake! 
 
Lights down on Alan. 
Lights up on the crew.   
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) We're losing. Coming up to the mark on 
the second windward leg and we're 57 seconds behind. 57 
seconds to make up in just two more legs. Over in Oz, it is five 
o'clock in the morning and millions of people across the country 
are still awake, watching us on TV.  Those who haven't given up 
in despair and gone to bed.  
 
CHINK -- Coming up to the mark. 
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MAD DOG -- Which spinnaker John? 
 
JOHN -- Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- John, I think it is time for the man in control of himself 
and his crew to make the call. 
 
MAD DOG -- John? 
 
HUGH -- John? 
 
JOHN – The 6 : 2. 
 
MAD DOG -- The old 6 : 2 coming up. 
 
CHINK – Bow's at the mark. 
 
The crew prepares the spinnaker. 
 
JOHN -- This is it, guys.  We have 57 seconds to find.... What said 
the man with the big cigars? 
 
CREW -- Never give in. Never give in. Never give in. 
 
Crew raises the spinnaker. 
 
JOHN -- Let's run these bastards down. 
 
The crew is fairly still holding the boat square to the wind. 
 
JOHN -- (to audience) As soon as we head downwind I can feel her 
sliding into the groove.  Our sails are delicately balanced with a 
light wind dead astern and Ben's beautiful boat responds to my 
hands on the wheel with a mystical grace. Where's the wind? 
 
CHINK -- Left side looks stronger.   
 
MAD DOG -- Up two, John, up two.  That is good.  It is a lift.  Good.  
Perfect.  Hold her there. 
 
HUGH -- We have got definite boat speed on them, John.  I think 
she's going to... She's jibing.  Dive below her.   102
 
JOHN -- Pole aft! We're back in it, Hughie. We're back in it! 
 
CHINK -- Heads are swivelling on the red boat.  They're worried. 
 
MAD DOG -- We're giving them the heebee-jeebees.  
 
HUGH -- Dennis'll try and come across.  And he won't care if he 
rams us.  He's got right of way. We have to pass before she blocks 
us.   
 
CHINK -- The red boat's jibing. 
 
HUGH -- We have to get past her before she reaches us.   
 
MAD DOG -- Up a bit more, John.   
 
CHINK -- The red boat's getting close. 
 
MAD DOG -- Looking good.   
 
CHINK -- If they hit us.... 
 
JOHN -- ... we'll be disqualified. I know, I know.  Mad dog…? 
 
MAD DOG -- Still looking good.  
 
CHINK -- Jesus, they're getting bloody close. 
 
MAD DOG -- Still looking good.... 
 
CHINK -- Here they come. 
 
Crew watches Liberty coming straight towards them then passing 
behind them. 
Lights up on Alan still watching. 
 
ALAN -- (cringing, as if to protect himself from the collision.) Jesus 
Christmas!   
 
MAD DOG -- And there they go! 
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CHINK -- By a whisker. 
 
Alan looks up again. 
 
ALAN -- Jesus bloody Christmas!  Ben!  Benny!  Get your arse up 
here!  We overtook them. We're winning again! 
 
JOHN -- We're going to jibe and drop the chute at the same time, 
guys.  And it is the last drop, so make it the best. Prepare to jibe. 
 
Ben arrives. 
 
ALAN -- She's heading up the last leg 20 seconds ahead. 
 
BEN -- I knew they could do it.  I knew it! 
 
JOHN -- Wait for it... Hoist the genoa! 
 
The major hoists the genoa up the mast with the winch. 
 
JOHN -- Here we go.  Jibing the boat! 
 
The boat jibes around the mark.  The spinnaker comes down. 
 
JOHN -- This is it.  The last leg home. 
 
CHINK -- We've got 20 seconds on them. 
 
JOHN -- By no means a safe lead. 
 
MAD DOG -- Red boat coming round the mark.   
 
HUGH -- Dennis'll try every trick in the book. Whatever happens, 
John, we have to keep a hard cover on them. 
 
Pause. 
 
JOHN -- What's he doing, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- He's tacking. 
 
JOHN -- Here we go. Tacking the boat!   104
 
The Crew tacks the boat in slow motion.  As they continue to tack, 
backwards and forwards, their actions become dancelike. 
 
JOHN -- And so it begins.  Dennis tries again and again to find 
some clear air to give his boat the power to get past us.  And 
every time he tries we tack across to keep it from him.  And with 
each tack both boats lose a little more speed. 
 
ALAN -- How many is that?   
 
BEN -- 22, or it could be 23. 
 
ALAN -- Bloody hell.  (looking through binoculars) Dennis's crew 
don't even look tired yet. 
 
BEN -- They've had more practice at this kind of racing than us. 
 
HUGH -- He's trying to break us, John. 
 
JOHN -- Let him try. 
 
BEN -- While we were having big wins against the frogs and the 
poms, Dennis and the others were going at each other like this all 
summer, months on end.  They've only just started. 
 
HUGH -- The red boat's tacking again.  
 
JOHN -- So quickly? Are you sure, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- He's committed.  We have to tack, John. 
 
JOHN -- Tack the boat! 
 
The Crew tacks the boat. 
 
HUGH -- And he's going straight back again, John.  Tack her again. 
 
JOHN -- Hughie, wait a minute, let's try to relax a bit and make up 
some boatspeed. We should be at 6 1/2 knots before we tack. 
 
HUGH -- We have to cover them, John.   105
 
JOHN -- Mad dog?  
 
MAD DOG -- 5 1/2, skipper. 
 
HUGH – We'll lose them. 
 
JOHN -- Damn it.  Okay. Tacking the boat! 
 
Crew tacks the boat in slow motion. 
 
JOHN -- The grinders’ pain would be intolerable for any ordinary 
human being, and each one has to struggle for a reason to 
disobey every instinct screaming inside his head telling him that 
his body is too tired and the pain too great ever to do it again. 
 
HUGH – He's coming back, John.  We have to go again. 
 
JOHN -- Jesus. And again!  Tacking the boat! 
 
The crew tacks the boat.  Exhaustion is setting in. 
 
CHINK -- This one's for Hughie. 
 
CREW -- Hughie! 
 
ALAN -- How many have they done now? 
 
BEN – 38 or 39. 
 
ALAN -- Bloody hell.  Most I ever did was eight, and that nearly 
killed me. Come on, boys.  Not far now. 
 
HUGH -- Red boat returning.  Tack her, John. 
 
JOHN -- Tacking! 
 
YA -- How about one for the skipper? 
 
CHINK -- Make it the best.  
 
CREW -- One for the skipper.   106
 
The Crew tacks the boat. 
 
JOHN -- One windshift could make the difference to either of us 
right now. 
 
HUGH -- We've still got a few boat lengths on them, John.  And 
we're almost at the layline.  Here they come again.  Tack again, 
John. 
 
JOHN -- We're almost home, gentlemen. Almost home.  Tacking 
the boat. 
 
CHINK -- How about one for Bondy! 
 
MAD DOG -- We'd better make this one the best or we won't get 
paid! 
 
CREW -- Bondy! 
 
The Crew tacks the boat. 
 
CHINK – That puts us on the layline.   
 
HUGH – Chink’s right, John.  Tack now and it is a straight run to 
the finish. 
 
JOHN -- Forget it, I'm staying right between the red boat and the 
finishing line.  I'm not tacking until Dennis does. 
 
HUGH -- John? 
 
JOHN – If we tack now, Hughie, and the wind shifts, Dennis could 
still take us. 
 
HUGH -- If we don't go soon he'll run us into the spectator fleet. 
 
CHINK -- We're way over the line. 
 
JOHN – Not going until he does. 
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HUGH -- John, we almost need a spinnaker to get back down to 
the line. 
 
Beat. 
 
JOHN – Okay, okay, but if he doesn't come with us, I'm going back.  
Tacking the boat. 
 
CHINK -- Let's make the last one for Ben.  And make it the best! 
 
MAD DOG -- Only the best for Benny!! 
 
CREW -- Benny!!! 
 
The exhausted crew tacks the boat. 
 
JOHN -- Hughie? 
 
HUGH – Something's happening over there... they seem to be... I 
think... I think he's run out of options, John. 
 
Pause 
 
CHINK -- He's going.  
 
HUGH -- Dennis is tacking, John. 
 
JOHN -- Thank Christ for that.   
 
HUGH -- Red boat's preparing their spinnaker pole. 
 
JOHN -- Is the light air spinnaker ready, Chink? 
 
CHINK – Spinnaker's ready, skipper. 
 
JOHN -- Are we parallel with the layline, Hughie? 
 
HUGH -- Just take her a little bit higher, John. 
 
John steers to starboard. 
 
HUGH -- Okay.  Hold this course.    108
 
JOHN -- We're taking her home. 
 
ALAN -- Hang on, boys, you can do it.  Make an old man happy. 
 
BEN -- You're not so old. 
 
ALAN -- No.  But I will be. 
 
Alan is isolated by light.  We hear, again, the resounding slam of the 
dungeon door which introduced Alan at the beginning of the play. 
 
ALAN -- I...I think we're going to make it... Benny? 
 
Lights return. Ben is no longer there. (Perhaps is now on the boat, 
standing by the mast.) 
 
ALAN -- Benny? 
 
The Crew are still.   
 
HUGH -- Seven boat lengths. 
 
ALAN -- Where are you Benny? 
 
Slowly, in the distance we begin to hear "Down under". 
 
CHINK -- Six boat lengths. 
 
ALAN -- Benny? It is all coming true, we are going to win it. 
 
Now we can just begin to discern the beginning of the victorious 
cacophony we heard at the opening.  Slowly it gets louder. 
 
MAD DOG -- Five boat lengths. 
 
ALAN -- Benny?  
 
HUGH -- Four boat lengths. 
 
ALAN -- Who’s going to keep me honest now, Benny? 
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CHINK -- Three boat lengths. 
 
Beat. 
 
JOHN -- Two boat lengths. 
 
Pause. 
 
The America's Cup canon is fired. 
The victorious cacophony rushes to a crescendo 
The lights slowly go down on an astonished crew. 
The cacophony fades, leaving one last voice in the darkness. 
 
"Any boss who sacks a worker for being late today, is a bum!" 
 
Lights linger on John and Alan as they were at the beginning.  
 
End of play. 
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Part two: 
 
Composing Taking Liberty 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 
1)  Avoiding Tedium 
 
This second part of my thesis is designed to give context to the first part, the 
script, which I will call the practice-based research component.  As the 
editors of the first issue of the Canadian Journal of Practice-Based Research 
in Theatre point out, the term "practice-based research" might equally well 
refer to research “for my practice, through my practice or into my practice” 
(2009, p.1), so I should make it clear that, in this instance, I am referring to 
research I have done, through my own practice, into the way drama seduces 
an audience into creating for themselves a mimetic illusion. By way of 
demonstration, I will discuss the intentionally seductive aspects I have built 
into my script for Taking Liberty.  The script is the blueprint for a 
performance and it is, of course, through the performance that the seduction 
is perpetrated. In this contextual component I will examine the nature of the 
mimetic illusion and the methodology of the seduction I have packaged into 
my practice-based research component. 
 
At this time there is so much engaging drama available to us that it is easy to 
take engagement for granted, but anyone who has had to sit through drama   111
that failed to engage them can attest to its being an excruciating experience 
in which time seems to slow down as boredom and restlessness intensify.  
Most audiences seem to think that their engagement depends on familiarity, 
so are inclined to watch the kind of drama that is aimed at satisfying their 
narrative expectations, which helps to explain the popularity of genre 
specific drama. However, too much of the same thing can be boring as well. 
As Bruner points out, "narrative generally, like culture itself, is organised 
around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms and possibility-
evoking transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.16).  For all their fear of tedium, 
absence of innovation in the form and style of mainstream drama leaves 
audiences hungry for material that subverts their expectations. Thus form 
and style evolve as dramatists try to keep their audiences hovering 
precariously between norms and transgressions. Judgements are made as to 
the value and quality of these new developments of form and style. With 
regard to content, Novitz (Hjort and Laver, 1997, p.246-262) points out that 
transgressive works of art that challenge core values and beliefs will 
generally be perceived as threatening and will excite hostility towards the 
artists who create them.  He adds that literature can, however, also operate 
subversively by initially engaging their sympathies through the medium of 
their own beliefs and values (and expectations) so that they "become 
susceptible, for the moment at least, to different beliefs, moral standards, 
religious values, and so on" (p.249). So if a dramatic narrative is able to 
draw its audience into an engagement with its characters it can then lead 
them into a conditional acceptance of those characters’ (perhaps alien) sets 
of beliefs and values.  Afterwards these attitudes will be judged according to 
the standards of that audience (which may or may not have changed in lieu 
of their experience).  
 
I should mention that when I speak of audiences in this thesis I am speaking 
of those audiences I have personal experience of as a performer, director 
and writer. I estimate that there would have been somewhere between 2000 
to 3000 of them (ranging in size from as few as 10 to as many as 5000 
individuals), so I have come to know audiences quite well.  As with   112
individuals, they are multifaceted, complex, contradictory and 
unpredictable. They vary enormously and have a great deal in common. I 
have seen and experienced many audiences who appeared to be deeply 
engaged with a drama even though, later, they judged it to be of dubious 
quality. Engagement, or reception, is triggered prior to any awareness of 
quality or merit. My contention is that the triggering of the reception 
process has the nature of a seduction and, like a seduction , it is only with 
hindsight that the victim is able to judge whether the experience was 
worthwhile or not.  What I am concerned with here is the mechanics of the 
seduction rather than the form, style or ideological intentions of the drama. 
How is an audience seduced into caring about characters and situations they 
know to be fictional?  Is there something in human nature that makes us 
susceptible to a hypnotic engagement by the narrative? Is there really such 
an activity as "suspending disbelief"? If so, how does it work? If not, does 
reception theory offer an alternative explanation? These are some of the 
questions that have engaged me through the writing of the script for Taking 
Liberty. In my research for this contextual component I have found that 
contemporary philosophy of the emotions provides some of the most 
interesting answers. 
 
I should clarify which aspect of the reception process I am referring to as 
seduction. The word seduce is defined by the OED as "To lead (a person) 
astray in conduct or belief; to draw away from the right or intended course 
of action to or into a wrong one; to tempt, entice, or beguile to do something 
wrong, foolish, or unintended" 
(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/174721?redirectedFrom=seduce#eid).  
My own choice of the alternatives offered by this definition, that is, my 
meaning in the context of this thesis, is "to beguile a person to do something 
unintended".  There are two kinds of intention to be discerned when 
discussing an audience entering into an engagement with a drama. The first 
is the initial intention to engage with the performance – which becomes a 
commitment when they buy a ticket. The second kind are all the intentions 
we have that are elicited by our emotional involvement with the drama, such   113
as rescuing the damsel in distress or helping her kill the aliens. We never act 
on these intentions because they are decoupled from the executive 
representations that effect physical movement (I examine this process in 
Chapter 3) but we are, nonetheless, beguiled and seduced. 
 
Drama and emotion are broad concepts that overlap and engage with each 
other in a number of ways. I will be discussing the nature of emotion at 
some length, so first of all, let me clarify what I mean by drama. Generally, 
when I use the term I am referring to the performance of a dramatic 
discourse common to film and theatre which contains action, events and 
character-to-character communication (illocutionary action) within a 
narrative context.  By specifying a drama common to both film and theatre 
I'm trying to isolate dramatic narrative from those modernist theatrical 
practices that contemporary theatre has inherited (or rediscovered) from 
non-narrative performance modes such as ritual ceremony, music hall, 
dance and circus. This is not to suggest that drama doesn't employ any or all 
of these, but in drama they are employed, as Aristotle recognised, for the 
sake of the narrative action rather than spectacle.  By the same token my use 
of the term drama excludes those technological aspects of film's narrative 
devices by which the screen simulates the vast windscreen of a thrillingly 
swift magical vehicle, and lends the drama a hypnotic elasticity of time and 
space, more in the mode of a novel or a dream than the representations of 
human action that drama in the theatre is limited to.  Condensing my 
definition of drama in this way will, I hope, allow me to finesse some 
peripheral differences between the practices of writing for film and theatre 
and to focus my field of inquiry on those aspects of the performance of 
drama that are common to both.  This will help me to identify those 
particular aspects of the dramatic mode in which the representation of 
human action and interaction is designed for the seduction and engagement 
of an audience. 
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2) The "feeling" method 
 
Many dramatists make the point (for example, Duerrenmatt and Osborne in 
Cole; p.132, p.141, and Albee in Plimpton, p.251) that it is not useful to think 
too hard about the practice of scriptwriting while it is happening.  In the 
heat of composition, the composer is faced with an infinite variety of 
decisions about what the story is and the way it should be told.  Every 
possibility must be conceived, considered and decided upon against 
myriads of other possibilities and, until the work is submitted, no decision 
will ever be final because it must always be subject to re-evaluation in light 
of the next one and the one after that.  It is impossible to measure 
consciously and rationally the value of every choice against all the other 
possible choices because if you did it is hard to imagine that any final 
decisions would ever be made. Therefore, emotional responses have to be 
trusted. As de Sousa points out in a more general context,  
 
... emotions are among the mechanisms that control the crucial factor of 
salience among what would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of 
objects of attention, interpretations, and strategies of inference and 
conduct.  
de Sousa, 1987, p.xv 
 
According to de Sousa we learn and develop emotional responses by means 
of structured memories which he calls "paradigm scenarios": 
 
Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the 
characteristic... emotion-type..., and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" 
responses to the situation, when normality is first a biological matter and then 
quickly becomes a cultural one. 
de Sousa, p.182 
 
A baby's smile is a prime example of this cultural appropriation of a 
biological response.  Initially a baby's smile is "a purely biological function" 
(ibid) with no particular intention to communicate.  But by three months the 
baby has learnt that a smile will evoke a response from its caretaker and so   115
"begins to use the smile 'instrumentally', that is, 'in order to get a response 
from someone'" (Stern, 1977, p.45; cited in de Sousa, p.182). Even so, a smile 
is rarely a conscious decision.  Paradigm scenarios operate below the radar 
of conscious memory, influencing decisions by recalling emotional 
responses to the perceived value of previous actions:  
 
... did the immediate outcome of the chosen action bring punishment or 
reward?  In other words, was it accompanied by emotions and feelings of pain 
or pleasure, sorrow or joy, shame or pride?  No less importantly, was the 
future outcome of the actions punishing or rewarding...? One of the main traits 
of civilised human behaviour is thinking in terms of the future.   
Damasio, 2003, p.145 
 
We compare past and present in order to "predict" the outcome of the 
intended action; "anticipating it in simulated form" (ibid, p.146), measuring 
immediate gratification against potential for a pleasurable and proud future. 
In this way we grasp the meaning and value of a situation by its associated 
feeling before we have worked it out cognitively.  When juggling, if you think 
too hard about what your hands are doing you're likely to keep dropping the 
balls. Similarly, when composing, I have to "feel" my way through the 
writing, hoping as I go that the best choices are being made. So this 
investigation into my own practice has to be a retrospective analysis; one I 
couldn't have made at the time without dropping the balls.  
 
Decisions about composition must be made according to the internal 
requirements of the work.  The composition being dramatic, these decisions 
will be influenced by emotion, and one of the skills a dramatist needs to 
master is recognising the difference between the emotions generated by his 
own paradigm scenarios and those generated by the scenarios he is 
composing.  Often the story the storyteller most wants to tell, the one, that 
is, which seems to the writer to be of the deepest emotional significance, 
strikes an audience as dull and irrelevant because they don't have the same 
relationship with the material that the storyteller has.  The narrative images 
and tropes and scenarios that seemed so touching to the dramatist when he   116
conceived of them can be misinterpreted or simply fail to trigger other 
people's emotional responses.  Of course, caring deeply about a topic can 
produce great literature but it could also be said that the more deeply a 
storyteller feels about his tale, the greater the danger of misjudging its 
effects when told. Even playwrights whose works are inclined to be figural 
representations of their own paradigm scenarios, like Tennessee Williams 
or Edward Albee, recognise this.  We are all, as they say, born storytellers. 
We like people to listen to our stories.  The hard part is to keep them 
listening.  Care must be taken not to let a personal relationship with the 
dramatic content influence dramaturgical decisions. The smile must be 
shared.  
 
Taking Liberty was initially commissioned by the Perth Theatre Company (in 
partnership with the Royal Perth Yacht Club) to celebrate the 25th 
anniversary of Australia’s winning of the America’s Cup. The writing of the 
play therefore provided an ideal model for an examination of my 
dramaturgical practice because the application of compositional technique 
to the story material could be examined according to its intended effect on 
the audience without any danger of its being influenced by any personal 
emotional investment.   
 
 
3) Resistance to seduction 
 
Taking Liberty tells of Australia's victory over America in an international 
yacht race.  The race is called the America's Cup because it has taken place 
every three years since 1840 and America never lost, until 1983, when the 
American boat, Liberty, was beaten by an Australian yacht, Australia II. 
There were three major figures involved in the Australian campaign. The 
Australian businessman, Alan Bond, who financed the campaign; Ben 
Lexcen, the designer who revolutionised yacht design with his creation of 
the Australian yacht's "winged keel", and John Bertrand who skippered the 
boat. I had intended that Ben Lexcen would be my central character because,   117
while Bond was better known, he was also deeply unpopular with the West 
Australian community, who were likely to constitute my main audience. The 
eventual victory enhanced Bond's international reputation to such an extent 
that, on the strength of it, he built a global corporate empire from pure 
credit.  When his corporation collapsed most of the money that was lost was 
lost by West Australians. So I had intended to make Bond a minor character.  
However, it became clear as I began to write the play that Bond's role in the 
proceedings was too important and his presence too strong to relegate him 
to a "supporting role". While this seemed to be a problem at the time, it now 
makes the composing of Taking Liberty a particularly useful demonstration 
of the way that drama is able to seduce (or fail to seduce) its audience, even 
in spite of their resistance to the charms of the central character.  I never 
met Alan Bond in person (until, as it happened, on the opening night of the 
play) and so I was able to create my own version of him based on the 
evidence of media records, interviews with people who knew him, two 
biographies and his autobiography.  From these I selected the information 
necessary to present those aspects of his character (a dramatic character, 
fictional or not, is only ever an impression of a human being) which not only 
served the action of the play but allowed Bond to sell himself to the audience 
all over again .  
 
 
4) Dramaturgical Methodology 
 
The first chapter of this contextual component deals with my dramaturgical 
methodology as I applied it to the writing of Taking Liberty. I haven't tried to 
deal with all aspects of my practice, or to suggest that there is any system to 
my method.  Many drama-writing manuals currently available present a list 
of dramaturgical rules or "principles" that a dramatist might be expected to 
encounter and apply (for example; Egri, 1960; Smiley, 1971; McKee, 1998; 
Russin and Downs, 2004; Snyder, 2005). Each of these manuals 
differentiates itself by identifying a list of what the writer considers to be 
the most important dramaturgical aspects to be dealt with. Each list is   118
different, though plot, character and dialogue appear in most of them.  I only 
deal here with those aspects of the process which presented interesting 
problems or issues in the composing of this particular play.  My own list, 
consequently, turned out to be exposition, suspense, and development of 
character.  It could certainly be argued, however, that these are the three 
most important jobs necessary for the crafting of dramatic action.  
 
David Mamet has suggested that all important aspects of the dramaturgical 
process deal with the relation of each given moment to "the whole" of the 
work (in Plimpton, 2000, p.382).  In the process of the selection and 
arrangement of the story material into a dramatic structure, commonly 
called plotting, the choice and positioning of each piece of the story is 
contingent on the innumerable ways it relates to the rest of the story and 
the tensions set off by that positioning.  I begin Chapter 1 by suggesting why 
the distinction between the fabula and sjuzet is analogous to that between 
story and plot, but more useful than the latter for a clear understanding of 
what is meant by "mimetic illusion".  I suggest that a useful dramaturgical 
approach to the plotting of the story is to identify, as States does, two orders 
of causal determination.  Within the first order, the causal determinants are 
the form and design of the work and of the way it will be experienced by an 
audience.  The second order of causal determination is that of the causes 
and effects within the story-world of the drama.  I then suggest an 
"organising principle" for the design of the work within each of the two 
orders; “Egri's premise” is the organising principle in the first order, while, 
in the second, it is "the hero’s pursuit of the desired outcome".  These two 
organising principles become "keys" to the structure of the work.  
 
The next part of the chapter deals with the problem I have already referred 
to, which puts to the test the seductive power of my play. This is the history 
of Alan Bond after winning the cup, a history that might disincline the 
audience to celebrate the success of the whole endeavour and, in particular, 
prejudice them against my "hero".  My method of resolving the problem   119
demonstrates how the priorities of the first order of causal determination 
are translated into the causal patterns of the second. 
 
The rest of the chapter deals with certain aspects of the dramaturgical 
process of writing this play (though by no means all of them).  I begin with a 
discussion of the difficulties of exposition - information which is innately 
undramatic but necessary to understand the action.  Taking Liberty was 
particularly demanding of exposition.  Details about sailing and racing were 
necessary to appreciate much of the action, but were quite the opposite of 
dramatic. I describe some of the methods I used to make these kinds of 
essential details palatable to an impatient audience. 
 
The success of any drama depends, to a great extent, on the dramatist's 
control of the audience's experience of time.  This is mainly, though not 
completely, influenced by their relationship with "what might happen next"; 
it is a function of suspense.  I discuss three methods of raising and 
maintaining tension and suspense: raising the stakes, manipulating 
temporal awareness and planting expectations of unpredictable outcomes.  I 
also identify two aspects of the unpredictable in drama: event and character.   
 
Finally in this chapter I discuss two approaches to the development and 
differentiation of character: dispositions or temperament, and status and 
self-esteem.  The first of these has to do with the private side of the 
individual character, the second with the public face.  Both approaches have 
a history almost as old as drama itself. 
 
 
5) Reception; mimesis and catharsis 
 
The second chapter is concerned with the process of reception by an 
audience of the performance of dramatic narrative.  Engagement with the 
dramatic text demands complex cognitive activity that shares much in 
common with the everyday psychological activity happening all the time as   120
we process sensory data into information and "understanding".  In the 
context of everyday life, the effort required to maintain these complex 
cognitive activities is considered to be worth making because they are 
necessary for our survival and flourishing.  A dramatic narrative needs to 
seduce it is audience into believing that, even in the absence of "real life 
benefits", the same effort is, nonetheless, necessary.  I argue that the illusion 
of this apparent necessity is sustained by an emotional involvement with the 
dilemma of the principal character or characters, the condition sometimes 
referred to as catharsis. While Chapter 3 will deal with the emotions and 
their part in the "cathartic" engagement of the audience, Chapter 2 is 
concerned with the cognitive processes of narrative reception.  
 
To begin with though, it is necessary to consider why most theories dealing 
with the activity of narrative reception are inclined to ignore catharsis.  I 
start by discussing the history of scepticism towards catharsis and question 
the view that catharsis is a "bad influence" on audiences of drama of both 
theatre and film.  
 
In spite of its critics the universal popularity of cathartic narrative in all 
forms and mediums is undeniable and the rest of the chapter explores 
reasons for its success.  I consider two kinds of explanation.  First, an 
evolutionary explanation of the advantages the capacity for storytelling may 
have offered for the survival of the species.  The rest of the chapter grapples 
with a second kind of explanation of the way dramatic narrative engages 
with the cognitive processes of the individual members of its audience; that 
is, the theory and philosophy of narrative reception. Reception theory 
constitutes a major branch of that vast field of research now usually referred 
to as narratology. I couldn't possibly do justice to the enormous amount of 
research that has gone into this field of study. I have tried to select and 
reference some of the research that has highlighted the complexity of the 
reception process. I have taken into account the contribution of cognitive 
"constructivist" psychology, formalist film theory and German reception 
theory to try to explain the way that everyday methods of processing   121
sensory data into information and "understanding" in daily life are recruited 
into narrative reception.   
 
Narrative reception begins with the ordinary processing of sensory data into 
information. A dramatic narrative depicts a sequence of events designed to 
persuade an audience that they need to identify what sort of information 
they are getting and how and why it is relevant to the ongoing dramatic 
development of the narrative.  We "make sense" of narrative by relating the 
information provided by the szujet to what we already know and 
understand.  Thus we fill the gaps left by the szujet with story material 
(fabula) which, based on our prior knowledge, we assume "ought" to be 
there.  This activity takes place at two "levels" of thinking; "primary" 
preconscious emotional responses, and "secondary" thinking that entails 
cognitive awareness. It is the combination of these processes that leads us to 
accept the apparent reality of the fictional world according to the 
conventions it has established. 
 
The second chapter concludes with a discussion of Ricoeur's model of 
mimesis.  It is based on Ricoeur's re-evaluation of Aristotle's dramatic model 
in the light of our understanding of time as established by Augustine.  
Following Aristotle, this model takes action as the principal mode of 
narrative and identifies three aspects of our understanding of human action: 
a practical understanding of its meaningful structures, its "symbolic 
resources" and its temporal character.  Mimesis is described as an 
interactive activity between text and audience taking place in three stages 
which Ricoeur calls "the three moments of mimesis".  First is the "pre-
understanding of the world of action", then comes the engagement with the 
text, requiring representation of action and the organising of the events, 
otherwise referred to as "emplotment". This collaborative mimetic process 
culminates in the third stage, the "re-configuration" of the action as it is 
finally understood by the audience.   
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After a brief discussion of the differences between narrative reception by a 
reader and that of an audience member, I conclude that in both cases a great 
deal of psychic effort is required.  I argue that the motivation to take such an 
effort is triggered by an emotional response to the narrative.   
 
 
 
6) The Emotional Audience 
 
The third chapter begins with a consideration of the paradoxical question 
(common in discussions of drama and emotion): why do we care about 
fictional characters?  I consider some of the solutions that have been offered 
before presenting my favoured explanation that the mental activity of 
audience members when they engage with a dramatic performance is 
related to the essential everyday activity by which we try to understand 
other people.  This involves a capacity to empathise with other people's 
dilemmas.  Drama exploits these empathetic inclinations to initiate the 
cathartic engagement of its audience.  This leads to a discussion of the role 
of emotions in the reception process. 
 
I identify two schools of thought about the nature of emotion; those who 
associate emotion with cognition, and those who don't.  The first group 
conceive of emotions as "propositional attitudes" and try to describe 
cultural explanations for mature human emotional experience.  To the latter 
the emotions are precognitive physiological responses associated with 
“readiness to act”. According to this theory it is the feeling of these 
physiological changes that we identify as emotion; the different kinds of 
readiness changes determine which emotions we feel.  The readiness to act 
is typically related to a desire to act, but there are some mental steps to be 
taken before desire is translated into physical movement.  The first step is 
the decision which establishes the intention to act.  This intention initiates a 
series of "executive representations" that relate the body to the goal of the 
action.  Damasio refers to these representations as "body maps" (Damasio,   123
1999).  He suggests that the capacity for generating body maps also offers 
the possibility of generating "as if" simulations that inform us how it might 
feel when the action we intend to take has been taken even before we take it.  
This notion is offered as a possible resolution to the fiction paradox. 
 
In the next part of the chapter I suggest that the composition of dramatic 
action, insofar as it is a design for an emotional experience, bears 
comparison with the composition of music.   
 
The field of human action can be divided into three categories according to 
the way it is influenced by emotion: (i) impulsive actions operate under the 
complete control of the emotions that initiate them, finessing cognition so 
that the necessity of the action is apparently unquestionable. Dramatists 
often create situations with high-stakes and big risks to provide plausible 
motives for characters to take this kind of action. (ii) Semi-deliberate and 
(iii) deliberate actions are those in which, as the name suggests, the 
emotional influence is mitigated by self-awareness and the need to plan and 
deliberate.   
 
The “propositional attitude” school of emotional theory takes a more 
philosophical approach to emotions, identifying the interaction of feeling 
and cognition, and conceiving of emotional experience as a feedback loop 
between subjective feelings and cognitive reappraisals.  This takes into 
account the complexity of values embedded in the meaning structures that a 
given emotion is responding to.  Everyday explanations of subjective 
emotional experience are narrative in form in that they give present 
emotions a context and value by identifying the relation of the subject's 
concerns to the present situation and to the past and future.  Values are 
innately attached to one's own selfish needs and desires but they are also 
taught, and thus culturally mediated; this includes the socially prescribed 
value or "appropriateness" of the emotional response itself.  Narratives can 
demonstrate how we ought to respond emotionally to the kinds of situation 
we might encounter.    124
 
The plausibility of a dramatic action depends on the plausibility of the 
motive - whether the audience can recognise and respond to the concerns of 
the hero in the context of her situation.  Like the composition of music, 
dramatic situations are designed to evoke cathartic responses of the 
broadest possible variety of valence and intensity.  I give a rather contrary 
demonstration of this by showing how two dramatic situations of entirely 
different scale can produce emotional responses of equal intensity. The 
potential complexity of dramatic catharsis is demonstrated by instances of 
emotion inducing denial and self-deception.  When, for example, a person 
feels two strong but incompatible desires at the same time it produces 
"psychic discomfort".    We have a capacity, in such circumstances, to 
unconsciously alter our view of the world so that it appears more 
accommodating. We see it in the way, for example, the Fox decides that the 
grapes he can't reach must be sour, or the way, given the choice, that we 
choose to believe in myths that rationalise our aggression and place our own 
tribe at the centre of God's love.  These are recognisable patterns of 
behaviour but unpredictable in any given particular instance.  
 
Drama is often driven by motivations that are, for a variety of reasons, 
unspoken or even, sometimes, unspeakable. I consider some of these more 
complex aspects of the operation of the emotions in drama, such as the way 
that Iago’s unspoken shame translates into his hatred for Othello, or the 
disappointment of the characters in the plays of Chekhov, and I suggest that 
it is only by means of the emotional comprehension we call catharsis that we 
can fully appreciate dramatic situations.   
 
In so far as contributing anything new to academic knowledge is concerned, 
my implicit argument is that narrative theory has underestimated the 
involvement of the emotions in the process of narrative reception.  My 
conclusion is that a richer understanding of the role of the emotions in the 
reception of dramatic narrative would be a useful academic pursuit.  That   125
said, my true purpose and greatest hope is that the work I have done here 
will influence my own dramaturgical methodology for the better. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
A Dramaturgical Methodology 
 
 
... if you write enough of it and let it flow enough, you'll probably come 
across something that will give you a key as to structure.  I think the 
process of writing a play is working back and forth between the moment 
and the whole.  The moment and the whole, the fluidity of the dialogue 
and the necessity of a strict construction. 
Mamet (in Plimpton, 2000, p.382) 
 
 
 
1)  Plotting the material 
 
Story and plot are usually described as the "what" and the "how" of 
narrative respectively.  But the meanings of the terms "story" and "plot", as 
both Lodge (1996, p.181), and Brooks (1992, p.13) point out, have become 
unstable and so less useful as terms for discussing narrative.  The Russian 
formalist distinction between the fabula and sjuzet is more precise. The 
fabula roughly equates with the story, the sjuzet with the plot.  The fabula 
has been defined as "the raw material" of the narrative (Lodge, 1996, p.207), 
and more precisely as "the order of events referred to by the narrative" 
(Brooks, 1992, p.12).  The sjuzet is the arrangement of and consequent 
perspective on the actions and events presented within the narrative.  This 
arrangement of actions and events is contingent on the temporal nature of 
its telling, that is, the arrangement is designed such that what is revealed 
sustains an ongoing preoccupation with what has yet to be revealed, the 
illusion being that what seems to be revealed was already there before.  This 
impression that the narrative creates of the fabula as an "invariant core" 
which "exists prior to any narrative presentation" is   127
 
... in the nature of a mimetic illusion, in that the fabula - "what really happened" - 
is in fact a mental construction that the reader derives from the sjuzet, which is 
all that he ever directly knows.   
Brooks, 1992, p.13 
 
Thus the sjuzet evokes the fabula in the minds of the audience, endowing it 
with a quality of "prior existence" by drawing the audience into a shared 
perspective of it. Interpreting the fabula from the sjuzet requires the 
imaginative (re)creation of the "original" events as experiences from the 
perspective of the characters involved in the narrative: "this race must be 
real because I care about winning it".  The mimetic illusion then is the story 
within which an audience imagines itself as they listen to, and/or watch and 
interpret the narrative; the illusion being that the story exists prior to its 
telling. And it renders the audience unaware of their own complicity in the 
creation of the experience.   
 
While the audience only ever experiences the fabula by way of the szujet, the 
dramatist must begin the composition of the szujet by gathering the material 
of the fabula. This story material is either invented or excavated.  Drama 
based on extant material or history is usually easier to write than when 
having to invent both the story and the manner of telling: 
 
The dramatist writing history could finish a play Monday and start another 
Wednesday, and go right on.  Because the stories are all prepared for him.  
Inventing the story is what takes all the time. 
Arthur Miller (in Plimpton, 2000. p.165) 
 
In the case of Taking Liberty the story material was readily available. If you 
have read the play you will know that in 1983 Australia won the America's 
Cup, which many believed, at the time, to be the world's most prestigious 
international yacht race.  Australia certainly believed it. But this alone would 
hardly have given the event historical significance.  What made the victory 
unique was that the Americans had never been beaten in the 134 year   128
history of "The Cup".  As a result the event made headlines around the 
world.  The final race of the series was broadcast live from Rhode Island 
Sound, which made it the middle of the night in Australia, but it was 
nonetheless said to have been watched by the majority of the Australian 
population.  The following morning a mildly intoxicated Australian Prime 
Minister famously announced that "anybody who sacks a worker for being 
late today is a bum".  The Sydney Morning Herald headline called it "The 
Biggest Thing since Peace in 1945 - Triumph Unites Nation".  Australia II, the 
yacht that won the race, was built and financed by a team from Perth, the 
state capital of Western Australia.  For my research, I read the many books 
that have been written about the event and interviewed some of the people 
who were involved in it.  It was the job of "celebrating" the winning of the 
America's Cup that presented me with a problem: how to convince an 
audience 25 years later that the event was still worth celebrating? Sporting 
events slip quickly into the quicksand of cultural history.  It might be 
difficult for an audience to remember why such a big fuss had been made 
about a boat race.  If they were to understand how the race was won and 
fully appreciate the significance of the achievement, a history of 30 years 
needed to be condensed into two hours, in a form that would support a 
sustained engagement with the material.  Where to begin?  Perhaps with the 
question: how do I come up with the plot that best tells the story? 
 
According to States, the dramatist makes decisions based on "two different 
orders of causal determination" (States, 1994, p.69).  The first of these is 
"the realm of design or purpose in nature... that is, the author’s super-
imposition of form on the seemingly "probable" events of the play" (ibid, 
p.70). Here the dramatist is thinking like an architect, organising the fate 
and fortunes of the characters and determining action according to 
narrative function so that it demonstrates his central idea (there can only be 
one). States' second "order of causal determination" is concerned with the 
purposes and pursuits within the world of the drama; the logic of the cause 
and effect of events and actions understood from a perspective or 
perspectives within the world of the drama. Here decisions regarding action   129
are made by or on behalf of and in the interests of the characters 
themselves. Like the relationship of the fabula and szujet, the difference 
between States’ two "orders of causal determination" suggests a difference 
between the material of the story and the way it is experienced.  However, 
while the fabula and szujet are useful notions for the theoretical analysis of 
narrative, States’ concept of the two "orders of causal determination" has a 
more practical design aspect to it. The first step in approaching the design of 
an object is to establish its purpose.  In the case of drama, purpose needs to 
be established in both orders of causal determination.   
 
Identifying the purpose helps to establish an organisational principle.  So for 
example, for the first order, a premise, as conceived and defined by Lajos 
Egri, is the essential basic description of the idea that the drama is designed 
to demonstrate.  Egri argues that a spare, well formulated premise is 
essential for the conception of an effective drama because it 
quintessentialises the purpose for which the drama is written.  Egri takes 
issue with Malevinsky who argued, as I have done, that emotion is the 
essential element of drama. Egri doesn't disagree, but he points out that 
emotion won't necessarily create good drama "if we do not know what kind 
of forces set emotion going" (Egri, 1960, p.7).  Smiley suggests that "as a play 
dramatises a pattern of action, it simultaneously explores human character" 
(Smiley, 1971, p.123).  Egri's premise pares down this pattern of action and 
exploration to a simple spare phrase; for example, "shiftlessness leads to 
ruin" (Juno and the Paycock), "the sins of the fathers are visited on the 
children" (Ghosts), "jealousy destroys itself and the object of its love" 
(Othello), "ruthless ambition leads to its own destruction" (Macbeth, Sweet 
Bird of Youth).  It is not hard to recognise a three-part operation at work in 
each of these.  The first part suggests character (shiftlessness, ruthless 
ambition etc), the second suggests conflict and direction, the third implies a 
conclusion.  It offers a dynamic operational structure for what Thornton 
Wilder said was drama's purpose; "the demonstration of an idea" (Cole, 
1961, p.111). Egri's premise shouldn't be mistaken for some sort of 
description of the “meaning” of the work.  Its job is simply to force the writer   130
into ruthless concision.  It provides a touchstone for measuring relevance.  A 
premise helps to identify those parts of the drama that are not part of what 
Aristotle calls the "unified whole":  
 
... incidents must be so arranged that if any one of them is differently placed 
or taken away the effect of wholeness will be seriously disrupted.  For if the 
presence or absence of something makes no apparent difference, it is no real 
part of the whole. 
Aristotle, 1981, p.43 
 
 
The second order of causal determination refers to the "internal" cause and 
effect structure of the world of the play.  Here the most important 
determinant of causes is "the hero's pursuit of the goal".  The word "hero" 
here has none of the connotations of courage and moral superiority 
conventionally associated with it. The hero is simply the principal agent of 
action and, usually, the subject whose perspective we are inclined to adopt 
to observe the moment by moment events and situations of the drama.  The 
action is driven by the need or desire of a character who consequently acts 
(or who in some cases, most famously Hamlet, doesn't) and who we 
therefore come to think of as the hero: "It begins with the premise: the hero 
wants something.  His desire begins with the beginning of the film" (Mamet, 
2007, p.59, italics in the original).  The desire of the hero for the goal is what 
establishes the temporal realm for potential mimetic action. “Typically the 
aim of a desire is to bring about some state of affairs" (Elster, in Solomon, 
2004, p.153). The action of the drama will take place in the gap between the 
initial wanting of/need for the desired outcome and getting it (or not).  The 
hero's desire is the first step in making what Ricoeur calls "the break that 
opens the space for fiction" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.45).  It is the beginning of the 
process I have described by which the audience, prompted by the 
performance of the script, fills in for themselves everything necessary to 
understand what connects the beginning with the end, the heroes with their 
goals.  Limiting the material to anything and everything necessary for the 
audience to understand the hero's "pursuit of the goal" helps to maintain   131
another of Aristotle's principal requirements for the drama: the unity of 
action. 
 
A disciplined unity of action maintains an audience’s concern about the 
outcome. It is a discipline that can lead the dramatist to some interesting 
dramaturgical solutions to storytelling problems.  For example, the 
requirement to "celebrate" the winning of the America's Cup raised a 
potentially serious obstacle to the willingness of the audience to enter into 
the spirit of the drama. Certain events that have occurred since that race 
meant that a substantial proportion of a Western Australian audience might 
be disinclined to celebrate. As I explained in my introduction the campaign 
to win the Cup was led by Alan Bond, the businessman who raised the 
money.  While he received the Order of Australia medal and became a 
national hero as a result of the win, in the years since his heyday of popular 
celebrity Alan Bond has suffered a precipitous fall from grace. He was at the 
centre of one of the country's most titanic corporate collapses, losing 
millions of dollars for thousands of investors.  Many who had invested in 
Bond's conglomerate of companies were reported to have "lost their life 
savings" and many of those lived in Western Australia and still do. Although 
Bond spent time in jail and had his membership of the Order of Australia 
rescinded, he received early parole for good behaviour and many felt he had 
been let off too lightly.  So since winning the cup Bond has become 
something of a pariah.  An effective "celebration" of the event would need to 
finesse this complication.  To insert into the story any sort of overt apology 
or justification for Bond's later behaviour was dramaturgically 
unacceptable.  It might incline the audience to suspect the entire work of 
being a propaganda exercise and, more importantly, it would be irrelevant 
to the plot, thereby breaking the unity of action.  If the audience was to enter 
into the spirit of the drama and care about the winning of the race their 
prejudice against Bond would need to be tempered.  I came up with two 
dramaturgical solutions to the problem.  The first came about by finding the 
right premise (in the Egri sense) for the play. 
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"Relentless determination leads to victory" might appear to be a predictable 
choice of premise for a drama about a sporting event but apparent 
predictability, as I will discuss later, can serve a purpose.  What is 
unpredictable in such a massively expensive and collaborative project as the 
campaign for the America's Cup is the unfolding conflict between the 
different modes of relentless determination within and between the 
disparate characters who were all supposed to be working together for the 
same end.  That, in part, is what produced the colour and intensity of the 
drama.  
 
Relentlessness is a synonym for obsessiveness.  They refer to similar 
behaviour, but the first has a positive and the second a pejorative 
connotation.  The grimly determined Captain Ahab is a character to whom 
both words are equally applicable and he acquires enigmatic appeal as a 
consequence of this ambivalence. But determination isn't always necessarily 
grim.  Sometimes it can't afford to be.  Raising the funds to finance the 
campaign required charm as well as determination.  It took an incorrigible, 
charming reprobate of Falstaffian proportions; the same characteristics of 
behaviour that also led to one of the greatest corporate collapses in the 
nation's history.  If Taking Liberty was to be the celebration I had been 
commissioned to write, I would have to present Bond's pursuit of the cup 
such that an audience would recognise all the negative traits of character 
they might have expected to see (relentless determination driven by 
obsessive greed), but then, in spite of their better judgement, could hardly 
help but find his good-natured, venal perspicacity appealing even in the face 
of his flaws. As Bond's character developed into a relentless Falstaffian 
rogue with the obsessiveness of an Ahab, it wasn't too difficult to highlight 
the former while still allowing for a suggestion of the latter. 
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2)  Expositions 
 
The audience needs to know enough information to understand the 
situational meaning that motivates the action. Situational meaning relates to 
a subject's concerns so, as well as information, exposition needs to provide 
some sort of perspective on the events, which usually means knowing from 
whose point of view we take the situation to be relevant.  But exposition 
must always be a by-product of action. One of the worst crimes of exposition 
is the conversation in which two characters tell each other things they either 
both already know or don't need to know. Shakespeare often employed the 
simple conceit of opening with two or three characters discussing the 
"current situation" as, for example, in Much Ado about Nothing, Othello and 
Hamlet, but it is always in the context of questions already raised in the 
minds of the audience about motives driving the action. The opening of 
Hamlet is justly admired for the elegance of its exposition through suspense 
and action.  Contemporary drama is inclined to leave the audience in 
ignorance with exposition only provided if and when a lack of information 
obscures understanding of the action.  And sometimes not even then. One of 
Beckett's innovations was his entire absence of exposition, contributing to 
the sense of timelessness in his dramatic world but also threatening to make 
it inaccessible.  Pinter adopted this approach to exposition, its absence 
contributing to the prevailing suspense. By the end of Pinter's No Man's 
Land we still don't really know who the characters are or where they are, 
which further highlights the absurdity of their meaningless struggle for 
status and power.   
 
Exposition was unavoidable in Taking Liberty.  If a non-sailing audience was 
going to become involved with the struggle of the hero, they needed to know 
about the history of the event and enough of the rules of yacht racing to 
understand, at the very least, how and why one boat is able and allowed to 
overtake another; but to understand that, they first needed to understand 
the counterintuitive logic of tacking and jibing - the direction of the boat as a   134
function of the forces of the wind against the sails driving the hull through 
the water. They also needed to be aware of some particular aspects of the 
six-leg course of the race on the Rhode Island Sound.  Adding to the difficulty 
was that sailors have their own jargon with which they discuss these 
subjects.  In such circumstances, comedy can help:  A remark by Ben Lexcen 
describing the skipper of the Southern Cross as "a smart bloke..., but, bless 
him, he couldn't handle people" (Stannard, 1984, p.57) presented the 
opportunity to disguise some essential technical information as an exercise 
in comic self-importance (p.19-23, script page numbers refer to the 
published script; Knight, 2008).  Alan Bond's attempt to join the crew of the 
Southern Cross provided a similar opportunity (p.31). 
 
Taking Liberty is about the marriage of sport and business, and so it was also 
important to provide some understanding of the arcane business dealings 
required to pay for the four campaigns it took to finally win the race.  I tried 
to do this with the schematic expositional "business" scenes between Bond 
and Warren Jones.  Most of us worry about debt so we sympathise as 
Warren tries to warn Alan of the dangers of his cavalier attitude to 
escalating debt.  For those who are aware of the eventual outcome of Bond's 
business procedures there is additional irony to these scenes.  But as the 
audience worry along with Warren, they are also picking up enough 
information to get a rough idea of the way the financial procedures work:  
 
WARREN – Our issued capital currently sits at half a million dollars. 
ALAN -- I know, I know... 
WARREN – While our liabilities are heading towards 50 million... 
ALAN -- I know, we've got a bit of a cash flow problem... 
WARREN -- It is no longer a problem, Alan, it is a fucking crisis! 
ALAN -- Warren, don't exaggerate, our property holdings are... 
WARREN – We're mortgaged up to our eyeballs!  We've mortgaged the 
mortgages on our mortgages. 
ALAN -- The blocks at Yanchep... 
WARREN -- Are not selling, Alan. 
ALAN -- No, but when we win the cup...   135
WARREN -- Alan, how are we going to win the cup if we can't even 
afford to send the crew to Newport, let alone the boat! 
ALAN -- Warren, have faith. 
WARREN -- The boys on the floor at the Sydney stock exchange are 
holding a sweepstake.  Did you know that? 
ALAN -- The Sydney stock exchange is a bloody sweepstake, what are 
you talking about? 
WARREN -- The closest estimate to the date when Bond Corporation 
collapses, wins the pot.  Not if it collapses, mind you, but when. 
p.21-22 
 
The drama of this scene is also helped by the contrast between the sanguine 
Alan and the melancholic Warren.  I will discuss this at greater length in the 
section dealing with character development. 
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3) Time, predictability and the expectation horizon. 
 
Truly, though our element is time, 
We are not suited to the long perspectives 
Philip Larkin, Reference Back 
 
Like fish in water, we can't conceive what it might feel like to be "outside" 
time. Nonetheless we are aware of a permanently present but ever-changing 
emotional response to past and future. This seems to give a sense of shape 
to our experience of time.  The story of our lives is always going on in the 
present but our expectations lead us into the unknown future with hope and 
dread while the memories that accompany us bring with them regret, 
resentment and grief.  The mind is stretched into the future and the past.  
Augustine called this condition distentio animi, the "distension of the soul". It 
is what Ricoeur means by time becoming human: 
 
Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a 
condition of temporal existence. 
Ricoeur, 1985, p.52. 
 
Drama depends on this personal relationship with time, particularly with 
the unknowable future.  The job of the dramatist is to maintain what Langer 
called "the tension between the given present and it is as yet unrealised 
consequent, ‘form in suspense’, the essential dramatic illusion” (Langer, 
1953, p.311).  Dawson tells us that the dramatic 
 
... seizes our attention by creating a situation... which arouses 
expectation of further situations... we become aware of short term and 
long-term expectations... we do not contemplate the action, we are taken 
into it, hence our sense of what is happening is in fact indistinguishable 
from our sense of what will or may happen.  
S.W. Dawson, 1970, p.28 
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But how is this put into practice? Hitchcock famously pointed out that two 
men having a conversation across a table becomes much more interesting if 
the audience knows there's a time bomb underneath it. The effect is to bring 
the future into sharper focus.  We now know what events the future might 
hold and we have an attitude towards them.  The secret is that which will be 
known, and to that extent draws the future into the present.  Strindberg's 
list of requirements for an effective play includes  
 
…a secret made known to the audience either at the beginning or towards 
the end.  If the spectator but not the actors know the secret, the spectator 
enjoys their game of blind man's buff.  If the spectator is not in on the secret, 
his curiosity is aroused and his attention held.   
Cole, 1961, p.183   
 
The first of these situations describes dramatic irony, the second, suspense.  
A contemporary audience has a greater familiarity with dramatic 
complications than Strindberg's did and they are commonly called on to 
juggle a multitude of secrets, kept and revealed, about and between many 
different characters, changing their perspectives of them all the time.  But in 
any drama there is always one secret of primary importance and it is always 
the same one: what's going to happen next?  The much anticipated but 
unknown future is the dramatist's trump card.  With this in mind it might 
seem fair to assume that my biggest problem with Taking Liberty was that a 
play about a race will depend for its excitement on the question of who will 
win, so in my case, with the answer only too well known, suspense would be 
hard to maintain.  Surprisingly though, suspense seems to survive 
foreknowledge; no matter how many times some people watch Psycho, they 
continue to be terrified by the shower scene. It seems that immediate 
concerns with the present and future displace the long term memory where 
knowledge of the outcome is stored.  So part of the dramaturgical job is to 
maintain a constant empathetic involvement with an immediate dilemma, 
directing the focus of attention towards a solution in the future: “how will 
they deal with the current crisis so that they will eventually reach the   138
desired goal?” Or, as Mamet says, work "back and forth between the moment 
and the whole". 
 
It is difficult for most of us to sit still for a long time.  Consequently, the 
longer the drama, the harder it is to hold an audience's attention.  The level 
of excitement and/or involvement needs to increase, (particularly when the 
audience already knows what's going to happen).  There are numerous 
dramaturgical techniques for increasing excitement and involvement.  Each 
in its own way manipulates the audience's relationship with an unknown 
future. I will discuss three of the ones I used. The first, which is standard 
dramatic practice, was to increase the risk. Increasing the value of what's at 
stake and lowering the odds of winning the goal builds excitement and 
deepens involvement. At the penultimate moment of almost any Hollywood 
action film what is at stake is the life of our hero (and those he is protecting) 
and the odds of his surviving are so small as to be almost nonexistent.  
However contrived and predictable the circumstances may be, the technique 
still seems to work. Audiences continue to be thrilled.  In the case of my own 
play historical events themselves provided plausible and interesting ways of 
increasing the risk.  Bond was convinced that winning the race would give 
him immediate rock solid credibility in the corridors of international finance 
and that, as a result, the value of any company he bought into before the race 
would increase significantly if he won.  So, going into the final campaign, 
Bond was gambling most of his own money and an enormous amount of 
other people's.  I was also helped by the unfolding sequence of wins and 
losses throughout the final seven races.  They could not have been better 
designed to increase the suspense, with our heroes always apparently on the 
verge of losing all the way to the final leg. 
 
The second technique for increasing tension that I will discuss has to do 
with the manipulation of the temporal awareness of the audience.  In the 
case of Taking Liberty once again the nature of the historical events 
themselves helped.  The timing of the regattas provided an ideal time frame 
to create an apparent temporal acceleration by manipulating the order and   139
duration of the action.  Here I use the terms order and duration in the sense 
that Genette used them, neatly summed up in the following passage by 
Richardson: 
 
Order is the relation between the chronological events of the story and the 
sequence in which those events are represented to the audience... duration 
attempts to measure the relation between the time represented in the 
narrative and the time it takes to read the representation of those events. 
  Richardson in Herman, 2007, p.147
   
So we might say that duration is the difference between the time lived on 
stage and the "real" time the audience takes to watch it.  The central "story 
arc" or "single action" of Taking Liberty is revealed (it was actually there at 
the beginning) when Bond is "challenged" by Vic Romagna in 1970 (p.12) 
and finds out about "The Cup". It ends with the final victory in 1983.  The 12 
years in between could, more or less, be divided into four campaigns of 
three years each. Each campaign leads to a series of trials culminating in a 
seven race regatta.  The first act of the play deals mainly with the nine years 
covered by the first three campaigns.  The first half of the second act deals 
with the last campaign, up to the final week of racing.  The final half-hour, a 
quarter of the play's length, deals with the last week of the entire 12 year 
effort.  This expansion of the duration creates for the audience the 
paradoxical experience of time both speeding up and slowing down.  
Ricoeur explains how this works by virtue of "a three-tiered scheme": 
 
... utterance-statement-world of the text, to which correspond a time of 
narrating, a narrated time, and a fictive experience of time projected by 
the conjunction/disjunction between the time it takes to narrate and 
narrated time.   
Ricoeur, 1984, p.77 
 
In Taking Liberty the second of these, the narrated time, slows down, getting 
closer to a correspondence with the time of the narration.  And yet suspense 
increases. This is because the deceleration is occurring as the finishing line 
gets nearer, and the nearer it gets, the greater becomes the craving to reach   140
it, that is, to reach it before the opposition, which is the difference between 
winning and losing.  So once again the dramatic effect of this manipulation of 
time hinges on perspective. 
 
The third of the dramaturgical techniques I want to discuss in this context of 
how drama strengthens its grip on the attention of the audience by playing 
with time and the unknown future, is the set up and confounding of 
expectations. This is a useful example of the way that the first order of 
causal determination influences the second.  Aristotle called it the peripeteia 
or peripety. Kermode defined this as "a falsification of expectation, so that 
the end comes as expected, but not in the manner expected" (Kermode, 
2000, p.53).  States describes it as "a change to the opposite of the expected" 
(States, 1994, p.89) and considers it to be not only a plot device but a 
constitutive principle of plot development: "we could say that drama is 
peripety and that the objective of drama is to make human experience as 
peripetous as possible" (States, 1971, p.27).  I think he's probably right. 
Dialogue and action are designed to give a peripetous shape to each scene, 
and the sequence of scenes is designed to build peripetously to an 
unpredictable climax of the play.  To demonstrate, let us consider the series 
of business office scenes in my play between Alan Bond and Warren Jones.  
In each Warren builds up an expectation of financial disaster before Alan 
finesses the problem with a clever solution. With each successive scene the 
stakes are increased.  So the scenes are building up an expectation which 
might be expressed as, "Warren always worries about financial catastrophe 
but Alan's always got a trick up his sleeve". Until we reach the last of the 
series (quoted below, p.157) when the absence of any immediate clever 
solution is now novel and thereby increases the significance of the final trial.  
This was a design I built into the play myself but there were plenty of 
unexpected events from history to provide further material for peripeteia.  
The most auspicious (from my own point of view; it was the least auspicious 
from theirs) was the sudden sequence of equipment failures which 
happened as the Australian yacht began the final series of races: 
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JOHN -- She's sailed thousands of miles without a 
hitch.  Why does she have to fall apart on us now!? 
              p.68 
 
Unpredictability, as Bruner points out, is "the impetus to narrative" (Bruner, 
2002, p.28), but it has been argued that some of the unlikely, "useful" 
accidents that constitute peripeteia (such as Oedipus meeting his father at 
the crossroads) can disturb the verisimilitude.  According to Hegel, "if we 
encounter improbable accidents, contrived situations, unduly complicated 
intrigues... then the impression of fatality is destroyed" (cited in Benjamin, 
2003, p.130).  But Benjamin points out that this is a flawed argument.  The 
notion of fate is, on the contrary, intensified when drama displays these 
kinds of "unnatural" complications: "for it is precisely the far-fetched 
combinations... which …betray, by their paradoxical vehemence, that the 
action of this play has been inspired by fate" (ibid).  The dramaturgical point 
to be made here is that you can get away with contrivances if you deal with 
them properly.  We don't notice the improbability of Oedipus meeting his 
father at the crossroads because we don't know yet that it is his father.  We 
only find out later in the context of a sequence of events which seems to 
make the fact that it was his father strangely and horribly appropriate.  
Ricoeur refers to this kind of plotting as the "strokes of chance that seem to 
arrive by design... making... discordance appear concordant" (Ricoeur, 1983, 
p.43). It wasn't mere coincidence though that Oedipus murdered his father.  
There is little that is accidental about human behaviour.  The meeting at the 
crossroads was coincidental but the killing was entirely volitional. Similarly, 
the collapse of the mast on Australia II was an accident that could hardly 
have occurred at a worse time for the crew but the worst events make the 
best drama because of what they demand of the characters.  The true source 
of fascination in drama is the unpredictability of human behaviour.  
 
If we break down any given instance of emotional behaviour to its 
constituent moments we will see how unpredictability proliferates. I will 
deal with emotion’s constituent parts and its relation to action at greater   142
length in Chapter 3; for now I just want to indicate how much potential 
inconsistency there is in any given emotional experience.  To begin with, 
action is a two-step process; recognition and response.  The first of these 
refers to the recognition of the meaning of a situation to the subject.  This 
has three aspects: 
1) relevance to concerns; 
2) appraisal of what can be done; 
3) urgency, difficulty and seriousness of the situation.  
(Pacherie, 2002, p.75). 
Each of these assessments is contingent on "the relationship between events 
and the subject's concerns, and not events as such" (Frijda in Jenkins, Oatley 
and Stein, 1998, p. 271).  Once "situational meaning" has been decided on, 
there is a concomitant emotional response, as a result of which, according to 
Frijda, "action readiness changes are generated... to execute a given kind of 
action" where "kind of action" is defined by "the end result aimed at or 
achieved".  Frijda proposes that what we understand as emotional 
experience is awareness of this "state of action readiness" (ibid, p.274). So 
what we call emotion is the feeling of the physiological changes caused by 
action tendencies.  As William James put it - we don't cry because we feel 
sad, we feel sad because we cry (James, 1884).  Frijda puts it that "different 
emotions arise in response to different meaning structures..., grief is elicited 
by personal loss, anger by insults or frustrations, and so forth" (ibid).  Each 
of these emotions has a paradigmatic action tendency. Elster has compiled a 
list of emotions with some of their paradigmatic action tendencies: 
 
Emotion:  Action Tendency: 
 
Anger    cause object of anger to be extinguished or to suffer (revenge) 
Hatred    cause object of hatred to cease to exist 
Contempt  ostracism, avoidance 
Shame    "sink through the floor"; run away; suicide 
Guilt    confess; make repairs; hurt oneself 
Envy    destroy the envied object or its possessor 
Fear    flight; fight; freeze 
Love    approach, touch, help, please the loved one   143
              (Elster in Solomon, 2004, p.152) 
 
The list is hardly comprehensive but it is enough to indicate that most 
emotions lead to a number of consequent alternative paradigmatic action 
tendencies.  It can be seen from all of this indeterminacy at the level of the 
elemental choices that constitute any given action, that while we might like 
to think that we are able to predict what the response will be to given 
circumstances, the specific choice of action made in response to a given 
specific event is impossible to predict with any kind of certainty.  As an 
audience, we can never be entirely certain of the action a character will take 
in a given situation but we know what the action tendency is because we 
recognise the situational meaning and, consequently, feel it. So we have 
expectations of the way things might go.  Recognisable patterns of behaviour 
are essential to drama's representation of action if it is to sustain plausibility 
and empathy.  But if the attention of the audience is to be held, these 
patterns must also be unpredictable. The kinds of psychic mechanisms I 
have been discussing display recognisable causal patterns of behaviour but 
are, in any given instance, unpredictable. Elster describes these mechanisms 
as "frequently occurring and easily recognisable causal patterns that are 
triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate 
consequences.  They allow us to explain, but not to predict" (1999, p.1, italics 
in the original).  The same can be said for drama.  The conditions and the 
consequences are infinitely variable, but the patterns of behaviour, while 
unpredictable, have a tantalising familiarity.  Drama demands this 
unpredictable predictability. 
 
"What's going to happen next?" usually equates with "what will he/she do 
now?" Empathy inclines members of an audience to wonder "what would I 
do if that was me?"  In the moments when significant action or reaction is to 
be made, the expectation or desire of the audience for a particular outcome 
will lead them to hypothesise a possibility one way or the other.  Such 
hypotheses are often emotionally motivated and happen on a preconscious 
level, but were they to be verbalised might be expressed as, for example: "If I   144
was him I'd teach that guy a lesson!", "Don't trust him, he won't do what he 
says he'll do" or "Use the force, Luke, use the force!" Hypotheses are then 
proved right or wrong, expectations supported or thwarted.   
 
Actions and emotions are intimately entwined.  As Blacker points out,  
 
…the well-made screenplay is all plot - suspense, tempo, intrigue, and, above 
all, action - without emotion it becomes pure mechanical contrivance. The 
selection and organisation of the scenes in the best possible ascending order 
toward a climax must evoke emotional reactions in the characters and in the 
audience.... plot is more than a pattern of events: it is the ordering of 
emotions  
Blacker, 1986, p.20   
 
So in composing the action the dramatist must take into account how 
temperament, dispositions and experience (among other things) will 
influence a character’s understanding of the meaning of a situation and their 
subsequent response.  If the audience are familiar with the character, his or 
her behaviour will need to fit their expectations of that character’s 
behaviour according to their previous understanding or else subvert those 
expectations with a surprise outcome which should be satisfying by virtue of 
its equally unexpected (and therefore even more surprising) suitability.  It 
might also lead to a "deeper understanding" of the character (or give that 
impression) increasing their empathy and reinforcing their involvement in 
the drama. Once action has been taken by a character, an audience is also in 
a position to experience the pleasure of retrospectively judging the relative 
value of the action; i.e. its wisdom or courage etc, and its relative success.  
They also get to judge the character by virtue of his or her actions.   
 
Ideally, every "beat" of a play's rhythm is composed according to some or all 
aspects of character behaviour I have just described.  An example from my 
own play involves a sequence of actions taken by John Bertrand during the 
races against the American boat.  In the first race John, in spite of being the 
skipper, avoids making a vital decision about crossing the stern of the other   145
boat, leaving the decision to his tactician, Hugh Treharne. As a result there is 
an equipment failure and the race is lost.  Afterwards John apologises:  
 
JOHN --.... The buck stops here, Hughie. Faced with Dennis on a faster 
boat, I lost my nerve and I asked you to call it.  Hardly the act of a man in 
control of himself and his crew was it.  (p.67) 
 
Both the avoidance of the decision and the apology reflect on Bertrand's 
character, offering the audience of view of a man under enormous pressure 
struggling with his fear and his sense of correct behaviour.  The sequence 
has its "payoff" later, in the final race:  
 
JOHN -- (to the audience) We're losing....Over in Oz, it is five o'clock in the 
morning and millions of people are still awake, watching us on TV.  
Those who haven't given up in despair and gone to bed.  
CHINK -- Coming up to the mark. 
YA -- Which spinnaker John? 
JOHN -- Hughie? 
HUGH -- John, I think it is time for the man in control of himself and his 
crew to make the call. 
YA -- John? 
HUGH -- John? 
JOHN – The 6:2. 
MAJOR -- The old 6:2 coming up. 
The crew prepares the spinnaker. 
JOHN -- This is it, guys.  We have 57 seconds to find.... What said the man 
with the big cigars? 
CREW -- Never give in! Never give in! Never give in! 
 
In the unpredictable moment before John names the spinnaker ("the 6:2") 
we can feel his indecision and fear of making the wrong choice (it is up to 
the actor to hold the pause for as long as he thinks the audience can bear it).  
It can be seen how the rhythm of this section, or "beat", builds up to that 
moment of decision, at which point we are momentarily “held in suspense” 
until the decision is made and once again the action sweeps forward. 
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4)  Aspects of character 1: dispositions. 
 
David Mamet's insistence that "characterisation" is the "screenwriting 
equivalent of HIV" (Mamet, 2007, p.58) is a deliberately provocative 
generalisation, but there is some truth to his meaning.  Mamet doesn't 
necessarily object to the notion of "character" per se.  I think what he is 
objecting to is the treatment of character as anything other than a function 
of plot and action. I think he is right to do so for two reasons; firstly, any 
attempt to present aspects of character that do not contribute to the 
development of plot distracts from Aristotelian unity of action and loosens 
the grip of the drama on the attention of the audience (see Mamet, 1986, 
p.76, for a useful example).  Secondly, because human nature is revealed in 
the behaviour of characters as they pursue their goals.  Different dramatists 
have different agendas but what they usually have in common is the 
composing of patterns of action that either reveal or raise questions about 
the agents who carry them out. In this way drama explores the relationship 
of character to action, which entails the relationship of characters to each 
other.  Characterisation, the "construction of character" by the dramatist, is 
a subject dealt with by all the drama writing manuals. While all of these 
writers agree on the importance (to the revelation of character) of the 
pursuit of goals or objectives, this is still the aspect of dramatic composition 
that elicits the greatest variation between them.  Waters discusses character 
in terms of functions – plot function, thematic function, and "tonal function". 
The latter being a way of thinking of characters in the play as equivalent to 
instruments in an orchestra. In keeping with this approach Waters suggests 
that playwrights should resist the inclination "to excavate a total biography" 
of the character. "A spareness of authorial evocation of character in the 
dramatic personae best serves the necessary open-endedness of 
characterisation in plays – for different actors will bring very different 
attributes to any particular role" (Waters, 2010, p.109). In support of this 
notion he quotes Harold Pinter's famous retort to a question about the past 
of one of his characters – "None of your damn business" (ibid, p.108). Downs   147
and Russin, on the other hand, insist on the importance of making lists of as 
much sociological, psychological and historical information about a 
character as possible (Downs and Russin, 2004, p.113). Egri emphasises 
character development, and takes what he calls "the dialectical approach" to 
the creation of character, insisting that it is the way characters change in 
response to events that characterises the drama. Edgar looks at the 
importance of role-play, that is, the idea that characters themselves are 
often playing roles just as human beings spend much of their lives involved 
in performative activity. This also seems to have been Brecht's approach to 
the presentation of character: 
 
…Physical attitude, tone of voice, and facial expressions are all determined by a social 
Gestus: the characters are cursing, flattering, instructing one another, and so on.  The 
attitudes which people adopt toward one another include even those attitudes which 
would appear to be quite private, such as the utterances of physical pain in an illness, 
or of religious faith.  These expressions of a Gestus are usually highly complicated and 
self-contradictory, so that they cannot be rendered by any single word, and the actor 
must take care that in giving his image the necessary emphasis he does not lose 
anything but emphasises the entire complex. 
From article 9 of Brecht's Organum, in Cole, p.76. 
 
In my own teaching practice I try to give a rough outline to my students of as 
many of the possible approaches that time will allow and suggest that they 
take the one or more that suits them. I think we each have a unique 
relationship with the rest of humanity which will reflect, if we are 
playwrights, the way we approach the creation of character. While a 
familiarity with all methodologies can only be useful, the writer needs to 
find his or her own way of doing it. 
 
Here, in keeping with the aim of my thesis, I want to consider two aspects of 
the way that the emotional attitude of characters emerges from and 
influences dramatic action. They are both methodologies which have a 
central role in the history and evolution of drama. I have chosen them, in 
part, to demonstrate that dramaturgical methodology and emotional 
psychology share a history that has yet to be eclipsed by the more 
fashionable and seemingly sophisticated methods of psychological analysis. 
Firstly, I will consider temperament or disposition as it is expressed in each   148
of the characters, the way it is revealed, and the way that the mix of different 
temperaments in the play worked to the advantage of the characters in the 
second order of causal determination (in pursuing the America's Cup) and to 
the benefit of the dramatist and audience in the first order, that is, the 
entertainment value.  The second aspect I want to consider of the role of 
emotions in establishing character is the effect of power and honour on self-
esteem, and the way self-esteem operates as a principal motivational driver 
of the action of the play.  
 
Human temperament is thought to have been schematised by Galen, 
physician to the court of Marcus Aurelius in the second century AD.  Galen's 
thesis was that human nature is influenced by a quartet of fluids, called the 
four humours, each bringing its own aspect of human character.  Dominance 
of one or other of the fluids gave dominance to that particular characteristic; 
a predominance of blood made you sanguine, black choler made you 
melancholic, yellow choler made you choleric, while phlegm made you 
phlegmatic.  Thus a disposition towards one of the three basic human 
passions; joy, sadness and anger are mixed together with a "cooling" 
ingredient. It is not hard to see how the notion might be useful to a 
dramatist.  A mix of strongly contrasting characters creates conflict and 
variation. The Roman playwright Plautus applied it to the characters of his 
comedies and it also influenced English comedy of the Renaissance, 
particularly through Jonson's use of them in plays like Every Man in His 
Humour.  It can still be a useful tool. 
 
Dispositions are revealed in the way that characters respond to situations.  
The character of Alan Bond is predominantly sanguine.  The power of his 
optimism is usually enough to overwhelm any of the qualms of the other 
characters.  This is what makes him such a powerful central character and 
driver of the action. It also explains the power of his anger when his 
intentions are frustrated.  To suggest the extremity of the forces unleashed 
when Bond's optimism turns choleric, I had the scene of his verbal abuse of 
the directors of the New York Yacht Club in the second act played   149
simultaneously to the scene in which Australia II is caught in a storm and 
one of the crew is lost (p.58). The other two principal characters, Ben 
Lexcen, the designer, and John Bertrand, the helmsman, provide an ideal 
contrast with Bond.  Ben is, like Bond, usually sanguine about the success of 
a project, but when things go wrong, quick to change temperament.  Unlike 
Bond though, rather than turning choleric, Ben is inclined towards 
melancholy. The dramatic potential of this contrast is demonstrated a 
number of times, but particularly after the catastrophe of the first campaign: 
 
ALAN -- Don't worry Benny, you'll feel better in a few weeks. We'll catch 
up back in Sydney and... 
BEN -- No we won't, mate.  I'm off to Europe. No one'll touch me in 
Australia anymore.  Not after this fiasco. 
ALAN -- Course they will!  You go and spend some time back with your 
family... 
BEN -- I don't have a bloody family, Alan, I thought you knew that. 
ALAN -- Yes, I did.  Sorry.  Look, you go back to Oz and I'll ring you in a 
month or two and we'll talk about it then, eh? 
BEN -- No we won't Alan. 
ALAN -- Okay, well I'll ring you anyway and see how you feel about it. 
BEN -- Alan, mate, it is over!  Okay? 
ALAN -- Sure, sure. 
BEN -- I mean it. 
ALAN -- See how you feel in a month or two... 
BEN -- I SAID I MEAN IT!  It is over!  I don't even want to think about it 
ever again.  Roger that, Alan? 
ALAN -- Sure, sure.  No worries Ben.  We'll talk later. 
BEN – Aaaaaaagh!!   
Ben leaves. 
ALAN -- (confused) Wonder what got up his pyjamas? 
 p.33-34   
 
A revealing aspect of the difference between these two characters is in their 
relative capacity for self-deception.  Sanguine characters are optimistic 
because they believe in the likelihood of their desired outcomes.  Bond, like 
many successful confidence tricksters, deceives others by deceiving himself 
as well. There seems little doubt, for example, of his conviction in 1970 that   150
Yanchep Sun City would indeed one day become the home of a Grand Prix 
circuit, a new Disneyland and a hovercraft ferry service (p.18).  The self-
deceptive capacity of his optimism is one of the characteristics that I think 
redeems him in the eyes of the audience in spite of his apparently 
inexhaustible acquisitiveness and lack of self-awareness.  On the other hand, 
a realistic view of the likelihood of desired outcomes is characteristic of 
melancholia. Ben, consequently, is inclined to expect the worst.  He is also an 
astute judge of human nature, his own in particular.  After the disaster of the 
first campaign he is the first to shoulder responsibility; "It was my fault… I 
thought I could design the perfect challenger on my first go" (p.33).   
 
John Bertrand, on the other hand, is the phlegmatic "steady hand" on the 
tiller.  Bertrand's phlegmatism, as well as establishing a clear contrast with 
Alan and Ben, offers additional dramaturgical benefits.  Free from the 
potential bias of Bond's optimism or Ben's pessimism, Bertrand's 
perspective is more likely to be trusted.  When, for example, at the beginning 
of the second act, Bertrand is sceptical about the capabilities of the "winged 
keel", his scepticism raises doubts in the audience about Ben's judgement of 
his new keel's abilities.  This effectively reduces the perceived odds of 
winning, thereby increasing the sense of risk associated with the entire 
enterprise, thus intensifying the suspense.  There is another example of the 
usefulness of Bertrand's reliability later on in the second act.  In the heat of 
the racing, those members of the audience who still don't understand 
enough of the necessary technical details to recognise how much trouble our 
heroes are in, need other trustworthy indicators of how serious things have 
become.  Bertrand's phlegmatism creates the impression that his emotional 
responses are a reliable barometer of how things are going.  So his 
emotional outburst at the end of race four is enough to indicate that the race 
is as good as lost, thereby dispensing with the need for further information 
and providing a natural end to the scene.   
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5) Aspects of character 2: status and self-esteem 
 
Conflict in drama is about power; who's got it, who wants it, who or 
what helps them to get it, and who or what gets in the way.  
Russin and Downs, 2004, p.108 
 
The struggle for power and status within the mobile structures of a social 
hierarchy has been the lifeblood of drama ever since the Roman comedies of 
Plautus.  It continued through the Middle Ages with the clowns of the 
commedia dell'arte  all distinguished by their social positions.  For Taking 
Liberty, differentiating the four central characters was facilitated by a clear 
delineation within the social hierarchy of multimillion-dollar international 
yacht racing.  While they all paid lip-service to the egalitarian ethos of 
recreational sailing it was nonetheless easy to identify status differences 
between "the money man" (Bond), the designer (Lexcen), the crew 
(Bertrand) and management (Warren Jones).  Each has his own function and 
position established within his own field.  Tensions arise when different 
hierarchies overlap.  For example, when Bond joins the crew of the Southern 
Cross (p.27) in the second race of the first campaign, an inevitable power 
struggle erupts out of the confusion between the offshore hierarchy of the 
campaign structure where Bond is the unquestionable authority, and the 
traditional power structure on board the boat.  Self-esteem is immediately at 
risk.  When Bond indirectly threatens Hardy by reciting the Napoleon story 
(in the previous scene it was the prelude to a sacking), Hardy's response is 
to draw Bond's attention to the immediate peril, thus establishing which 
power structure is in effect under the present circumstances.  Bond has little 
choice but to concede: 
 
ALAN --... Captain Hardy? 
HARDY -- What? 
ALAN -- Did you know that when Napoleon lost a few battles he took out his best 
general...   152
HARDY -- ... and shot him.  I know, I know.  Do you really think that little parable 
is going to make me want to win this race any more than I already do? 
ALAN -- Just doing my best to motivate the team. No offense, Cap'n.  
                   (p.31) 
 
Another example of this kind of power struggle occurs in the second act 
when Warren Jones expresses his resentment at having been sidelined by 
Bond to the management of the campaign to win "the cup", away from the 
day-to-day operation of Bond's business corporation.  In this instance 
dominance over the territory is a little less clear but in the end, after some 
initial give-and-take, Bond leaves no doubt as to their relative positions in 
this hierarchy: 
 
WARREN -- …  Why are we buying a bloody brewery? 
ALAN -- Have you seen the share price? 
WARREN – I had to read about it in the paper.   
ALAN -- You've been busy. 
WARREN -- I'm twice is busy since you put Chink back on the boat. 
ALAN -- John needed him to run the foredeck.  Chink's a tyrant on the 
foredeck.  I know.  I've been there. 
WARREN – But I managed to get a moment with Peter Beckwith - And 
found out about all the other acquisitions.  Hope Island Casino, South 
Melbourne Football Club, Skipper Caravans, Simplicity Patterns... 
ALAN -- Warren, it is only the beginning. 
WARREN -- You've tripled last year's debt. How long do you think the 
banks'll wait for their interest this time? 
ALAN -- (the boss) Warren, why are we having this conversation? 
Pause 
ALAN -- Your job, Warren, is the America's Cup.  I don't want you 
worrying about this side of the business anymore.  I've got Beckwith and 
Oates to worry about that. 
WARREN -- Beckwith and Oates don't worry enough. 
              (p.52) 
 
In the drama of a heroes' pursuit of a goal, the value of the goal usually 
speaks for itself; rescue, escape, treasure or marriage all have (or appear to 
have) intrinsic worth. The principle dramatic question will therefore be,   153
"Will he, she or they achieve the desired outcome?” Usually, however, at 
some stage in the plot, the question of the moral value of the goal is raised, 
which raises the concomitant question about the virtue of the hero. The way 
a particular drama deals with these questions is usually an indication of its 
ethical or ideological slant. As I have said, narratives that ignore the 
question are very rarely innocent of an ideological slant even if, as Bruner 
suggests, "the teller knows not what ax [sic] he may be grinding" (2002, p.6). 
All narratives carry a message about the conditions that ought to prevail in 
the world, all things being normal. Some use overt challenges to the 
prevailing norms as part of their dramaturgical methodology, in which case 
the dramatic question, "will the hero win?" is joined by a further, usually 
more interesting, question; "should the hero win?" 
 
As I began writing the play I knew that the question most likely to be 
hovering in the minds of many members of the audience (it would have been 
in mine if I was watching it) was "why should we care about a 25-year-old 
yacht race?"  The beginning of the play acknowledges this question and, to a 
certain extent, reassures the audience that it will be answered.  Each of the 
three conversations interwoven through the opening raises the question as 
to whether winning the race was "worth the effort" (p.4-5).  As well as fairly 
bluntly presenting the question that the play seeks to answer, it also 
establishes the motivation for the three men to begin to tell their story; each 
explaining in their own way why they believe the 10-year campaign for The 
Cup was worth it.  To do so they must implicitly explain why it was worth it 
to them.  Because they are sportsmen, not psychologists, none of them 
succeed in explaining anything other than what their own contribution was 
to the success of the enterprise and their own unquestioning faith in the 
value of their efforts.  In doing so they unintentionally reveal something 
intrinsic about their own character and help to answer the other question 
the play deals with: how did the Australian campaign succeed against such 
overwhelming odds?  How, that is, did this particular David win against such 
a Goliath?   
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In most sporting contests winning is said to be valued "for its own sake" 
(exemplified by Newbolt’s Vitaï Lampada: "not for the sake of a ribboned 
coat, or the selfish hope of a season's fame").  I doubt, though, if many would 
deny that self-esteem is the true prize: 
 
In societies or spheres of social life where outcomes are regulated by 
competition, the emotion experienced by the winners is a variety of pride, 
triggered by the belief in one's own (socially defined) goodness.... pride is 
likely to be especially intense... [when] esteem, self-esteem, and feelings of 
superiority merge into one delicious emotion. 
Elster, 1999, p.207 
 
Contestants want to prove themselves better, smarter, braver etc, than the 
opposition. My research suggested that this was the case for both Bertrand 
and Lexcen. Both men appeared to have a sense of the "honourable" 
tradition of the race and of the esteem that winning it would bring.  
However, as I suggest early in the play, it is clear that Bond's motives are not 
quite as untainted.  Elster points out that "the pursuit of honour may be an 
investment in material self-interest, if the reputation for courage can serve 
to advance one's career" (ibid 238).  This establishes a tension between 
motives of self-esteem and self-interest which provide a rich vein of 
dramatic potential.  Bond has an intuitive understanding of global capital's 
inclination to associate esteem with money.  It becomes clear in the 
following passage that the experience of losing his first campaign has only 
served to reinforce this intuition: 
 
ALAN --... Warren.  What we need to do now is set up another company to 
organise and manage the challenge in '77. 
Warren groans. 
WARREN -- Why?  Why?! 
ALAN -- The cachet, Warren! The cachet!  You know what I've learnt from 
this, Warren? Men who want to be rich and powerful go to the America's 
Cup to be with men who are already rich and powerful.  To make real 
money, you have to go where the real money lives. You know what your 
armchair socialist says about the Americas Cup?  "It is just a rich man's 
hobby".  Well, maybe they're right.  But listen to the names, Warren:  Sir   155
Thomas Lipton, the Earl of Dunraven, Harry Sopwith, the Morgans, the 
Vanderbilts.  Men like that don't just make money, Warren.  They make 
history. 
                 p.35 
  
This counterpoint between his motives of self-interest and self-esteem 
continues to be reiterated and sustained through the rest of the play.  It can 
be heard again during the sixth race, with Lexcen's implied question: 
 
BEN - I don't know if I care any more.  I can't even remember why winning it 
was so important. 
WARREN - Because it would give us access to global finance at the deepest 
level.  
ALAN - What he means, Benny is that if we win, the doors of every major 
financial institution in the world will open and men with bottomless pockets 
will come running out, begging us... 
WARREN - On their hands and knees… 
ALAN - ...to take their money. (Beat) Not to mention the honour of winning.... 
WARREN - Also good for business. 
ALAN - And the fame and adulation. 
WARREN -- Fame and adulation isn't bad for business either. 
 
The final iteration of this theme comes with Bond's final lines, spoken as he 
and Ben watch the last few metres of the last leg of the final race: 
 
ALAN - Come on Bertrand, make an old man happy. 
BEN -  You're not so old. 
ALAN - No, but I will be. 
 
This imagining of oneself in the future looking back at the present is a well 
established and powerful rhetorical tool.  Shakespeare exploited it regularly, 
most famously in the St Crispin's Day speech in Henry V.  Shakespeare's 
Spanish contemporary Lope De Vega also used it in, for example, the 
wedding scene in Fuente Overjuna.  I "adopted" the essential structure of the 
St Crispin's day speech for Bertrand's speech to the crew before the final 
race.  Hearing Bond's "No, but I will be" (old) at the end of the race, reminds   156
the audience of the Alan Bond they met at the very beginning of the play and 
in this way the dramatic irony of beginning the telling with the end of the 
story pays off.  We are presented with a triple perspective; Bond, on the 
brink of his greatest success, inadvertently draws our attention to where 
this will all end; with his ruination, in jail.  He doesn't know that, but we do.  
We see Bond's present past, present present and present future all at once, 
in what Bateson called "a knot of relevance" (Bateson, 1979, p.6)  The "true" 
value of the triumph to Alan Bond is highlighted by this dramatic confluence 
of temporal perspectives.  Later, in jail (as we have seen at the beginning of 
the play), he will declare, like the lion in The Wizard Of Oz, that his most 
valued possession is his badge of public esteem; the medal he received for 
winning the America's Cup.   
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Cognition and Mimesis 
 
 
... according to Aristotle - and we agree here - 
narrative is the soul of drama.  
     Brecht (in Cole, 1961, p.77) 
 
 
 
1) Catharsis and its critics 
 
The first text to attempt a dramaturgical methodology, Aristotle's Poetics, 
doesn't have much to say about the experience of the audience except to 
mention a couple of aspects of drama that provide an audience with 
pleasure.  Firstly: 
 
... inborn in all of us is the instinct to enjoy works of imitation.... the reason 
for this is that learning is a very great pleasure... they enjoy seeing likenesses 
because in doing so they acquire information (they reason out what it 
represents, and discover, for instance, that 'this is a picture of so-and-so!') 
 Aristotle, 1981, p.35   
 
The other kind of pleasure that Aristotle mentions is "the tragic pleasure 
that is associated with pity and fear" (ibid. p.49).  He associates these 
emotions with tragedy because this is the kind of drama he was dealing with 
in the Poetics.  Ricoeur, however, points out that Aristotle's description 
serves as an ideal model for the purposes of generalising about all narrative 
(Ricoeur, 1983, p.32). Theorists of the post-dramatic also take the 
"Aristotelian model" as the standard description of drama (see, for example,   158
Hamilton, 2008).  I shall adopt this approach and take Aristotle's description 
of tragedy as a structural model for drama in general. 
 
To continue this inquiry into the nature and practice of "dramatic seduction" 
I want to consider the difference between the two kinds of pleasure Aristotle 
refers to in the Poetics; the aesthetic pleasure gained from the recognition of 
imitation, and that pleasure "associated with pity and fear" generally 
referred to as catharsis. The first kind of pleasure, a phlegmatic, aesthetic 
response to art and drama has long been considered the appropriate critical 
response, while pleasure of the second kind, an emotional comprehension 
and engagement offered by catharsis, has suffered a considerable amount of 
vilification.  Before discussing these different critical attitudes, let me clarify 
what I mean by catharsis. 
 
There has been much debate over what, precisely, Aristotle meant by the 
term .  A common interpretation is "purgation".  The Penguin Encyclopaedia 
(1965) for example says; "tragedy, according to Aristotle, arouses pity and 
fear, and thus purges the spectator of an excess of these emotions; he called 
this discharge of emotion catharsis".  The Shorter OED defines it as both 
purgation and "purification of the emotions by vicarious experience, as 
through the drama (in ref. to Aristotle's Poetics)" (third edition, 1973). In the 
introduction to his translation of the Poetics, T.S. Dorsch says that by the 
catharsis of such emotions as pity and fear Aristotle means “their 
restoration to the right proportions, to the desirable 'mean'" (Aristotle, 
1981, p.19). So, rather than merely expelling an excess of emotion, catharsis 
is seen as a kind of emotional rebalancing.  Oatley (in Hjorte and Laver, 
1997, p.267) and Nussbaum (1986, p.239) understand catharsis to refer to 
the clarification of an emotional experience leading to a deeper 
understanding. Ricoeur agrees, calling it "the integrating part of the 
metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling."  It 
"consists therefore in the transformation of the pain inherent in these 
emotions [pity and fear] into pleasure" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50). He goes on to 
point out that "this subjective alchemy is also constructed in the work by the   159
mimetic activity," but more on that later.  Whether or not Aristotle actually 
believed that by vicariously feeling an emotion we can, literally, purge it, 
there can be no doubt that "feeling emotion" was a necessary part of the 
experience of dramatic narrative as he conceived it: "the plot should be so 
ordered that even without seeing it performed anyone merely hearing what 
is afoot will shudder with fear and pity as a result of what is happening." 
(Aristotle, 1981, p.49).  He was also clear about the best way that the 
emotional response should be elicited; "Fear and pity may be excited by 
means of spectacle; but they can also take their rise from the very structure 
of the action which is the preferable method and the mark of a better 
dramatic poet" (ibid. p.49). Ricoeur suggests that "structure" here is a 
mistranslation: "The Poetics does not speak of structure but of structuration.  
Structuration is an oriented activity that is only completed in the spectator 
or the reader" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.48).  Thus it implies events in time rather 
than an object in space; the reception rather than the text.  So, according to 
Aristotle, "the preferable method and the mark of a better dramatic poet" is 
to give rise to the emotions of the spectator by "the very structuration of the 
action".  However, as I said, subsequent critical theory has been inclined to 
disagree. 
 
The main criticism of the notion of catharsis is usually aimed at the soporific 
effect emotional involvement appears to have on audiences: we are so busy 
weeping over Willy Loman that we risk missing the social, political and 
ideological causes and implications of his downfall.  In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche says that "illusionism" and "naturalism" belong in "the realm of 
the wax museums" (Nietzsche, 1993, p.38).  He thought that a "skilful" 
audience must be capable of "seeing the work of art as art, in an aesthetic 
way" (ibid. p.37).  The alternative would be, first, a failure to recognise the 
"horror and absurdity of existence", and consequently, a failure to 
experience the antidote; the "redeeming, healing enchantress - art" (ibid. 
p.40).  In the case of Nietzsche himself there can be little doubt that he 
succeeded in recognising the horror and absurdity of existence.  However, in 
the face of it, the "healing enchantress" seems to have failed him.  But this   160
didn't prevent the notion of "aesthetic distance" that he recommended 
leaving a powerful influence on modernism: for example, the theatrical 
effects of Expressionism, which, for the first decades of the 20th century, 
were applied throughout Europe by dramatists like Strindberg, Pirandello, 
Apollinaire and Cocteau, were designed "to awaken the spectator from his 
illusionist period'" (see Oscar Budel in Demetz, 1962, p.59-85).   
 
German theorists in the fields of aesthetics, perceptual psychology and art 
history began to use the concept of Einfuhlung - literally, the activity of 
"feeling into" - to describe the embodied but unemotional aesthetic response 
of a spectator to an image, object or spatial environment (Koss, 2006, 
p.139). Koss suggests that this reveals "a fracturing of the disciplines... a 
rejection of narrative, with the emergence of visual abstraction" (ibid.).  
However, with the rise of the cinema, mass media and the middle-class, new 
forms of spectatorship developed and the word Einfuhlung lost its meaning 
as a description of aesthetic experience.  With the publication of Worringer's 
Abstraktion and Einfuhlung (Abstraction and Empathy) the concept became 
"a conceptual foil" in a theory that placed abstraction (and its associated 
discomforts) at the heart of the aesthetic experience while associating 
Einfuhlung with a quality of comfort which Worringer felt was inappropriate 
for an aesthetic appreciation of abstract art (ibid. p.146).  So Einfuhlung and 
abstraction were now placed "at opposite extremes along an existential 
continuum of emotional discomfort" (ibid. p.148).  Its association with 
"comfort" meant that Einfuhlung became negatively associated with 
femininity and therefore passivity; on the other hand "abstraction," said the 
art critic Karl Scheffler, "remains foreign to women" (ibid. p.150).  With the 
rise of film as popular entertainment Einfuhlung was used more and more as 
the label for a psychological and emotional absorption in on-screen 
narratives and so was now perceived as wholly passive and comfortable; 
which was precisely what Brecht objected to in what he called 
Einfuhlungstheater (Empathy Theatre).  What we can see by this change in 
the meaning of Einfuhlung is that its moral value changes along with it.  
When it begins the century as an aesthetic response to an image, object or   161
spatial environment, it is valued positively.  But when Brecht uses it in the 
Thirties to mean psychological and emotional absorption in the narratives of 
cinema and theatre, its association with passivity (and therefore femininity) 
has turned it into a pejorative term.  I don't think it is coincidental that as 
this change in meaning and value came about, its reference changed from 
being a response to timeless abstractions and objects in space, to being the 
absorption of a temporal narrative.  This change of its timeframe, or 
temporal reference, is an important difference between aesthetic pleasure in 
the still life of an art object and the complex temporal narrative experience 
that Aristotle referred to as catharsis.  
 
According to his friend Walter Benjamin, Brecht introduced  
 
... the dramaturgy of his theatre as a 'non-Aristotelian' one, just as 
Riemann introduced a non-Euclidian geometry.... Riemann refused the 
axiom of parallels; what Brecht refuses is Aristotelian catharsis, the 
purging of the emotions through identification with the destiny that 
rules the hero's life. 
Benjamin, 1998, p.18 
 
It is hardly surprising that, as he watched the audiences at Nuremberg 
identifying with the destiny of their hero, Brecht should want to introduce 
some aesthetic distance into his theatre practice. As Herbert Blau points out 
"what we saw in Brecht - appraising the disfigurement of history in the 
avatar of the crowd - was a willingness to forego the placid moment of 
intimacy for the rigorous moment of perception, in the interests of which it 
becomes strategically necessary to restore the scrupulous distance" (Blau, 
1990, p.6).  Benjamin said that the task of Brecht's "epic theatre" was "not so 
much to develop actions as to represent conditions" (Benjamin, 1998, p.18).  
He added that "represent" here doesn't mean reproduce but rather "to 
uncover", that is, to reveal the truth of the situation.  The principal method 
was by various interruptions to the flow of the action, thereby focusing 
attention onto particular moments, which is the famous effect of alienation 
or "making strange" (Verfremdungseffekt).  John Willet believes that Brecht   162
probably appropriated his concept of enstrangement from the Russian 
formalist, Victor Shklovsky.  In his essay "Art as Technique" written in 1917 
(in Lodge, 1988, p.15-30), Shklovsky argues that perception, when it 
becomes habitual becomes automatic and, therefore, virtually unconscious.  
Our apprehension of familiar objects is "as shapes with imprecise 
extensions".  Thus, we see them as if they were "enveloped in a sack" and the 
job of art is to remove them from this "automatism of perception" by 
"defamiliarisation".  Willet points out that Brecht only began to talk about 
the Verfremdungseffekt after a visit to Moscow in 1935 where he would have 
come into contact with formalist ideas and, in an interesting confluence of 
events, he also saw a performance by a Chinese theatre company which had 
a powerful influence on his theatre practice (Brecht, 1964, p.99).   
 
The principal exponents of the pervasive "naturalistic illusionism" that 
Nietzsche, the Expressionists and Brecht were so determined to resist, were 
the enormously popular conventional set-piece dramas and farces 
performed in large proscenium arch theatres throughout Europe in the 19th 
and early 20th century. The ideological attitudes represented in this kind of 
drama were perhaps best expressed by Arthur Wing Pinero, one of its most 
successful British practitioners, who insisted that "wealth and leisure are 
more productive of dramatic complications than poverty and hard work" 
(Pinero, 1985, p.xii). One of the constraining conventions to which this kind 
of theatre conformed was the rule of Aristotle's three unities, according to 
which dramatic tragedy should consist of "a single action" performed in one 
place and in real time.  It was these pervasive narrow theatrical conventions 
which served to make Brecht's episodic "epic theatre" seem so strange in its 
time.  If you had to point out the most striking change to the dramatic form 
that Brecht wrought on modern theatre it must be this.  In 1955 
Duerrenmatt was able to say that "Aristotle's unities have not been obeyed 
by anyone for ages" (in Cole, 1961, p.133).  It has often been pointed out 
that, for all his alienation techniques and his disdain for linear narrative 
(Brecht, 1964, p.44), Brecht's plays owe much of their success to the 
engaging quality of his stories and characters (for instance, by Gray in   163
Demetz, p.151-6, and Tynan, 1975, p.196-8).  What Brecht proved was not 
that Aristotelian catharsis has an unnecessary and detrimental influence on 
an audience's experience, but that you don't need to maintain the unities of 
place and time in order to wield it. This loosening up of dramatic structure 
wasn't a new development, just a return to earlier forms.  That said, I doubt 
if modern drama would have the muscular dramaturgical flexibility that it 
has were it not for Brecht's revolutionary influence. I don't think Brecht 
would have been unhappy with this idea.  In fact Jameson suggests that 
"Brecht would have been delighted, at an argument, not for his greatness, or 
his canonicity... as rather for his usefulness..." (Jameson, 1998, p.1, italics in 
the original). 
 
In response to a global entertainment industry (in the predominant 
mediums of film, television and theatre) in which the dominant form 
continues to be the dramatic narrative, the failure of non-narrative 
performance to displace drama as mainstream entertainment is interpreted 
by "post-dramatic" theorists as a failure of moral fortitude: 
 
While the large theatres, under the pressures of conventional norms of the 
entertainment industry, tend not to dare to deviate from the unproblematic 
consumption of fables, the newer theatre aesthetics practice a consistent 
renunciation of the one plot and the perfection of drama... 
                Lehman, 2006, p.27 
 
It seems surprising that more than thirty years after Schechner established 
Performance Studies as an academic discipline (see Schechner, 1976), some 
academics and bureaucrats still perceive the non-narrative theatre they 
champion as some sort of political movement in opposition to an 
Aristotelian hegemony; "… the authority of the dramatic paradigm", for 
example, or "… the dominance of text in the theatrical medium" (Hamilton, 
Australasian Drama Studies, April, 2008, p.9: see other articles in this edition 
for further examples of this attitude). This adversarial positioning of “post-
dramatic" performance in opposition to drama and the dramatic tradition 
seems unnecessary.  Non-narrative performance has its own traditions in   164
the circus and Music Hall and Dance Theatre.  The serial transgressions 
(social and aesthetic) performed by troupes such as Sydney Front and the 
Wooster Group, and the visual and aural feasts of the likes of Robert Wilson, 
Eugenio Barba and Tadashi Suzuki hardly need to establish their validity on 
the basis of having somehow "overcome" the dramatic mode.   
 
Post-structural theorists dealing with film have been no less critical of 
catharsis. Theory takes an audience's enjoyment of the cathartic effects of 
the drama to be indicative of its identification with, and therefore 
submission to the representations of the ideology of the prevailing 
hegemony of money and power. (Although as Carroll, Smith and Bordwell 
suggest, the concept of "identification" seems to cover such a wide variety of 
cases that it has become too vague and equivocal to be particularly useful; 
Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.17).  According to this line of argument, a 
member of an audience is not the autonomous individual he imagines 
himself to be but a subject constituted by cultural, institutional and 
ideological discourses and practices, and always susceptible to further 
influences. Althusser's explanation of interpellation suggests how easily we 
succumb to the suggestions of power: 
 
... ideology "acts" or "functions" in such a way that it "recruits" subjects among 
the individuals (it recruits them all) or "transforms" the individuals into subjects 
(it transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most 
commonplace police (or other) hailing: 'Hey, you there!' 
              Althusser, 1971, p.174 
 
The subject is susceptible in this way to territorialisation by the subjectivity 
of a fiction even as the "illusion" of autonomy is maintained:  
 
... by controlling the reader's position, a fiction calls on a reader not only to 
sympathise but to identify with and therefore occupy certain subject 
positions and social roles, thereby becoming an individual who on the one 
hand is subject to some greater authority such as the nation state, and on   165
the other whose inner life is constituted in part by the illusion that one is a 
free agent.  
            Currie, 1998, p.28 
 
Silverman describes the way that Frank Capra's film It is a Wonderful Life 
hijacks the subjectivity of the viewer:  
 
The opening shot of that film discloses a town-limit sign which reads: 'You 
are now in Bedford Falls.' ... the pronoun "you" only means something to the 
degree that the viewer identifies with it, ... locating him or her in the 
narrative space soon to be inhabited by George Bailey, who will function 
thereafter as the chief signifier of his or her subjectivity.  
              Silverman, 1983, p 50 
 
Murray Smith proposes that Althusser's notion of interpellation is an 
adaptation and extension of Brechtian theory with its implication that 
subjects "can never really be conscious of the structures that determine 
their existence" (Bordwell and Carroll, p.134).  Smith suggests, however, 
that this is a contradiction of Brecht's very modus operandi; that it is 
possible for human society to change.  I'm not suggesting that narrative is 
entirely innocent. As I pointed out earlier, subliminal normative 
assumptions often lurk in the background of a story: "often so well 
concealed that even the teller knows not what ax [sic] he may be grinding" 
(Bruner, 2002, p.6).  But an emotional investment in the pursuit of the hero 
need not blind us to the paucity of his values.  I might, occasionally, weep 
while watching It is a Wonderful Life, which would seem to suggest a 
cathartic identification with its hero.  But even as the tears rolled down my 
cheeks I wouldn't necessarily feel any less disdain for the institutions of 
capitalism or Christmas than I normally do.  As Murray Smith points out: 
 
A strong emotional response to a character never results in identification or 
empathy conceived as "self oblivion" and emotional responses do not 
necessarily cloud the spectator's critical reasoning and thereby "consume 
his capacity to act."   
Smith (in Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.144)   166
 
On the other hand, it should also be said that the distrust of the pleasure of 
the narrative for its own sake is understandable and desirable.  The 
advertising industry understands very well how brief a narrative needs to 
be to offer enough associative pleasure to convince most of humanity to 
organise itself, contrary to its own interests, around an economy designed 
for the acquisition of stuff it doesn't need.  This may be responsible, in part, 
for the disapproval by critics, theorists, academics and the like of the 
psychological and emotional absorption in the narratives of cinema and 
theatre. But this disapproval doesn't seem to have prevented an ongoing 
shameless indulgence in a psychological and emotional absorption in the 
narratives of cinema and theatre by a vast and growing majority of the 
entire population of the globe.  In spite of sonorous objections from 
Nietzsche, Brecht, Althusser and their colleagues (all the way back to Plato) 
to the popular tendency of audiences to become "hypnotically transported" 
by dramatic narrative, audiences doggedly insist on continuing to be so.  It 
seems that there is something about the human imagination which loves to 
lose itself in a story.  What is it about us that this should be the case? 
 
 
2) The Storytelling Animal 
  
There are two kinds of explanation of our susceptibility to narrative 
engagement. The first explains our predisposition to engage with story as a 
function or symptom of our evolutionary success (or lack of it) as a species. 
The second describes the manner and means by which a story draws the 
individual into an engagement.  It is the second kind of explanation that I am 
mainly concerned with in this thesis.  But to give this a context I will briefly 
deal with the first kind of explanation, particularly with suggestions 
regarding possible evolutionary advantages offered by the storytelling habit. 
 
The social sciences and particularly Marxist and behaviourist schools of 
anthropology and psychology long held that mind begins as a "tabula rasa"   167
and that storytelling, along with almost everything else related to mind and 
behaviour, is socially constructed (Searle,1996; Joseph Carroll, 2006).  
However, the "nature/nurture debate" in psychology seems to have been 
resolved by research that has concluded that nature and nurture influence 
the development of the human personality; "genes and environment, 
biological and social factors, direct our life courses and that their effects 
intertwine" (Myers, 1995, p.113).  How then do culture and biology 
intertwined lead to a human predisposition to tell stories?  
 
Evolution is a stochastic process (from the Greek, stochazein, to shoot with a 
bow at a target; that is, to scatter events in a partially random manner, some 
of which achieve a preferred outcome).  "If a sequence of events combines a 
random component with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of 
the random are allowed to endure, that sequence is said to be stochastic" 
(Bateson, 1979, p. 245), hence "natural selection".  So, if storytelling is an 
adapted predisposition of humans, it must offer some sort of selective 
advantage. What are the advantages to storytellers that they should 
propagate and proliferate? Sugiyama makes a suggestion, based on research 
into contemporary foraging communities, that narrative operates as a 
survival mechanism by enabling people to "acquire information, rehearse 
strategies, or refine skills that are instrumental in surmounting real-life 
difficulties and dangers" (Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.187).  Stories of the 
Dreamtime, for example, helped to familiarise aboriginal people with the 
landmarks that would help them to survive the vast, harsh terrain through 
which they wandered (ibid. p.195).  
 
Negotiating the terrain of society can be equally as difficult and dangerous 
as much geographical terrain and the rehearsal of strategies and skills in the 
act of storytelling might be equally as useful.  Research in evolutionary 
psychology and the relatively new field of Adaptationist Literary Studies or 
"Literary Darwinism" reveals that stories recognise and recapitulate 
patterns of behaviour that have evolved over time. Cultural Theory might 
warn that this kind of literary Darwinism is in danger of becoming   168
biologically deterministic. Feminist criticism, for example, would argue that 
fairy tales perpetuate socially constructed gender norms, representing 
women as subservient and men as heroic.  Suggesting that such stories are 
"naturally selected" reinforces patriarchal social hierarchies. Gottschall has 
taken samples of traditional folk tales from a range of different cultural 
areas around the world, calibrated to represent a fair distribution of content 
across the six geographical regions, and has confirmed that "female 
protagonist main characters are significantly underrepresented" (Gottschall 
and Wilson, 2005, p.210).  He points out however that this research is not 
necessarily an argument in favour of biological determinism; "considerable 
variability across subsamples testifies to human flexibility and the 
importance of physical and social environments in influencing the 
development of individuals and societies" (ibid. p.219). The fact that stories 
representing princes rescuing princesses are more common than stories of 
princesses rescuing princes doesn't necessarily reflect the wisdom of the 
status quo, as much as unavoidable genetic differences between men and 
women, and stories, as Bruner points out, are not only told to instruct but 
also to forewarn; "culture is, figuratively, the maker and enforcer of what is 
expected, but it also, paradoxically, compiles, even slyly treasures, 
transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.15). Bruner suggests that one of narrative's 
most important purposes is to propose and establish social norms and then 
to test them by rehearsing transgressions with a view to improving our 
understanding of the conventions.  Collective life, says Bruner, would hardly 
be possible without 
 
... the conventionalisation of narrative that converts individual experience 
into collective coin which can be circulated, as it were, on a base wider than 
the merely interpersonal one.  Being able to read another's mind need 
depend no longer on sharing some narrow ecological or interpersonal niche 
but, rather, on a common fund of myth, folk tale, "common sense".  And given 
that folk narrative, like narrative generally, like culture itself, is organised 
around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms and possibility-
evoking transgressions, it is no surprise that story is the coin and currency of 
culture.  
Bruner,2002,  p.16   169
 
Thus Bruner argues that our success as a species can be attributed to the 
capacity for social interaction, communication and organisation that 
narrative allows for. Bruner is a member of what Strawson refers to as "the 
narrativist orthodoxy".  Strawson believes that, while the habit of narrative 
may well be true for some, it is completely false for others:  
 
There is a deep divide in our species.  On the one side, the narrator's: those 
who are indeed intensely narrative, self-storying, Homeric, in their sense of 
life and self, whether they look to the past or the future.  On the other side 
the non-narrators: those who live life in a fundamentally non-storytelling 
fashion, who may have little sense of or interest in, their own history, nor 
any wish to give their life a certain narrative shape.  In between lies the great 
continuum of mixed cases.  
Strawson, 2004, p.10   
 
But this is exactly the point that literary Darwinists make.  Like many other 
genetic traits, the storytelling gene may be dominant in some and not in 
others. If the species benefits from our capacity for narrative, then 
presumably a predisposition for the conceiving of stories must offer an 
individual a reproductive advantage.  If, as Ridley (Ridley, 1994, p.318-30) 
and Miller (Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.156) maintain, a talent for gossip, 
imagination and storytelling offer the potential for attracting partners for 
reproduction, then perhaps Strawson should brush up on his Shakespeare.  
 
According to Boyd organisms must "attend to the opportunities and threats 
that matter to them".  Boyd hypothesises that "art is an adaptation whose 
functions are shaping and sharing attention, and, arising from that, fostering 
social cohesion and creativity" (ibid. p.151, italics in the original).  He refers 
to research by Bekoff and Allen showing that the colour contrast between 
the sclera and the pupil is greater in the eyes of humans than it is in 
chimpanzees and bonobos, and it is greater in those creatures than in other 
apes and monkeys.  From this he surmises that "the ability to monitor the 
direction of others’ attention has mattered more to humans than even to our   170
nearest relatives" (ibid).  Boyd considers focus of attention to be of 
enormous evolutionary benefit to humans as social animals.  It provides us 
with the capacity for language and the ability to understand "multiple-order 
intentionality" which is our capacity to understand what someone is 
thinking about someone else thinking about someone else and so on.  
Dunbar suggests that a particular skill for multiple-order intentionality was 
one of the talents that made Shakespeare such a fine dramatist.  To 
understand the subtle interplay of motives and intentions operating in 
Othello for example, we need to understand how Iago is manipulating 
Othello's understanding of Desdemona's feelings and thoughts about Cassio, 
while at the same time calibrating Desdemona's true feelings and thoughts 
about and towards both Othello and Cassio and so on (Dunbar, 2005, p,7-
22).   
 
The focus of attention necessary to deal with these levels of complexity also 
contributes to our capacity to "rehearse strategies" as Sugiyama put it.  The 
"rehearsal of strategy" requires a great deal more thought processing than it 
might at first seem: 
 
All intelligent animals can focus on the immediate present, expectations of 
the immediate future, and perhaps some recollections of their personal past.  
But we alone, because of our special capacity to share and sharpen attention, 
can focus our minds together on particular events of the past as experienced 
or witnessed by ourselves or others, …on possibilities and impossibilities, 
and events hypothetical, counterfactual, and fictional... and to turn them 
through the vast space of possibility.   
Boyd (in Gottschall and Wilson, 2005, p.152) 
 
This "vast space of possibility" contains all our representations of 
everything that we might know about the world and time.  As such it is 
infinite and daunting.  Its existential horrors were first identified by the 
Christian philosopher, Augustine.   
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Augustine points out that our problems begin as soon as we try to think 
about the nature of time: "What, then, is time?  I know well enough what it 
is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to 
explain, I am baffled" (Augustine, 1961, p.264).  This bafflement arises from 
the apparent paradox of asserting the very existence of time, because if we 
assume that time is composed of a past, present and future then we are 
confronted with a contradiction; the past has gone, the future has yet to be 
and the present is already passing. So the past, present and future don't exist 
and, therefore, neither does time. Augustine resolved this contradiction by 
distinguishing between “eternal time”, the sort of time we measure by the 
sun and the moon and with clocks, and our own personal, internal 
experience of time, human time:  
 
…it is not strictly correct to say that there are three times, past, present 
and future.  It might be correct to say that there are three times, a 
present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of 
future things.  Some such different times do exist in the mind, but 
nowhere else that I can see.  The present of past things is the memory; 
the present of present things is direct perception; and the present of 
future things is expectation.  
Augustine, 1961, p.269 
 
Human experience of time is thus composed of memory, direct perception 
and expectation and it is important to our conception of it that we recognise 
the present moment as the very point at which expectation becomes 
memory:  
 
Man's attentive mind, which is present, is relegating the future to the past.  
The past increases in proportion as the future diminishes, until the future is 
entirely absorbed and the whole becomes past... the mind regulates this 
process... the future, which it expects, passes through the present, to which it 
attends, into the past, which it remembers.  
Ibid. p.277 
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Augustine demonstrates this by the analogy of the recitation of a psalm.  In 
this process of reciting what has already been learned, you begin with "an 
expectation of the whole of it" but as you recite, that which exists in "the 
province of expectation" is now relegated to the past, so that 
 
... the scope of the action which I am performing is divided between the two 
faculties of memory and expectation. ...  But my faculty of attention is present 
all the while, and through it passes what was the future in the process of 
becoming the past.  
Ibid. p.278   
 
One can have a "long expectation of the future" (the present future) or a 
"long remembrance of the past" (the present past) but attention is always 
and only concerned with that singular point of the present present.  
Augustine refers to this disparity as the distentio animi - the distension of 
the soul. Distension is the result of the difference in the nature of attention 
compared to that of expectation and remembering. It is also "true of any 
longer action" including "a man's whole life" and even "the whole history of 
mankind, of which each man's life is a part" (ibid.).  This is the key to 
understanding man's suffering: compared to heaven where there is no time, 
just "ever present, never future, never past", the life we live here in this 
world is havoc: 
 
... I am divided between time gone by and time to come, and its cause is a 
mystery to me.  My thoughts, the intimate life of my soul, are torn this way 
and that in the havoc of change.   
Ibid 
 
Augustine's "havoc of change" shares a striking resemblance to Boyd's "vast 
space of possibility". It is the subjunctive world described by Ricoeur as "the 
realm of the 'as-if'", in which all the "possibilities and impossibilities" and 
"events hypothetical, counterfactual, and fictional" come rushing out of 
Augustine's "present future" of expectations, to be dealt with in the 
immediacy of the "present present" and are then already disappearing into   173
the "present past" to become events of memory, only to be reprocessed as 
models for more hypotheses and expectations.  To further contribute to all 
this "havoc", our gift for multiple-order intentionality invites us to consider 
all the uncertain confusion and complexity of other people's intentions and 
expectations as well, four or five orders worth, each with their own worlds 
of motivation and possibility. Freedom of thought, as the existentialists 
warned, can be frightening and the "vast space of possibility" is a place none 
of us would wish to be lost in without a guide. Ricoeur suggests that story 
offers a straw to clutch at:  
 
In the capacity of poetic composition to re-figure this temporal experience, 
which is prey to the aporias of philosophical speculation, resides the 
referential function of the plot.  
Ricoeur, 1983, p.xi   
 
Stories provide relief from "the distension of the soul" because they have a 
beginning and an end which we can know and understand; and that, as 
Augustine implies, is what it must be like to be God. This is another of the 
benefits of storytelling. To tell a story is to offer another individual respite 
from "the havoc of change" by finding a semblance of order, a reason for the 
occurrence of strings of dreadful events and the consolation of a satisfactory 
resolution (or even merely the possibility of a resolution, as Scheherazade 
managed to do for all those nights). This is what Ricoeur calls "the poetic act 
par excellence... the triumph of concordance over discordance" (ibid. p.31).  
He sees it as a solution to the Augustinian paradox (the paradox that sees 
our "distended souls" churned by "a havoc of change" through "nonexistent" 
time).  The act of understanding a narrative is the act of comprehending as a 
whole "the miscellany constituted by the circumstances, ends and means, 
initiatives and interactions, reversals of fortune, and all the unintended 
consequences issuing from human action" (ibid. p. x). It brings order to the 
chaos.  But narrative is not merely the imposition of an order onto a world of 
chaotic discord: 
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Aristotelian theory does not accentuate concordance alone but, in a highly 
subtle way, the play of discordance internal to concordance.... this internal 
dialectic of poetic composition..., makes the tragic muthos the inverted figure 
of the Augustinian paradox.  
Ibid. p.38   
 
Muthos here refers to "the arrangement of the events" into a narrative; not 
so much plot per se as the making of the plot, which Ricoeur calls 
"emplotment". The "discord" within the "discordant concordance" of the 
Aristotelian plot is rung by such incidents as "come unexpectedly and yet 
occur in a causal sequence in which one thing leads to another".  So while 
the causal sequence is sustained, concord is disturbed by "those strokes of 
chance that seem to arrive by design" (ibid. p.43).  As I pointed out in my 
first chapter, in tragedy the most important example of this kind of incident, 
carefully designed to appear as if it arrives by cruel luck, is the "reversal" or 
peripeteia which, in causal sequence with the other "fearful and pitiable" 
incidents characterised by "surprise and recognition", serve to bring the 
tragic hero to his or her inevitable demise.  All of which, nonetheless, 
consoles us with its implications of order and meaning in the face of what 
Zizek calls "the radical contingency of the historical process" (Zizek, 1991, 
p.157). 
 
Is this why happy endings seem to give us so much pleasure?  Is it the 
experience of momentary relief from Augustinian despair that we enjoy so 
much?  Whatever the explanation, it is undeniable that a narrative 
transforms the pain inherent in the suffering of its hero(es) into pleasure.  
This is borne out by the size of an entertainment industry that can only be so 
large because of the size of the market it provides for.  The advertising 
industry is related to the entertainment industry but the stories are shorter.  
Seeing beautiful young people briefly experiencing blissfulness in beautiful 
locations seems to offer enough associative pleasure to convince us to buy 
syrupy soda drinks by the gallon but not enough for us to want to watch it 
for its own sake.  Commercial television depends on our being prepared to 
tolerate the short-term narratives of advertising for the sake of the   175
pleasures of long form drama of any genre or style. But while the pleasures 
of long form drama tend to be richer and deeper than the short forms, they 
are not guaranteed. In spite of the enormous investment that the film and 
television industry puts into script development it is so hard to guarantee 
success that one of its most successful screenwriters has famously said that 
in Hollywood "nobody knows anything" (Goldman, 1985). This is because 
the processes of narrative reception are complex, delicate and subject to 
great variation. Ricoeur calls it the "subjective alchemy" that transforms 
suffering into pleasure, and it is "constructed in the work by the mimetic 
activity" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50). To better understand the process, let us also 
brush up on our Shakespeare… 
 
 
3) Schemata, Gaps and Frames. 
 
And make imaginary puissance; 
Think, when we talk of horses, that you see them 
Printing their proud hoofs i’ the receiving earth; 
For ‘tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings, 
            Shakespeare (Henry V) 
 
The audience, as Shakespeare points out to them in Chorus's speech at the 
beginning of Henry V, is always necessarily complicit in the creation of their 
experience of the dramatic narrative.  Booth has described the appropriate 
response of an audience to the two characters implicit in one of Browning's 
dramatic monologues, Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister:  
 
Our job, to put it crudely, is to recreate the qualities of the two men and 
the drama between them as precisely and vividly as possible.  Experienced 
readers can do the job of recreating the speaker in opposition to his own 
views without having to make every step consciously. 
     Booth, 1974, p.144 
 
Although they are only effectively provided with a single perspective, it is 
expected that each member of a successful audience will adopt the   176
perspectives of both characters, as well as maintaining their own, without 
making any conscious decision to do so.  My interest here is with the way 
that a script, as a blueprint for a dramatic performance, elicits this 
complicity (without having to create a Chorus to beg for it). In my first 
chapter I described how the reception of a dramatic narrative involves an 
audience in the creation of a mimetic illusion by drawing the fabula from the 
szujet, keeping in mind that "the fabula - "what really happened" - is in fact a 
mental construction that the reader derives from the sjuzet, which is all that 
he ever directly knows" (Brooks, 1992, p.13). This involves organising 
paradigmatic story material into a syntagmatic diachronic narrative 
structure.  Now I'd like to go into a little more detail about what that process 
involves. 
 
First of all, our understanding of a narrative is modelled on our quotidian 
understanding of the world around us, so let me briefly discuss that.  
According to current theories of cognitive development, children learn 
surprisingly early (by two to three years old) to build concepts or schemata.  
Schemata are the models or "mental moulds" against which we measure 
experience, categorising everything we perceive by virtue of what we 
already know. We also adjust or "accommodate" our schemata to "fit the 
particulars of new experiences" (Myers, 1995, p.89).  Reception and storage 
of thought material is organised according to innumerable schemata by 
which the mind contextualises, recognises and classifies incoming 
information and constructs and makes sense of reality.  For a dramatist 
whose job it is to involve an audience in the world of the dramatic narrative, 
this immediately raises the question; what constitutes this sense of reality?  
How many (or few) schemata are necessary to create verisimilitude, the 
impression of reality?  William James raised the question of reality not by 
asking what it is but by asking "under what circumstances do we think 
things are real?" He identified different "worlds" that attention and interest 
make real for us: "in each of which an object of a different kind can have its 
proper being: the world of the senses, the world of scientific objects, the 
world of abstract philosophical truths..." (cited in Goffman, 1975, p.2).  As   177
well as measuring new input against established kinds, schemata also "make 
sense" by providing frames or contexts.  Bordwell uses visual perception as 
an analogy to illustrate this "constructivist" theory: 
 
.... seeing is a bewildering flutter of impressions.  The eye fixates many 
times per minute... yet we see a stable world... the visual system is 
organised to make its inferences in an involuntary, virtually 
instantaneous manner.... this automatic construction is also affected by 
schemata-driven processes that check hypotheses against incoming 
visual data.... we assemble our visual world from successive glances 
which we constantly check against our reigning "cognitive maps....  
Bordwell, 1988, p 31 
 
As data is received, sub-conscious cognitive activity tries to "make sense" by 
making inferences, thereby turning data into information.  The relationship 
between sensory data and the schemata that contextualise it is always 
dynamic and contingent; the schemata is testing and refining sensory data 
even as the data is testing the adequacy of the schemata.  So each new input 
is measured according to whether it constitutes a part of something.  This 
interaction creates, "a perceiver's recognition of global patterns 
characteristic of that data.  'Meaning' is said to exist when pattern is 
achieved" (Branigan, 1992, p.14).  Kant called this process of "making sense" 
the "productive imagination" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.68).  In dealing with 
narrative we do the same thing but in this case narrative itself constitutes 
"the whole" of which everything else is a part. Isolated individual events are 
brought together and recognised as part of a story.  The process requires the 
synthesis of any number of narrative schemata.  Ricoeur suggests an analogy 
between this "grasping together" of events by recognising them as part of a 
story, with what Kant has to say about "the operation of judging" which 
"places an intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept" (ibid, p.66).  The 
productive imagination connects understanding and intuition by 
"engendering syntheses that are intellectual and intuitive at the same time" 
(ibid.).  By integrating an intellectual understanding of what we call the 
theme or "point" of a story with an intuitive recognition and selection of   178
circumstances, characters, episodes and so on, the productive imagination 
engenders "a schematism of the narrative function" (ibid). 
 
Bordwell points out that all this is a problem-solving, goal-oriented process:   
 
Perception tends to be anticipatory, framing more or less likely 
expectations about what is out there.... the organism interrogates the 
environment for information which is then checked against the perceptual 
hypothesis.  
Bordwell, 1988 p.31   
 
 
Involuntary cognitive processes are designed to "make sense" but to do that 
they need some idea of what it is they are making sense of.  As James 
pointed out, different "worlds" have different requirements so they trigger 
different sets of assumptions about what will "make sense". According to 
Iser this is why literary texts are designed so that they "... cannot be fully 
identified either with the objects of the external world or with the 
experiences of the reader" (Iser, 1989, p.7).  This produces "a degree of 
indeterminacy" leaving gaps in the reader's conception of the world of the 
text.  It is the job of the reader to then fill these "gaps of indeterminacy" by 
reference to either "the external world of objects" or "the reader's own 
world of experience".  We can see how this relates to the relationship I 
described previously between the sjuzet and the fabula: The sjuzet leaves 
"gaps of indeterminacy" in the narrative which the audience needs to fill 
with story material, fabula, in order for the narrative to make sense.  In fact, 
since it is impossible for a narrative to describe everything, it is inevitable 
that much of the difference between a narrative world and the "real" one 
will be a question of what is missing. This isn't a weakness or failure.  On the 
contrary, it can be constitutional of a narrative's power.  Virginia Woolf 
remarked that part of the quality of Jane Austen's novels was in the way 
that: "She stimulates us to supply what is not there" (cited in Iser, 1989, 
p.33).   
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Iser offers an example of a literary form that shows how his notion of 
"indeterminacy" is related to the teleological aspect of narrative.  It is the 
"serial story" that Dickens wrote for weekly magazines, the episodes later 
collected and published as novels.  Each episode usually ends "where a 
certain tension that has been built up demands to be resolved" (Iser, 1989, 
p.11), a situation more commonly referred to as a cliff-hanger: 
 
The dramatic interruption or prolongation of suspense is the vital factor that 
determines the cutting, and the effect is to make the reader try to imagine the 
continuation of the action.  How is it going to go on?  In asking this question we 
automatically raise the degree of our own participation in the further progress of 
the action. 
                  Iser, 1989, p.11 
 
Mamet makes a similar point in the advice he gives to playwrights to exploit 
the fact that "the only thing we, as audience, care about in the theatre is 
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?"  (Mamet, 1988, p.76, capitalised in the original).  
This creation of suspense is a technique used by any skilled narrative 
practitioner to involve her audience as deeply as possible in the action of a 
story, but it is a particularly important device for a dramatist whose purpose 
is to engage the sustained attention of an audience for up to three hours, 
during which they must be made to feel "only too happy" to continue to 
create for themselves a mimetic illusion.   
 
The importance of the temporality of the narrative and the relation of past 
and future in the generation of schemata can hardly be overstated.  
According to Branigan, "the essence of narrative is a presentation of 
systematic change through a cause and effect teleology" (1992, p.19).  
Hypotheses about "what will come next" based on current information are a 
vital part of the process of engagement with the narrative. Bordwell tells of 
evidence that "goal orientation is a salient aspect of the schema of causality" 
(Bordwell, 1988, p.35). A story "cues" expectations, hypotheses and 
predictions as to possible futures, based on an understanding of the world of 
the characters of the story as well as all the myriad conventions associated   180
with the context of its telling: genre, style, internal narrative logic and the 
model of narrative structure according to which we anticipate the directions 
it might take us (Bordwell and Thompson, 1986, p.24).  Todorov 
essentialised narrative into a causal structure which transforms a given 
situation through five stages: 
 
1) equilibrium           
2) disruption          
3) recognition of the disruption     
4) attempt to repair the disruption    
5) reinstatement of initial equilibrium   
(Todorov, 1971, p.39) 
 
We don't need to be consciously aware of these structural models of 
narrative since our experience of stories is enough for us to anticipate and 
predict the direction of events.  Nor, strangely enough, do we need to be 
right.  As I mentioned earlier this process (essentially the reception process) 
reflects, to a certain extent, the relationship of an audience and a culture, in 
that it is "organised around the dialectic of expectation-supporting norms 
and possibility-evoking transgressions" (Bruner, 2002, p.16).  An audience 
wants both comforting familiarity and, as Wordsworth put it, "the charm of 
novelty".  The play of expectations between the desire for verisimilitude and 
"the unpredictability of creation" was described by Jauss as meeting on the 
"horizon of expectations" of the world of text and audience: 
 
a literary work...  evokes what has already been read, gets the reader into one 
or another emotional disposition and, from the outset, creates a certain 
expectation of what "will follow" and of "the ending", an expectation which 
can, as one's reading advances, be maintained, modulated, reorientated.... It is 
a guided reception, unfolding in a way that conforms to a well-determined 
indicative schema.... the new text evokes for the reader (or listener) the 
expectation horizon.  
        Jauss, 1970, p.175 (cited in Pavis, 1982, p.74} 
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This schematism arises out of a tradition constituted by "the interplay of 
innovation and sedimentation" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.68).  "Sedimentation" is 
established by the paradigms of form, genre and type.  A paradigm is 
established not only by a tradition of genres, but also individual works, each 
of which, to a lesser or greater extent, is innovative, and all of which, in the 
context of tradition, are “marked as particular types”, and in this sense are of 
themselves typical and paradigmatic.  As each new work deviates from the 
established paradigms, it contributes to the gradual evolution of new forms.   
 
It might be useful to recall here the distinction made by States between the 
two orders of causal determination in which the play of expectations 
operates: the first, that of the design and composition process; the second 
we might call the diegetic order, in which the audience shares the play of 
expectations with the hero(es). The difference between these two orders of 
causal determination might be described as the difference between the view 
from outside the story world and the point of view of the principal 
character(s) "inside" the story. We can see that these two orders of causal 
determination have different kinds of schemata and different sets of 
contextual frames. The "expectation horizon" within the story world (States’ 
second order of causal determination) is concerned with the hero's pursuit 
of the goal.  The expectation horizon of the first order of causal 
determination is concerned with the play of narrative variations.  It 
shouldn't be too surprising, given what we now know about the human 
capacity for multiple-order intentionality, that the audience is quite capable 
of maintaining both points of view at the same time (which is why Aristotle 
said that they experience both pity and fear, but more on that later).  
Actually, the capacity to deal with two perspectives at once isn't limited to 
humans.   
 
Watching monkeys interacting with each other at the zoo, Bateson observed 
that they would not only fight, but also play at fighting.  He recognised that 
fighting and play-fighting are two completely different modes of behaviour 
requiring two kinds of mental processes.  When the monkeys play at   182
fighting, both of these two kinds of mental process are operating at once.  
Bateson refers to them (with a passing salute to Freud) as "primary" and 
"secondary" (Bateson, 1972, p.141).  What is characteristic of "primary-
process" thinking is that it is unable to discriminate between "some" and 
"all", between denotative action and that which is denoted, between "play" 
and "non-play" (ibid. p.179).  A "higher" cognitive level of processing is 
required for such discriminations to be made.  It is only at the higher level, 
at the level of "secondary-process" thinking, that the message "this is play" 
is received and gives a context to the action.  This "secondary-process" 
recognises the difference between an expression of emotion which is playful 
and one that signifies an authentic emotional condition.  A "playful" display 
of emotion is a negotiation of two signals at the same time; "this is real" and 
"just kidding".  The two signals are received in a particular configuration. 
"This is real" is "framed" by "just kidding".  The frame establishes the 
conventions by which behaviour is organised and understood. Thus, within 
the "frame" of a cinema screen or a theatre, actors become characters in a 
story, not because they resemble those characters, but because we as an 
audience and they as performers agree to the convention that they depict 
those characters, much as a snarling kitten attacking a ball of wool depicts 
the lion attacking a wildebeest. The ball of wool has no resemblance to the 
wildebeest.  This difference between resemblance and depiction is useful to 
keep in mind.  Resemblance is a symmetrical, reflexive relation; if I resemble 
my cousin, then he will resemble me and so if I am young and handsome, he 
must also be young and handsome, ipso facto (Sartre, 1940, p.ix). On the 
other hand, if I was an ugly old actor I could still depict a handsome young 
man so long as the audience is prepared to make the metaphoric 
substitution.  This is why the ageing and famously "unprepossessing" 19th 
century actor, Edmund Booth, was able to say, "When I play Romeo, I am the 
handsomest man in Europe!"  For that matter, it is also the reason that we 
are able to concern ourselves with whether or not Daffy Duck will avoid 
being shot by Elma Fudd, instead of worrying about whether or how 
(among other things) a duck can speak.  
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Thus, an audience's acceptance of "the truth of the fiction" depends not on 
the drama's success in "faithfully representing human social life" but in the 
set of conventions they have agreed to.  Drama establishes and utilises these 
conventions ("agreed pretences") to manipulate the combination of primary 
and secondary mental processes at work in the minds of its audience, 
"cueing" them with enough knowledge and understanding as to a 
character's situation to imaginatively simulate their interior experience of 
acting within the fictional world, a condition I have referred to as a mimetic 
illusion.  Goffman extrapolates on Bateson's notion of the play-frame.  He 
suggests that play-fighting uses real fighting as "a model, a detailed pattern 
to follow" which he calls "keying": 
 
... a set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in 
terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned 
on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else.  The 
process of transcription can be called keying.  A rough musical analogy is 
intended.  
              Goffman, 1975, p.44 
 
So we might say that within the frame of a narrative, the productive 
imagination organises data into schemata in a particular key.  Drama, 
according to Aristotle, is the representation of action. In the "key" of action, 
sensory data isn't just organised into its usual relation with the world but 
also into its relation with time and volition.  The process of creating it he 
called mimesis.   
 
 
4) Mimesis 
 
According to Aristotle, as translated by Ricoeur, it is the pairing of mimesis 
with muthos, "the organising of events" (which Ricoeur calls "emplotment") 
which constitutes the "what" of "what drama does".  While Aristotle's Poetics 
is principally concerned with the writing of dramatic tragedy, he also uses 
the word poetics to mean "the art of composing plots" and therefore "puts   184
the mark of production, construction, dynamism on... the two terms muthos 
and mimesis, which have to be taken as operations, not as structures" 
(Ricoeur, 1983, p.33).  So in Aristotle's mimesis there is no sense of Plato's 
notion of mimesis as an imitation of existing reality but rather the depiction 
of a metaphor of "universal" reality in the representation of action as an 
organised series of events.  It represents, "such things as might be... the 
universal... the kind of things a certain type of person will probably or 
necessarily say or do in a given situation" (Aristotle, 1981, p.44,).  So the 
story world is both fictional and universal, and while it is not an imitation of 
the world, nor is it entirely separate from it. Ricoeur refers to mimesis as 
making "a break that opens the space for fiction" but he suggests that this 
break should be conceived not as a separation but as a set of connections: 
 
... that praxis belongs at the same time to the real domain, covered by 
ethics and the imaginary one, covered by poetics, suggests that mimesis 
functions not just as a break but also as a connection... 
Ricoeur, 1983, p.46 
 
Ricoeur proposes mimesis as a three-part process which begins and ends 
with the audience; "the three moments of mimesis", beginning with an 
audience's "pre-understanding of the world of action", followed by the 
central, pivotal configuration of the action and events which Ricoeur calls 
"emplotment", and it is then completed by the "re-configuration" of the 
action as it is finally understood by the audience.  In this way emplotment, 
"draws its intelligibility from its faculty of mediation, which is to conduct us 
from the one side of the text to the other, transfiguring the one side into the 
other through its power of configuration" (ibid. p.53).  From "one side to the 
other" also means “from before to after” and it is this temporal aspect of 
action that makes the whole notion tricky to grasp.  Time, as I've already 
discussed, is an aporia, which is the reason for Ricoeur's examination of 
narrative in the first place since the aporia of time is one "to which only 
narrative activity can respond" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.6).   
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Ricoeur suggests that narrative composition is grounded in three aspects of 
our "pre-understanding of the world of action; its meaningful structures, its 
symbolic resources, and its temporal character" (ibid. p,53).  He points out, 
however, that this listing of the three categories of "the world of action" is 
not a closed one.  Later I will suggest that another aspect of our experience 
of the practical "prefigured" world, that of the emotions, might be added to 
the above list of competences and pre-understandings which the plot-maker 
has at his disposal.  For now, let me clarify Ricoeur’s three aspects of our 
"pre-understanding of the world of action".   
 
To begin with, action is distinguished from mere physical movement 
because it cannot be separated from the goals, motives and methods of the 
agents who commit actions and who can be held responsible for them.  An 
action always presupposes an intended outcome.  So the meaning of any 
action can be explained and understood in terms of "what", "why," "who", 
"how", "with whom", and so on. To understand the interconnections of these 
terms is to have "that competence we can call practical understanding" (ibid. 
p.55).  This "practical understanding" also requires comprehension of some 
of the rules of narrative structure; those syntactic features that are aspects 
of cultural tradition analyzed by the Russian formalists and their successors 
(Propp, Todorov, Greimas) to identify different kinds of plots.   
 
As narratives become more pervasive and audiences become more 
sophisticated in their narrative comprehension dramatists have become 
more adventurous in the way that they structure their narratives. Dramas 
may, for example, challenge an audiences’ temporal expectations by telling 
the story backwards (Harold Pinter's Betrayal) or, indeed, backwards and 
forwards (Christopher Nolan’s Memento). In the early scenes of Taking 
Liberty I rely on an audiences’ comprehension that the narratives of the 
three central characters are being woven together, so that, for example, in 
the following sequence two sets of dialogue are occurring at the same time, 
otherwise it would be a meaningless sequence of lines that seem to have 
nothing to do with each other:   186
 
ALAN – Have you got a boat that fast? 
HARDY – Are you John Bertrand? 
BEN – Nope.   
JOHN – I am. 
BEN – I've got a real pretty picture though.  (He shows Alan his design) 
ALAN – Will it beat /Rolly Tasker? 
HARDY -- /Rolly Tasker tells me you're a good sailor on a fast boat. 
BEN – She'll beat anything with sails. 
JOHN – You're Gentleman Jim Hardy. 
ALAN – How much will it cost? 
HARDY – Frank Packer wants to take another crack at the cup in 
1970. 
BEN – A hundred grand, give or take. 
JOHN – Which cup? 
HARDY – There's only one, lad. 
ALAN – Better be bloody fast then. 
BEN – She will be.  
JOHN – Got a boat? 
p.11 
 
 
Narrative is only possible because our actions are "always already 
symbolically mediated" and another aspect of the "practical understanding" 
of human action necessary for narrative composition and comprehension is 
an awareness of "the symbolic resources of the practical field" (ibid. p.57). In 
other words, there needs to be an understanding, shared by the composer 
and his audience, of how actions are "already articulated by signs, rules and 
norms" (ibid.).  Here, Ricoeur refers to the work of Geertz and Cassirer, for 
whom "symbolic forms are cultural processes that articulate experience" 
(ibid.).  We are talking here about the symbols which incorporate meaning 
into action and thus make action decipherable within the symbolic social 
system.  It is by these symbolic systems that social reality is constructed (see 
Searle, 1996) and by which "culture understands itself" and confers "an 
initial readability on action" (ibid. p.58).  Any given action or gesture (as 
distinct from mere physical movement) takes place within the entire system 
of "conventions, beliefs and institutions that make up the symbolic 
framework of a culture" (ibid.).  It is important to be clear that these are 
symbols "...that underlie action and that constitute its first signification, 
before autonomous symbolic wholes dependent upon speaking or writing   187
become detached from the practical level" (ibid.). So, for example, at the 
level of this "first signification", a cigar, even in the analyst’s office, is only 
ever something to be smoked.   
 
This symbolic mediation leads to the establishment of social norms which 
immediately acquire value, thus rules of description become prescriptive; 
for example, the spontaneous wave of an arm in greeting can acquire 
meanings that evolve through cultural reiteration into the compulsory 
salute. The values of the action then attach themselves to the agent: 
 
As a function of the norms immanent in a culture, actions can be estimated 
or evaluated, that is, judged according to a scale of moral preferences.  They 
thereby receive a relative value, which says that this action is more valuable 
than that one.  These degrees of value, first attributed to actions, can be 
extended to the agents themselves, who are held to be good or bad, better or 
worse.  
Ibid. 1983, p.58 
 
It can be seen from this how an examination of symbolic mediations of 
culture leads us from social description to social convention through to 
moral judgement and questions of what constitutes ethical behaviour.  This 
raises the question as to whether it is possible for a character or even a 
particular action to be ethically neutral.  It is a question which Ricoeur 
answers with a resounding "neither possible nor desirable":  Undesirable 
because "the actual order of action does not just offer the artist conventions 
and convictions to dissolve, but also ambiguities and perplexities to resolve 
in a hypothetical mode" (ibid. p.59).  Ethics are established by social 
convention and one of the functions of art is to explore and challenge the 
borders of convention.  Among other things, narrative constitutes "an ethical 
laboratory" where a writer can experiment with ethics and values.  The 
history of literature is a dialectic encompassing the struggle of 
institutionalised moral structures resisting the challenges of innovative 
alternatives presented to it by the radical in art and literature. 
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The "third anchorage" that composition finds in our "pre-understanding" of 
the world of action is in its temporal character.  Notions of narrative 
temporality that are useful for a dramatist to be familiar with - to which I 
have already referred - are those identified by Genette of order and 
duration.  For example, if the szujet misrepresents the order of the events of 
the fabula (as it usually does), the audience will reorganise them in their 
imagination into their "original" order so as to make sense of them. 
Similarly, if the timeframe of the fabula is, say, 10 years from beginning to 
end, by the end of the show an audience will have re-imagined the two hours 
they spent watching it so that the beginning of the story will seem like it was 
10 years ago.   
 
I should reiterate that what I have been dealing with is a description of a 
pre-understanding and competence to utilise the meaningful structures, 
symbolic resources and temporal character (though the list is not closed) of 
the domain of action and that these pre-understandings are necessary to 
begin the exercise of narrative configuration that Ricoeur calls emplotment.  
Emplotment is the pivotal operation that makes "the break that opens the 
space for fiction", a space in which the audience engages with the drama 
which Ricoeur calls "the kingdom of the as if".  As I said, this break should 
not be conceived as a separation but as a mediation "between what precedes 
the fiction and what follows it" (ibid. p.65).  The interconnectedness of a 
dramatic narrative, drawing each of its elements into an intelligible whole is 
one of its essential characteristics.  The dramatist's job is to turn a diversity 
of events into a single story, so that an audience is able to "draw a 
configuration out of a simple succession" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.65).  This is what 
gives the story its "followability". We speak of being able to "follow" a story 
because we understand why each episode is a consequence of those we have 
already seen and we have confidence that it will lead us to a conclusion 
which, although unpredictable, will in retrospect "make sense" one way or 
another of everything that came before.  This retrospective comprehension 
of the way that each part of the narrative relates to the whole requires the 
synthesis of any number of narrative schemata and is a function of the   189
"productive imagination" which integrates an intellectual understanding of 
the plot and the theme or "point" of a story with an intuitive recognition and 
selection of circumstances, characters, episodes and so on.  As I pointed out 
earlier, Ricoeur sees an analogy between this configurational act of 
"grasping together" events by recognising them as part of a story, with 
"what Kant has to say about the operation of judging" which "places an 
intuitive manifold under the rule of a concept" (ibid. p.66).   
 
Ricoeur identifies three particular aspects to this "mediating process" by 
which emplotment holds its action(s) together.  Firstly, there is the way it 
turns a diversity of events into a single story, so that an event comes to be 
defined by "its contribution to the development of the plot." The plot, 
therefore, mediates between "events and a narrated story" by organising the 
events into "an intelligible whole".  By galvanising together each of the 
events with its narrative connections, emplotment "draws a configuration 
out of a simple succession" (ibid. p.65).  As Dawson makes clear in the 
following passage this process of reconfiguration is not just an intellectual 
exercise: 
 
All works of art are fully grasped through the perception of the 
interrelatedness of their parts, and in drama the relation between parts is 
characteristically one of tension.... it is useful to remember, as I. A. 
Richards reminds us in The Principles of Literary Criticism that this tension 
is in us, but we can only discuss it in terms of the work of art itself.  There 
are many different kinds of tension in drama... but the underlying, 
continuous tension is that between the situation at any given moment and 
the complete action.... the most simple and striking example of this tension 
is suspense. 
Dawson, 1970, p.30 
 
A second aspect to the mediating process of emplotment is the way that 
those components of narrative action that are "capable of figuring in the 
paradigmatic tableau established by the semantics of action" (p.66) such as 
agents, motives, circumstances, interactions, goals, unexpected results and 
so on, pass from the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic, that is, they are   190
selected from the "tableau" of the paradigms of action to be "integrated" into 
the story. We recognise here the writer selecting from "the paradigms" of 
the first order of causal determination to be arranged along the syntactic 
order of the story – the second order of causal determination. Thirdly, 
emplotment mediates by way of its temporal characteristics. One of the 
ways it does this is by the expectation of an endpoint which "furnishes the 
point of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole" 
(ibid. p.67).  The plot imposes "the sense of an ending" (Kermode, 2000) so 
that all events are related and equally relevant in that they are steps 
towards an end. This is particularly important when the story as such is 
already known.  If you already know the ending then following the story 
 
is not so much to enclose its surprises or discoveries within our recognition 
of the meaning attached to the story, as to apprehend the episodes which are 
themselves well known as leading to this end.  A new quality of time 
emerges from this understanding. 
Ricoeur, 1983, p.67 
 
Thus, not only does an audience get satisfaction from finding out "what 
happens next" but also from the quality of the connectedness of each event.  
This is perhaps indicative of a relation between the way an audience 
comprehends and appreciates drama (and other narratives) with its 
comprehension and appreciation of music. Ricoeur observes a parallel here 
between the "Augustinian paradox" of time and the way that emplotment 
deals with time, in that they both combine a pair of temporal dimensions.  As 
we have seen, emplotment draws together a chronological, episodic, linear 
representation of time by means of the configurational, in that a story is a 
single configuration of multiple events.  So we might say that the episodic 
dimension equates with Augustine's "eternal" time (an infinite succession of 
"nows"), while the configurational equates with what he calls "human time" 
illustrated by the recitation of the Psalm in which past and future are always 
connected to the ongoing present.  It is from this correlation between the 
two pairings of temporal concepts in Augustine and emplotment that 
Ricoeur extrapolates what is perhaps the central thesis of his work: "By   191
mediating between the two poles of event and story, emplotment brings to 
the [Augustinian] paradox a solution that is the poetic act itself" (ibid). In 
other words, narrative draws the events together in a connective pattern; it 
brings the consolation of a "discordant concordance" to the jarring havoc of 
the condition that Augustine calls the distentio animi - the distension of the 
soul. Perhaps, as I suggested earlier, this explains the success and popularity 
of storytellers of all styles and types. 
 
While noting that the importance Ricoeur places on recognising the 
extended series of multiple events as a single story validates the approach to 
composing the work I talked about in the first chapter (the two orders of 
causal determination and the "organising principles" within each of them; 
Egri's premise in the first order and the heroes pursuit of the goal in the 
second),  I'm not suggesting that the object of the exercise for an audience 
should be to identify the premise, although the premise is likely to influence 
an audience’s notion of "what the story was about".  I also think that the 
"followability" of the story is the payoff for the dramatist’s struggle to 
discipline the narrative into the "single knot of relevance" that disallows any 
elements unrelated to the premise or what the hero wants. 
 
The mimetic activity is completed where the world of the text meets the 
world of the reader or audience.  Ricoeur characterises the process as a 
transition from "configuration to refiguration" that reaches its fulfilment in 
the mind of the audience. Just as, in the reading of a sentence, each word on 
its own refers to nothing but itself until it can be gathered up into the mind 
of the reader where its purpose as part of the meaning of a single concept is 
completed, so narrative keeps us waiting for the meaning of an action until it 
is completed and its true cause is revealed. 
 
This analogy raises a couple of questions that need to be dealt with:  First 
the thorny problem of reference.  Thorny because linguistics and semiotics 
as disciplines reject intentions oriented toward the “extra-linguistic."  
Ricoeur argues for a different approach;    192
 
…if (following Benveniste rather than de Saussure) we take the sentence as the 
unit of discourse, then the intended of discourse ceases to be confused with the 
signified correlative to each signifier within the imminence of a system of 
signs.  With the sentence, language is oriented beyond itself.   
Ibid. 1983, p.78 
 
The event of discourse is not confined to the speaker.  Language does not 
constitute a world of itself, it refers to the world of our experience. It has a 
dialogical function whereby the speaker intends to "bring a new experience 
to language and share it with someone else" (ibid.).  What needs to be found 
is a way to cross the gap between the horizons of speaker and listener, text 
and reader.  Ricoeur finds it by means of "metaphorical reference".  The act 
of metaphor is the extension of meaning.  Meaning for Ricoeur emerges at 
the level of the sentence: "words alone cannot be metaphoric.  They are 
metaphoric only in the context of the sentence" (Ricoeur, 1991, p.77).  
Rather than a mere substitution of one word by a simile, a metaphor creates 
meaning by a "semantic discrepancy", a violation of the rules which 
determine appropriate predicates. By communicating in this way it 
engenders a "new pertinence that the metaphorical utterance establishes at 
the level of sense, on the ruins of the literal sense abolished by its 
impertinence" (ibid. p.80).  It is in this activity of "metaphorical reference", 
covering all non-descriptive uses of language in a narrative, by which the 
worlds of text and reader are brought together.  A narrative text is "the 
proposing of a world" (ibid. p.81).  The world of the text and the world of the 
reader are "fused" in the act of reading/watching/listening. This "fusion of 
horizons" leads to the "dialectic of sedimentation and innovation.  The shock 
of the possible, ... is amplified by the internal interplay, ... between the 
received paradigms and the proliferation of divergences. ... Thus narrative ... 
is a model of practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its 
paradigms" (p.80).  In this way fiction expands our horizon of existence, 
"augmenting it with meanings that themselves depend upon the virtues of 
abbreviation, saturation, and culmination, so strikingly illustrated by 
emplotment" (p.80).    193
 
Until now Ricoeur's approach has been structured around Aristotle's Poetics 
for which tragic drama is the case model and, thus, well suited for my own 
theorising of a methodology for the composition of dramatic narrative.  But 
in his reflections on the end point of emplotment, he acknowledges that 
Aristotle is more concerned with the composition of the text per se than with 
the traversal from text to audience.  Perhaps it is as a result of this that 
Ricoeur's references and terminology with regard to the reception of 
narrative become more suggestive of the act of reading than that of 
watching and comprehending a drama.  In discussions like this we must be 
careful not to blur the distinction between reading and watching drama too 
easily: are there any significant differences between the comprehension of a 
text by an act of reading and that of an audience attending a performance 
that would invalidate my application of his description to the experience of 
an audience engaged with a drama?  Let me identify some of the more 
obvious differences.  When an audience watches a performance of drama 
there are, as Lodge points out, extra dimensions of feeling and suggestion 
being communicated simultaneously "on several different channels" (Lodge, 
1996, p.217) which Ricoeur, by conflating a reader and an audience, might 
be inclined to overlook. As Pugliatti pointed out, the dramatic text shouldn't 
be seen as a "linguistic text translatable into stage practice" but rather as "a 
linguistic transcription of a stage potentiality" (cited in Elam, 1980, p.209).  
Elam suggests the following differences between a text to be read and a text 
to be performed:  
 
... it is the performance, or at least a possible or 'model' performance, that 
constrains the dramatic text in its very articulation... the constant pointing within 
the dialogue to an undescribed context suggests that the dramatic text is radically 
conditioned by its performability... and indicates throughout its allegiance to the 
physical conditions of performance, above all to the actor's body and its ability to 
materialise discourse.             
            Elam, 1980, p. 209 
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Ricoeur, however, once again takes his cue from Aristotle who appears to 
see no significant difference between watching a play performed and the 
act of reading it. This is because he uses the term "narrative" in a generic 
sense, only contextualising differences between the diegetic and the 
dramatic modes when necessary. It is justified on grounds that he has 
chosen a mimesis of action as his dominant category: "The result of this 
choice is that the distinction between the diegetic mode and the dramatic 
mode moves to the background" (Ricoeur, 1985, p.153).  I was making a 
similar distinction at the very beginning of this discussion, when I pointed 
out that, for all their many differences, what theatre and film have in 
common is the drama of human action. I think it is a strong enough 
argument to validate Ricoeur's concept of mimesis as a description of the 
dramatic narrative in terms of its composition and reception.  
 
I hope it has become clear from even this minimal summary of it that the 
mimetic process, regardless of whether it is being undertaken by a reader or 
a member of an audience, is a deeply complex and dynamic network of 
activity which requires a great deal of psychic effort, which Shakespeare 
refers to as "imaginary puissance". A performance of Taking Liberty, for 
example, requires six actors to run up and down a narrow wooden platform 
and pretend to pull on a few ropes, but somehow, the imagination of the 
audience translates these actions into a 10 year campaign (of real sailing on 
real oceans) to win an international yacht race: to the extent that, when the 
final victory Canon is fired, on many nights during the run of the play, they 
quite literally leapt to their feet and cheered the actors as if they really had 
just won the America's Cup. 
 
The question is: what motivates the mental effort required for all this work 
of reception of the narrative.  Interaction with story is so common and 
universal that it tends to be taken for granted that reception and emotional 
involvement will happen automatically. Theoretical explanations and 
descriptions of the receptive processes of an audience watching a dramatic 
narrative appear to make this assumption: that the activity of reception is a   195
foregone conclusion. But I don't see that it would necessarily happen at all 
without an initial emotional response to the material to trigger the process. 
Isn't it the emotions that fuel the dynamic connections of each single action 
to the episode it belongs to, as well connecting that episode to the entire 
story, thus drawing the audience into the reception process?  Bordwell, 
while acknowledging the relevance of emotion, suggests that the affective 
aspect of the narrative experience doesn't need to be dealt with by the 
constructivist theorists because cognitive comprehension processes can be 
separated from the emotions: 
 
As a perceptual cognitive account, this theory does not address affective 
features of film viewing.  This is not because I think that emotion is 
irrelevant to our experience of cinematic storytelling - far from it - but 
because I am concerned with the aspects of viewing that lead to constructing 
the story and its world. I'm assuming that a spectator's comprehension of 
the film's narrative is theoretically separable from his or her emotional 
responses.   
Bordwell, 1988, p.30 
 
This assumption that our comprehension of narrative can be separated 
from our emotional responses is highly contentious. If, as Bordwell suggests, 
all of our thinking is a goal-oriented process, then we must assume that it is 
with a view to satisfying some sort of desire, otherwise achieving the goal 
has no payoff.  As Frijda points out: "Emotional valence - the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness of emotional reactions to things, events or situations... is the 
origin of all goals" (Frijda,1994, p.17).  In anticipation of this argument 
Bordwell offers the rather limited notion of an "emotional kick" that we 
experience when an expectation initiated by the narrative is interrupted or 
delayed and then fulfilled.  We experience this "emotional kick" because; 
"the organism enjoys creating unity" (Bordwell, 1988, p.39).  This takes us 
back to the difference between aesthetic and cathartic pleasure.  Bordwell's 
"emotional kick" is an aesthetic response, it does nothing to explain the 
spectrum of emotions that an audience feels ebbing and flowing with the 
travails of the hero of the narrative.  Can there really be any doubt that   196
emotional responses constitute an element of the action of the dramatic 
narrative? The reason I cry with joy for George Bailey when he is returned 
to his family and saves everybody's Christmas is because (in spite of my 
own personal distaste for Christmas and everything associated with it) I 
have been sharing his suicidal distress for the previous ninety minutes.  It 
may well be that the reluctance to deal with emotion in theories of reception 
is due to the objections to catharsis I discussed earlier (by Nietzsche, Brecht, 
Althusser and their fellow sceptics all the way back to Plato). Another 
reason for this reluctance might be the paradoxical nature of the question 
that catharsis inevitably raises; why should we care about something that 
doesn't exist?  To deal with these objections, a different kind of explanation 
of mimesis is required to the one that my discussion of reception theory has 
offered so far. 
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Chapter 3   
 
 
The Emotional Audience  
 
 
Emotion is evolution's way of giving meaning to our lives.  
Bower, 1992, p.4 
 
 
 
 
1) "He's behind you!"  -  Fiction and Empathy 
 
Our capacity to experience an emotional response to fiction raises questions 
about the nature of belief, emotion and verisimilitude, reminding us again of 
William James's question: "under what circumstances do we believe a 
situation to be real?"   
 
We are inclined to think that an emotional response is indicative of a "real" 
event because we trust our emotions to be authentic, spontaneous, 
biological responses to danger or opportunity.  After all, while we can 
pretend that we are sympathetic or frightened, and we might even feel guilty 
for not feeling as sorry as we believe we ought to feel, we will not 
experience feelings of pity or fear or joy if we don't care about a situation, 
because to care we must surely believe it to be the case.  For the same 
reason we are not likely to experience pity for someone if we believe that 
their apparent suffering is an act.  Nor do we feel pity for someone or 
something that doesn't exist. This is why an emotional response to fiction 
strikes us as paradoxical.  I know that George Bailey doesn't exist, he is just 
an actor reciting lines from a script recorded on film and broadcast on to my   198
television screen, nonetheless, when George returns to the bosom of his 
nonexistent family I weep with joy.  My tears would seem to be evidence 
that I must, in some way, to some extent, believe in the existence of George 
Bailey.  Hence, the equation appears to boil down to; I feel therefore I 
believe.  But here's the paradox: if, while watching Psycho, I am genuinely 
and sincerely afraid that Marion Crane is about to be stabbed in the shower 
by a psychotic murderer, and therefore believe it to be the case; why don't I 
call the police?  Thus the authenticity of the emotional response to fiction is 
challenged by its failure to motivate action: "What is pity or anger which is 
never to be acted on? ...Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive 
motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton, 1990, p.196).   
 
The problem is known as "the fiction paradox" and regularly resurfaces 
among Anglo-American academics concerned with theories of narrative and 
culture.  Its history is debated; Neill refers to it as "ancient questions... in 
recent years resurfaced..." (Bordwell and Carroll, 1996,  p.175) and 
Nussbaum frames her description of the issue with references to Aristotle's 
Poetics (Nussbaum, 2001, p.238-248) while Yanal, on the other hand, insists 
that it is "not one of the perennial problems of philosophy" (Yanal, 1999, 
p.13, his italics) because neither Plato nor Aristotle "incorporates 
recognition of fictionality in their theories of mimetic art" (ibid).  The 
paradox can be presented as a set of three propositions which I have 
paraphrased from Levinson (in Hjort and Laver, 1997, p. 22-3) and Yanal 
(1999, p.11):  
1) we experience emotions in response to fiction;  
2) we only feel emotions in response to things in which we believe;  
3) we don't believe in the existence of things we know to be fictional.   
Rationalist resolutions to the paradox are explained as denials, 
contradictions or challenges to one or more of these three propositions, 
usually based on their failure to fit strict definitions of what constitutes 
authentic emotion or belief.  For example, the most common explanation for 
the phenomenon that I receive from students in scriptwriting tutorials 
when I ask why it is that we care for fictional characters is the "suspension   199
of disbelief" theory.  This involves a challenge to proposition 3, which, if 
allowed, leads to a contradiction of proposition 2.  Walton challenges 
proposition 1 by suggesting that the emotions we feel in response to fiction 
are "quasi-emotions" evoked by our imagining ourselves involved in the 
fiction.  He doesn't consider the emotions to be "real" because the situation 
that generates them isn't real, which we must be aware of because we are 
not motivated to act (Walton, 1990).  This raises questions about what 
constitutes "authentic" emotions, that is, what are the minimal 
requirements necessary for us to be able to say that an emotion exists; 
 
When we view or conceive an object as having such and such properties, 
whether or not we strictly believe that it does, we must, on pain of 
incoherence, be taking said object to exist or be regarding it as existent.   
Levinson (in Hjort and Laver,1997, p.24) 
 
Rationalist arguments tend to assume that mental states such as emotions 
and beliefs are total and can be strictly defined, but, as Curry points out, 
agreement about the "type-identification" of mental states depends on 
presumptions with regard to common meanings and psychological 
conditions which may not necessarily be universal (Hjort and Laver, 1997, 
p.70).  Curry, paraphrasing Moran, points out that fiction isn't the only 
situation in which we have feelings about things that don't exist or are "non-
actual": "Isn't it also problematic that I should be upset at the thought of an 
event that I know didn't happen to my child, or that did happen to me long 
ago..." (ibid, p.71).  Similarly, Nussbaum suggests that we are inclined to be 
profligate with our beliefs and emotions.  She points out that we can react to 
a character emotionally and, simultaneously, share the emotions of a 
character by identification.  We can also react emotionally towards the 
"implied author" (as conceived by Booth, 1961) which she defines as "the 
sense of life embodied in the text as a whole".  A fictional work can also 
evoke emotions with regard to "one's own possibilities" which are "multiple 
and operate at multiple levels of specificity and generality" (Nussbaum, 
2001, p.242).  A simultaneous experience of all these attitudes is possible 
because we are capable of experiencing more than one emotional response   200
at a time.  Nussbaum points out that we can, for example, feel sympathy for 
Marion Crane and rage at her killer at the same time as feeling sympathy for 
all women who are raped or assaulted and anger at all their attackers, while 
simultaneously feeling acutely aware of our own sadistic and persecutory 
aggression which leads us to want to see her slashed.  This is a reminder of 
our capacity for multiple-order intentionality by virtue of which we are able 
to adopt a number of subject positions and, it would seem, emotional 
attitudes simultaneously.  
 
As I have already pointed out, an audience is not simply a passive observer 
of the activity that takes place in the drama; cognition is a dynamic process 
in our relations with both the "real world" and any given fictional one. A 
story is not just projected onto our minds as we read or listen or watch - 
producing the fabula from the szujet requires the selecting and sorting of 
the paradigms of action into a syntagmatic linear narrative.  This process of 
filling in the gaps and making sense of the szujet is not entered into from a 
point of view of objective curiosity.  We, the audience, are drawn into it 
because we have adopted a subjective perspective of the events; we have 
taken a personal interest.  As Nussbaum points out, emotional responses 
arise as a result of the formal structures of the work (ibid).  This is what 
Ricoeur called "the subjective alchemy…constructed in the work by the 
mimetic activity," which "conjoins cognition, imagination, and feeling..." to 
transform "the pain inherent in these emotions [pity and fear] into 
pleasure" (Ricoeur, 1983, p.50).  I mentioned earlier that literary Darwinists 
have theorised that our capacity as human beings to enter into the 
perspective of one or more other people is an adaptation that has evolved as 
"a precondition of our collective life in culture" (Tomasello, cited in Bruner, 
2002, p.16). Bruner, as I said, suggests that storytelling is an adaptation by 
which we have found a way of converting "individual experience into 
collective coin which can be circulated, as it were, on a base wider than the 
merely interpersonal one" (ibid, p.16). This would seem to suggest that the 
act of adopting the personal perspectives of the characters in fiction or 
drama is modelled on the common storytelling interactions we have with   201
each other as individual members of a community.  Both activities require 
empathy and a theory of mind. 
 
For humans and philosophers the problem of other minds is the question of 
how we recognise and comprehend that others have the same kind of 
internal consciousness as we do ourselves.  Blackburn discusses the three 
principal "suggestions" that modern philosophy makes about 
"understanding the sayings and doings of others" under the title "Theory, 
Observation and Drama" (Blackburn, 1995, p. 274).  Of these three 
approaches, the observational approach assumes that other people's 
meanings are "manifest in their utterances" (ibid), while the "theory theory" 
suggests that we make "tacit use of a 'folk theory' or rough sets of principles 
that take us from observed behaviour, thought of as evidence, to one 
particular attribution of belief and meaning" (ibid).  The third approach is 
that we attribute meaning to others by "a process of re-enactment: a 
dramatic projection or entering into the position of another" (ibid).    
Blackburn discusses the compatibility of the three suggestions I have just 
outlined and argues convincingly that there are necessary aspects to our 
understanding of other people that only the dramatic option is able to fulfil.  
This is now more commonly referred to as "simulation theory" and has 
become one of the most prominent of the philosophical theories that deal 
with the way we understand each other (Blackburn, Oatley, Goldie). One of 
its early proponents was R.G. Collingwood. According to Blackburn's reading 
of Collingwood, a particularly useful aspect of the concept is the view that 
understanding others is not merely to place them in some kind of "lawlike 
causal network" but also to understand their self-interested motivations, 
which includes, among other things, their personal history and aspirations 
and their own self-understanding, that is "the understanding and rational 
control of what one is doing" (Blackburn, 1995, p.277).  Again, this is not 
simply a matter of "finding individual elements of the person... connected by 
scientific law with other elements", it is "an essentially holistic enterprise 
that needs to draw on indefinitely wide knowledge of the person's human 
context" (ibid). This corresponds with Goldie's description of empathy as "a   202
process or procedure by which a person centrally imagines the narrative 
(the thoughts, feelings, and emotions) of another person" (Goldie, 2000, 
p.195).  The simulation model is sometimes accused of giving "improper 
privilege to the first person, even involving a Cartesian transparency of the 
mind to itself".  According to Blackburn, however, Collingwood "had no 
patience with Cartesian transparency".  He considered that the 
understanding of the self was as "historical" as the understanding of others: 
"the child's discovery of itself as a person is also its discovery of itself as a 
member of a world of persons...; in my thinking I am both speaker and 
hearer" (Blackburn, 1995, p. 278). 
 
This notion of "empathy as simulation" establishes a correspondence 
between quotidian social interaction and the way that we comprehend 
drama. Oatley has even suggested that they are more or less the same thing, 
proposing that "simulation" is a fair translation of Aristotle's mimesis (Hjort 
and Laver, 1997, p.265).  Oatley hypothesises that "by engaging with the art 
of the theatre... we are induced to run on ourselves narrative simulations of 
actions, with their consequences and emotional effects" (ibid p.267).  
Elsewhere, Oatley has suggested that it was Shakespeare who first 
conceived of the theatre as a simulation of the world run on the minds of its 
audience, the point of which was to observe and better understand the 
"deep structure" of selfhood and social interaction (Oatley, 2001). Neill 
makes a similar point: that empathy gives us access to feelings that would 
otherwise be foreign to us, mirroring "the feelings and responses of others 
whose outlooks and experiences may be very different from our own" 
(Bordwell and Carroll, p.180). But as Goldie points out, it is not sufficient 
simply to be able to say of someone that "he is afraid" or "he feels fear": "You 
have also at least to be able to say what it is he is afraid of.  To do this and 
also to explain why the person has the feelings that he does towards this 
object of his emotion, it will be necessary to piece together or fill in the 
emotion's narrative" (Goldie, 2000, p.181).  This is because, as Nico Frijda's 
first "law" of emotion establishes; emotions "...arise in response to the 
meaning structures of given situations" (Frijda, 1988, p.271).  To   203
understand what I am feeling you need to try on my shoes.  Collingwood 
(reiterated by Blackburn) said that what we do to understand others is to 
"re-centre" ourselves, to change the "egocentric map" so that we can think 
and feel about the world from the other's point of view, and since, as we 
have seen, our own point of view is as both speaker and hearer, then in 
empathising with others we continue to be aware of them, just as we are 
aware of ourselves, as "a member of a world of persons".  This act of 
understanding self and other by hypothesising the other as oneself requires 
no conscious effort, it is instinctive and involuntary and a natural part of our 
emotional lives. 
 
It may well be that the recently discovered mirror neuron helps to facilitate 
this kind of empathy. Mirror neurons fire in the brain when we watch 
someone else performing an action, and the pattern of firing mimics the 
pattern that we would use if we were performing that action ourselves. 
Stern has described their activity as follows, "the visual information 
received when watching another act gets mapped onto the equivalent motor 
representation in our own brain by the activity of these mirror neurons." 
(Stern, 2007, p.37). Some scientists have suggested that mirror neurons 
provide a neurophysiological foundation for empathy, love and human 
interaction (see, for example, Preston and de Waal, 2002, p.1–72: Decety and 
Jackson, 2004, p. 71-100: or Gallese and Goldman, 1998, p.493-501). 
However, I have some qualms about the usefulness of mirror neurons as an 
explanatory device for reasons I will discuss later. 
 
Empathy isn't merely a simultaneous emotional response.  To be empathetic 
with you, my feelings must be related to your feelings - I must feel as I do 
because you feel as you do.  Neill references Susan Feagin's theory that in 
empathetic responses the connection between my mental state and yours is 
made by way of belief.  Empathy is in this sense a cognitive state: "a matter 
of my holding second-order beliefs about your beliefs" (Bordwell and 
Carroll, 1996, p.182).  However, merely forming second-order beliefs about 
another's beliefs is not sufficient.  My beliefs about what you believe could   204
easily leave me entirely unmoved.  Empathising with another is, at least in 
part, "a matter of understanding how things are with her" (ibid, p.183).  So 
while second-order beliefs are a precondition for empathy, it also involves, 
as I have said, taking another's perspective on things, imaginatively 
representing to oneself the thoughts, beliefs, desires and so on of another as 
though they were one's own.  To do this you have to know, or at least have 
some beliefs about, what the other's thoughts, beliefs, desires and emotions 
are.  A certain amount of knowledge is necessary.  However, it doesn't 
necessarily follow that "the better we know them, the greater the empathy".  
Empathy is motivated by a desire to understand the other person and under 
normal conditions requires a great deal of guesswork, but in the case of 
some novels, with their descriptions of the character's internal psychology, 
we sometimes receive too much information, to the extent that we feel we 
don't need to exercise empathy in order to understand them (ibid, p.188). In 
this regard, drama bears closer resemblance to our everyday experience 
than prose fiction.  What a drama provides (ideally) is enough knowledge 
and understanding as to a character's situation, as well as an external view 
of their response to it, so that we are able and motivated to imaginatively 
simulate their interior experience.  This imagining of the inner life of a 
character in a drama involves, just as it does in everyday life, a complex 
ongoing process of inferencing their cognitions and emotions, based on the 
assumption that their cognitive and emotional life is more or less the same 
as our own.   
 
Aristotle indicated that the cathartic experience of an audience specifically 
involves feelings of both pity and fear for a character in a drama.  Pity and 
fear denote the two different perspectives I have been talking about; pity is 
felt by the audience in response to the character's suffering while fear is the 
emotional experience of the character involved in the action that is shared 
by the audience.  Neill extrapolates: 
 
Since the very beginnings of the debate, the pity and the fear that 
works of fiction may evoke from us have been lumped together.  But   205
our emotional responses - whether to fictional or to actual persons 
and events - are not all of a kind.  For example, we can distinguish (at 
least roughly) between emotional responses in which the focus of 
concern is oneself (as, for example, in fear for oneself), and those in 
which the focus of concern is another.  And among "other-focused" 
emotional responses, we may distinguish between sympathetic 
responses (such as those in which I fear for you), and empathetic 
responses (for I may also feel fear with you). 
Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.175 
 
The difference between sympathy and empathy, "feeling for" and "feeling 
with", is also the difference between an external social perspective of others 
and an adopted subjectivity of others, commonly referred to as 
"identification" (although Carroll, Smith and Bordwell warn that the concept 
of identification covers such a wide variety of cases that it is too vague and 
equivocal to be particularly useful: Bordwell and Carroll, 1996, p.17).   In the 
case of Taking Liberty, the audience,  in spite of already knowing perfectly 
well that "our heroes" would win the race (because that's what happened in 
the historical event of 1983), nonetheless behaved, when the winning 
moment was represented, as if it had just taken place in front of them, 
cheering and whistling and, on a number of occasions giving the 
actors/sailors a raucous standing ovation. 
 
So the point I'm at pains to make is that when an audience empathises with 
a character in a drama they feel both as if they were in the character's 
predicament, as well as feeling for the character, which includes judging that 
character's actions and responses as appropriate or not (according to social 
norms and conventions), and they are feeling and cogitating on these things 
all at the same time, without making any conscious decision to do so. It is by 
this instinctive, involuntary tendency towards the multi-perspective that the 
audience is seduced into engaging emotionally with situations invented by 
the dramatist. Its effectiveness is best demonstrated by situations of 
dramatic irony, in which the audience knows and understands the situation 
better than the character on stage. One of the most effective situations of   206
this kind is the representation of a hero in jeopardy but unaware of it.  In 
pantomime the standard version of this situation is a hero who, while 
thinking he is in hot pursuit of the villain, is unaware that the villain is 
creeping up behind him: "Where is he?" asks the hero. "He's behind you!!" 
scream the children.  And they do scream.  There is a particular kind of 
intensity for them about the situation.  Not only do they feel sympathy (pity) 
for the character in danger, and empathy (fear) with his condition, but there 
is also an additional sense of frustration that comes from not quite being 
able to grasp why it is that the hero doesn't recognise the danger as clearly 
as they do.  The response can't be dismissed as a symptom of childhood.  
This kind of dramatic situation is a requisite component for any standard 
thriller or horror film.   
 
Drama is designed to exploit an audience's empathetic inclinations in this 
way to recruit their complicity in sustaining the reception process. But 
drama also uses catharsis as a rhetorical device.  Aristotle and Cicero were 
among the earliest philosophers to recognise the importance of 
understanding how emotion operates in everyday life in order to use it for 
rhetorical purposes.  An audience shouldn't need more than an "everyday 
understanding" of emotions (commonly referred to by emotion theorists as 
"folk psychology": see, for example, Griffiths, 1998 , p.1) for the purposes of 
recognising the emotional responses of the characters in a drama and 
entering into an empathetic or "cathartic" engagement with them. However, 
for the dramatist (or anyone else) who wants to exploit the emotional 
responses of an audience for rhetorical purposes, a deeper and clearer 
understanding of the nature and operation of the emotions would be 
beneficial.  
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2) Emotion as the feeling of a readiness to act 
 
Our emotions are designed to direct attention towards the object or 
situation that has triggered them and so it is against their nature to make 
themselves readily available for a cognitive examination of what they are 
and what they do.  De Sousa admits that it is easier to explain what emotions 
are not, than what they are (De Sousa, 1987, p.19).  Griffiths, on the other 
hand, doubts whether "emotion" is a useful term at all since the "putative 
kinds of psychological state" it seeks to describe are impossible to categorise 
(Griffiths, 1997, p.1).  This "covert" aspect of emotion raises a number of 
philosophical questions concerned with issues of volition and free will:  If 
my attention and awareness can be hijacked by my emotions, how much 
control can I be said to have over my thinking? A perceived opposition 
between "thinking" and "feeling" has a history going back to Plato who said 
that our emotions and appetites are like wild horses that need to be reigned 
in by reason (Goldie, 2000, p.113).  In the field of contemporary emotion 
theory these ancient philosophical concerns find expression in an ongoing 
debate between two theoretical approaches.  One theorist goes so far as to 
say that "there are two kinds of emotional theorists in the world", the 
cognitive and the non-cognitive (Prinz in Hatzimoysis, 2001, p.69).  The 
"non-cognitive" theory of emotions is concerned with immediate 
physiological responses to stimuli, while "cognitive" theory concerns itself 
with longer term emotional responses. Both are vital to an understanding of 
the way that drama operates on an audience.  
 
I have already mentioned that William James is acknowledged as 
introducing the modern conception of non-cognitive emotion theory.  In a 
paper written in 1884 he described emotion as an embodied response to a 
stimulus that is only subsequently followed by conscious awareness 
(LeDoux, 1998, p.43; Goldie, 2000, p.52).  On first consideration the idea 
seems counterintuitive and provoked considerable resistance (Griffiths, 
1997, p.80), as, it seems, James anticipated it would:   208
 
Common sense says: we lose a fortune, are sorry, and weep; we meet a bear, are 
frightened and run... the hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of 
sequence is incorrect,... that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed 
between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we 
cry. 
William James (quoted in Campbell, 1997, p.26) 
 
In other words, "it is physiological change that puts the emotionality into 
emotion" (Robinson in Solomon, 2004, p.30).  
 
Contemporary research in neuroscience has provided evidence which 
appears to support James's theory.  It suggests that, responding to a given 
situation, the body undergoes characteristic patterns of physiological 
change, the nature of which determines the nature of the emotion.  These 
changes can occur prior to any cognitive awareness of an emotional 
response (Damasio, 1999, 2003).  Physiology finesses cognition in a variety 
of highly complex processes (LeDoux, 1999; Damasio, 2000; Ellis, 2005) but 
perhaps the most telling difference between a "conscious cognitive 
appraisal" and pre-conscious "affective response" is that the latter triggers 
the activation of the amygdala, a small region of the forebrain which deals 
with urgent situations such as threat. If I see a rabbit in the wild, for 
example, signals are transmitted from my eyes to my visual cortex which 
transmits the sensory representation of the rabbit to different parts of the 
brain including the amygdala, the working memory and long-term 
memories.  Since the rabbit poses no threat, the response of the amygdala is 
benign and the "working memory system" has time to integrate long-term 
memories with sensory representation, and as a result I become aware that 
the object I am now looking at is a rabbit.  If, on the other hand, I see a bull 
with horns heading in my direction, the amygdala has already arranged for 
me to turn around and start running in the opposite direction before 
cognition has recognised it; before I am even aware enough of what I'm 
looking at to remember its name; before, literally, I can say "bull".  This is 
because the amygdala doesn't recognise the bull as such, it simply registers   209
what Goldie calls the "emotion-invoking determinable property" (Goldie, 
2000, p.38), in this instance perhaps, horns approaching at speed, signalling 
"threat!" My conscious awareness of the specific nature of the threat only 
arises some milliseconds later (LeDoux, 1998).  Emotional responses 
requiring a pre-cognitive pathway through the mammalian brain developed 
well before human beings developed consciousness, and for obvious 
reasons; "if the rabbit is to escape, the action must be undertaken long 
before the completion of even a simple cognitive process" (Zajonk, 1994, 
p.294).  In the following passage Ekman describes the "inherited central 
mechanism that directs emotional behaviour" which he calls (adopting a 
phrase proposed by Tomkins, 1962) an "affect program": 
 
A cascade of changes occurs in split seconds, without our choice or 
immediate awareness, in: the emotional signals in the face and voice; 
preset actions; learned actions; the autonomic nervous system activity 
that regulates our body; the regulatory patterns that continuously 
modify our behaviour; the retrieval of relevant memories and 
expectations; and how we interpret what is happening within us and in 
the world.   
Ekman, 2003, p.65 
 
Ekman believes that what he calls the "basic emotions" - surprise, anger, 
fear, disgust, sadness and joy - each have their own affect program, each 
with a unique set of recognisable patterns or sequence of responses.  This 
sequence of responses, he believes, is common to all humans regardless of 
culture or race (although he is at pains to point out that "affect program" is a 
metaphor to indicate the complex of activity we normally describe as an 
emotion - ibid, p.66).   
 
Frijda, another theorist of the Jamesian tradition, proposes that "emotions 
arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations; different 
emotions arise in response to different meaning structures" (Jenkins, Oatley 
and Stein, 1998, p. 271).  On the face of it this would seem to be obvious; 
different kinds of emotion are elicited by particular types of event: "grief is   210
elicited by personal loss, anger by insults or frustrations, and so forth."  The 
point though, is that it is "meanings and the subject's appraisals that count - 
that is, the relationship between events and the subject's concerns, and not 
events as such". Frijda calls this "the law of situational meaning" (ibid).  
Pacherie condenses Frijda's description of an emotion stimulus to a three-
step process: 
1) relevance to concerns; 
2) appraisal of what can be done; 
3) urgency, difficulty and seriousness of the situation. 
Once evaluation has happened "action readiness changes are generated" 
(Pacherie, 2002, p.75).  The way a situation is evaluated may well change, 
however, as the meaning of the situation changes: "frustration or offense 
can be seen as caused by someone powerful who may have further offences 
in store, and fear then is likely to supplant anger as the emotional response" 
(Frijda, 2002, p.273).  
 
Action readiness is the bodily impulse to act in accordance with emotional 
inclination: "...impulses to approach or avoid, desires to shout and sing or 
move, and the urge to retaliate; or, on occasion... an absence of desire to do 
anything, or a lack of interest, or feelings of loss of control" (ibid, p.274). 
Frijda suggests that "meaning structures of emotion are lawfully connected 
to forms of action readiness"(ibid).  So it is by the particular quality of 
feeling of the "action readiness" response to a given situation that we 
identify the particular emotion we're experiencing. This notion draws 
together and helps to clarify the relation between two differing notions of 
drama, the first, that drama is an emotional experience, the second, 
stemming from Aristotle, that the principal element of drama is action.  
 
In light of the idea that the origin of emotion is the feeling of a readiness to 
act, a play or a film can be seen as the designing of an emotional experience 
by the construction of the dramatic action. My enquiry into this idea will be 
the main subject of the rest of the chapter, beginning with the nature, and 
particularly the physiology, of human action. This will lead, on a brief   211
tangent, to a possible resolution of the fiction paradox, which will, I hope, 
help to explain why, when watching a Warner Brothers cartoon, we aren't 
disturbed by the unlikelihood of a talking duck, and why, if we think Marion 
Crane is going to be attacked in the shower, we don't call the police. 
 
 
3) Desire, intention, and the as-if-body-loop 
 
If a brief event can be said to constitute a single action it seems fair to ask 
how this kind of single action relates to Aristotle's notion of an entire drama 
as a "single action".  The answer is that some actions can be part of other 
actions: if the Aristotelian single action of Hamlet is constituted by Hamlet's 
revenge for the murder of his father, we can say that Hamlet consists of a 
sequence of "sub-actions" taken by the Prince (opposed and assisted by the 
actions of others) to complete the action of bringing about the death of his 
father's murderer.  Thus the causes of action are reduced to what is usually 
referred to by action theorists as "the belief/desire causal theory of action".  
Pacherie identifies this theory by the three ways it distinguishes actions 
from other kinds of happenings or behaviours;  
i) being part of a particular kind of causal sequence of events; 
ii) key elements of this causal sequence being intentional states;  
iii) explanation of action being causal explanation (Pacherie, 2002, p.55).   
According to the "belief/desire" theory, the death of Claudius at the end of 
Hamlet should be explained by Hamlet's desire to kill Claudius and his belief 
that a sword through the heart should do the trick.  Thus the action "Hamlet 
kills Claudius" is explained by Hamlet's belief and desire. What the theory 
overlooks, however, are the four acts of the play that separate Hamlet's 
initial promise to his father's ghost to kill Claudius, from the killing itself. 
The problem with the belief/desire causal theory of action is that it assumes 
that the complex of desires to act and beliefs about how to do it completes 
the explanation.  It makes the same mistake I make when I wonder why an 
audience doesn't take action as a result of their emotional response to the 
dramatic situation in a performance. It fails to take into account the   212
intermediary steps of intention and commitment that are necessary if the 
desire to take action of a particular kind is going to result in any kind of real 
action (let alone the “right” one). There are three kinds of problem that 
Pacherie identifies that the belief/desire causal theory of action fails to 
explain; 
i) the problem of automatic or impulsive actions - many actions, in 
particular automatic or habitual ones, do not seem to be preceded by any 
particular belief or desire to perform them; 
ii) the problem of causal inertness - one might have beliefs and desires that 
would seem to rationalise acting in a certain way but still not act (Hamlet in 
a nutshell);  
iii) the problem of failed actions - the truth of the beliefs figuring in the 
belief/desire complex does not guarantee that the bodily movement made 
by the agent is appropriate.  i.e.; in a game of tennis my orienting belief that 
my opponent is on the other side of the court and my instrumental belief that 
hitting a cross-court forehand would constitute a winning point may be true, 
but I may still fail (ibid, p.57).  
 
Pacherie notes Bratman's point that desires are merely "potential influences 
of action" whereas intentions are "conduct-controlling" (Bratman, 1987, 
p.16; cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.59).  Thus it is important to recognise 
intentions as separate states from beliefs and desires.  Borrowing her 
terminology from Bach, Pacherie suggests a "dual model" of intention (as 
action explanation) which splits intention into "prior intentions versus 
executive representations" (Bach, 1978; cited in Pacherie, 2002. p.61). 
According to this dual model, all actions, whether preceded or not by prior 
intentions, require executive representations for their initiation and 
execution.  She points out that executive (or "motor") representations, "are 
typically conceived of as outside the realm of the mental and as falling 
within the sole province of physiology" (ibid p.63).  But this seems to 
suggest that cognition isn't concerned with movement, that there is "a gap 
between the motivating cognitions and the act they cause" (Israel, Perry and 
Tutiya, 1993, p.529; cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.62). According to Pacherie   213
this misconception probably arises because "the phenomenology of 
perception has a salience that the phenomenology of action usually lacks" 
(ibid p.62).  Be that as it may, executive representations fill the "gap" 
between the cognition and the act: "actions have a phenomenology of their 
own that does not reduce to some species of perceptual phenomenology and 
executive representations are needed to account for the awareness we have 
of what we are doing"(ibid).  
 
The concept of executive representations has been further clarified by 
neurophysiological research which suggests that "actions are driven by an 
internal representation of a goal rather than directly by the external world" 
(Jeannerod, cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.67, my italics).  Previously, theorists 
have been inclined to "artificially separate" movement representations, 
assumed to pertain to a physiological approach, and action representations, 
assumed to pertain to a psychological approach.  Jeannerod suggests that 
"there is no such dichotomy but rather a continuum" (ibid).  This research 
reveals highly complex processes of interaction involving two aspects of 
executive representations; (i) representations of "the body as a generator of 
acting forces...dictated by kinematic rules and biomechanical constraints" 
and (ii) representations of the goal of the action, which include 
representations of "both the external object toward which it is directed, and 
the final state of the organism when that object has been reached" (ibid, 
p.68).  
 
In her interpretation of this research Pacherie emphasises the importance of 
the dynamic character of executive representations; "neither states of the 
body per se nor states of the environment per se, but rather dynamic 
relations between body and goal" involving "an interplay of anticipations 
and adjustments in response to sensory feedback" (ibid, p.69). What this 
seems to suggest is that the pattern of action which we call narrative that 
connects the subject to the goal can be found operating at all levels of human 
activity.   
   214
So Pacherie establishes "two levels" of intentional states: prior intentions 
and executive representations. Prior intentions are able to govern the 
executive representations directing the behaviour of the agent by 
determining what aspects of the situation are attended to and then deciding 
"which among the available action schemata will be selected and in what 
order" (ibid, 71).  This can be quite specific, as when the prior intention is to 
act according to a definite plan, but it can also be indirect such as when 
driving a car along a familiar route:  
 
Many sub-actions will have to be performed; accelerating, changing gears, 
making turns, applying brakes... and so on.  These sub-actions don't need 
to be represented at the level of the prior intention, what the prior 
intention does here is simply to raise the level of activation of the 
schemata concerned with driving and to make more salient the aspects of 
the situation that are relevant to driving. 
Pacherie, 2002, p.71 
 
There are also some "routine or automatic actions" which don't depend on 
the presence of prior intentions at all, such as absent-mindedly sipping a 
mug of coffee while writing: "the conjunction of the visual perception of the 
mug combined with a state of thirst, even if not consciously registered" 
(ibid, p.72) triggers relevant action schema, as well as activating related 
schemata and inhibiting rival schemata.  The sipping of the coffee may not 
interrupt attention to the writing at all, unless preconscious expectations 
are suddenly subverted, such as the coffee having gone cold or discovering a 
dead fly floating on the surface.  Suddenly emotions of disgust and perhaps 
anger interrupt the concentration previously focused on the writing so that 
action can be taken to deal with the new situation.  We can see from these 
two examples that the connection between prior intentions and executive 
representations can be decoupled at a variety of points along the continuum. 
This casts a little more light on the mystery of the "fiction paradox", that is, 
why an audience doesn't act in response to a dramatic representation which 
they seem, at the time, to believe. For a better understanding though, it   215
would be useful to reconsider executive representations from different 
perspective. 
 
Damasio suggests that the location of the mental activity I have been calling 
executive representations is in a region of the brain which receives signals 
from various parts of the body and thus maps and monitors "the ongoing 
state of the organism" (Damasio, 2003, p.96).  These "body maps" register 
all the different organic systems; neurological, limbic, etc.  Damasio suggests 
they are designed as part of the ongoing maintenance of the body's 
homeostasis. An aspect of these areas of the brain is that they are also 
capable of simulating or creating "false" maps of what's happening in the 
body; "certain brain regions, such as the prefrontal/premotor cortices, 
directly signal the body-sensing brain regions" thus bypassing the body 
itself to create what Damasio calls an "as-if-body-loop"; 
 
... the body-sensing areas constitute a sort of theater where not only the 
"actual" body states can be "performed," but varied assortments of "false" 
body states can be enacted as well... 
              Damasio, 2003, p.117   
 
An example of the "simulated body state" which Damasio calls the "as-if-
body-loop", is one I have already referred to; the executive representations 
that guide action between "the external object toward which it is directed, 
and the final state of the organism when that object has been reached".  By 
reproducing the action tendencies that would occur in response to the "as if" 
situation, the "as-if-body-loop" or "simulated body state" informs us how it 
would feel to be in the situation it is simulating, that is, what the emotional 
response would be, including its valence and intensity, if the action were to 
be taken.  Is this not the situation of the member of an audience watching a 
dramatic performance?  So when an audience watches the performance of 
drama, the play-frame could be said to be operating as an unconscious 
disconnect between intentions and executive representations, particularly if 
we take these representations as conceptually analogous to Damasio's body 
maps.  If every audience member’s multiple intentions, such as "save Marion   216
from the approaching attack" and "run away, run away", are directed by the 
frame "this is just a film" towards the dynamic body maps of the "as if" body 
loop, the audience will be able to enjoy all the appropriate action tendencies, 
each with its own emotional valence and intensity, without having to leave 
their seats.   
 
At this point I should, perhaps, deal with the relatively recent discovery of 
mirror neurons. According to Stern, 
 
Mirror neurons sit adjacent to motor neurons. They fire in an observer who is doing 
nothing but watching another person to pay (e.g., reaching for a glass). And the 
pattern of firing in the observer mimics the pattern that the observer would use if he 
were reaching for that glass, himself. In brief, the visual information received when 
watching another act gets mapped onto the equivalent motor representation in our 
own brain by the activity of these mirror neurons. It permits us to directly participate 
in another's actions, without having to imitate them. 
Stern, 2007, p.37 
 
Some scientists have suggested that mirror neurons provide a 
neurophysiological foundation for empathy, love and human interaction. 
This may well be the case, however, I have two reasons for leaving mirror 
neurons out of my exploration of mimesis and emotion. First of all, research 
by neurophysiologists at Harvard University and elsewhere has cast some 
doubt on initial assumptions about the function of mirror neurons (Hickok, 
2009). Secondly, this is not a thesis in the field of biology or 
neurophysiology. While I have certainly ventured into explanations of 
emotions and of the "fiction paradox" by means of some aspects of 
neurophysiology, I have tried to do so in a way that offers a model by which 
to understand the event. For example, Damasio’s description of the body-
sensing areas of the brain constituting "a sort of theater…". Here, the 
neurophysiologist is not so much providing a scientific explanation of our 
experience but, rather, an aid to a useful, if rough, understanding of the way 
the process might work. The notion that mirror neurons provide an 
explanation of mimesis may well be true in the scientific/biological sense,   217
but it contributes little to our understanding of why some dramatic texts 
succeed in sustaining the experience of a mimetic illusion while others fail.  
As Churchland has pointed out, our understanding of others' intentions 
happens at a more complex level of neural activity than that of individual 
neurons: "A neuron, though computationally complex, is just a neuron. It is 
not an intelligent homunculus. If a neural network represents something 
complex, such as an intention [to insult], it must have the right input and be 
in the right place in the neural circuitry to do that" (Churchland, 2011, 
p.142). 
 
One further point might help to clarify how it is possible for us to "believe" a 
fiction even when it is patently absurd, such as the representation of a 
talking duck.  De Sousa suggests that there is a significant difference 
between a belief and an emotion.  It has to do with our ability to 
hypothesise.  To hypothesise is to entertain a possible belief so that it is "as if 
we believed something to be true" even if it isn't. The "as if" here places the 
frame of "this is a hypothesis" around the belief.  Unlike beliefs, however, 
emotions cannot be hypothesised.  Either we feel them or we don't (De 
Sousa, 1987, p.157).  Hence, in any subjunctive or metaphorical activity, 
such as hypothesising or depiction or play, the pretense is always with the 
cognition and never with the feeling. Empathy is a kind of hypothesis.  As I 
discussed earlier, when we see a character or characters in action, fiction or 
not, we automatically want to know why - what is it that motivates them 
(because there might be something in it for us)?  To understand their 
motivation we must enter into their perspective and see how things feel 
from their point of view.  This is why empathy demands simulation.  To 
understand their motivation we have to become emotionally involved with 
what they care about and the inability to hypothesise emotions means that 
once we have adopted their perspective, their emotions become ours.  This 
helps to explain why drama relies on emotion for verisimilitude; because, as 
I said, in emotional experience feeling finesses cognition.  As soon as we 
enter into an empathetic understanding of another person, fictional or not, 
our empathetic awareness of their feelings pre-empts our judgement of   218
them as people.  We are, therefore, predisposed to overlook Daffy’s 
duckness because we have already begun to share his existential angst. 
 
 
4) Gestic music  
 
According to Frijda's "law of concern… every emotion hides a concern, that 
is, a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular states of the 
world" (Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p.274). Concerns dictate the way we 
perceive any given situation and decide what is salient about it and give it its 
emotional meaning; "The evaluation of the rationality of an emotional action 
will concern how performing this action relates to the antecedent goals of 
the agent" (Pacherie, 2002, p.75).  So the appraisal of a given situation 
depends on what concerns are in the foreground at the time of evaluation: 
"my discovering that the computer won't work will generate anger if my 
intention was to start writing now".  However, it might also produce 
malicious joy if the goal "was to test whether the virus I have been 
programming has the devastating effects I was hoping for" (ibid). It is 
important to reiterate that rationality in this instance is not related to the 
goal but to the efficacy of the action in achieving it.  With regard to drama, so 
long as it has been made clear to the audience how important it is to the 
protagonists to achieve their goal, any action taken to achieve this end will 
seem to be rational and appropriate, no matter how ridiculous we might 
consider the goal itself to be. The nature of the goal in this context is 
irrelevant; a McGuffin.  It is the context of the character’s concerns and the 
situation that renders their actions plausible (or not), sustains 
verisimilitude and holds the empathetic involvement of an audience 
because, by virtue of recognising the situational meaning they share the 
paradigmatic action tendencies of the characters and so, quite literally feel 
the plausibility of the action.  This is a why Aristotle preferred plausible 
impossibilities to implausible possibilities (Aristotle, 1981, p.68).  This 
brings us back to the question of the difference between the emotions of 
"real-life situations" and the vicarious emotions felt at the cathartic   219
moments of drama; the difference, for example, between the joy we might 
feel when proposing marriage and being accepted, and the joy we share 
with, say, Beatrice and Benedict when they finally acknowledge their love at 
the end of Much Ado about Nothing.  What is important about emotion felt by 
the audience towards and about a given dramatic situation is not so much 
whether it feels the same as the "real-life" version but whether it makes the 
dramatic cause and effect feel plausible.   
 
It is hardly surprising that we are so susceptible to being engaged by drama, 
because our attention will always be directed by an emotional response to a 
situation that has apparent urgency or might be relevant to our concerns. 
Frijda describes the influence of events on our embodied emotions by 
comparing it with a piano player's fingers on the keys of the piano: 
  
Meaning structures are lawfully connected to forms of action readiness.  Events 
appraised in terms of their meanings are the emotional piano player's finger 
strokes; available modes of action readiness are the keys that are tapped; 
changes in action readiness are the tones brought forth. 
The keys, the available modes of action readiness, correspond to the behaviour 
systems and general response modes with which humans are endowed…. And 
last, the response modes include the action control changes that are manifest in 
behavioural interference and that we experience as preoccupation and urgency; 
sometimes, these are the only aspect of our change in action readiness that we 
feel or show.  
Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p. 271.   
 
The analogy of the appraisal of emotional meaning with the keys on a piano 
is alluring to a dramatist with aspirations to composing the emotional 
experience of his characters and his audience. It is no coincidence that 
Brecht likened the work of the dramatist to the composition of what he 
called Gestic music.  His idea of "gestus" being a language of attitude and 
gesture: "A gestus characterises the relations among people." (quoted in 
Pavis 1982, p.41). If events trigger the "emotional piano player's finger 
strokes" then the performance of a script, which is the dramatist's   220
composition of the events, is analogous to written music being read and 
performed on Frijda's piano.  
 
The recognition of a character’s concerns and desired outcome, evokes the 
empathy of the audience and locks them into an involvement with the 
process of reaching or achieving it.  They come to feel the different modes of 
action readiness of the character, calibrating the dynamics of the 
relationships between the character's intentions and goals. Modes of action 
readiness include (but are not restricted to) action tendencies, which Frijda 
defines as "states of readiness to execute a given kind of action" where "kind 
of action" is defined by "the end result aimed at or achieved" (Frijda, in 
Jenkins, Oatley and Stein, 1998, p.274). For instance, the action tendency 
associated with anger is defined as "the removal of obstruction".  So 
potential action paradigms such as attacking, spitting, insulting, turning 
one's back or slandering might be considered to be actions of a similar kind 
insofar as they are aimed at "removal of obstruction".  Elster makes the 
point that action tendencies "typically go together with desires - that is, 
desires to act" (in Solomon, 2004, p.153).  Here again is his list of emotions 
with their paradigmatic action tendencies: 
 
Emotion:    Action Tendency: 
 
Anger      cause object of anger to suffer (revenge) 
Hatred    cause object of hatred to cease to exist 
Contempt  ostracism, avoidance 
Shame    "sink through the floor"; run away; suicide 
Guilt    confess; make repairs; hurt oneself 
Envy    destroy the envied object or its possessor 
Fear    flight; fight 
Love    approach, touch, help, please the loved one 
              (ibid, p.152) 
 
Goldie suggests that each episode of an emotional response leading to action 
can be described in terms of a "script" with a set of "paradigmatic steps so 
that for each sort of emotion, there will be a paradigmatic narrative   221
structure of elements of emotional experience" (Goldie, 2000, p.92, my 
italics).  Here is Goldie's five-step description of an anger episode: 
 
step 1: paradigmatic recognitional element involved in anger; 
step 2: paradigmatic facial expression for anger; 
step 3: paradigmatic bodily changes and feeling of those changes; 
step 4: paradigmatic motivational response involved in anger; 
step 5: paradigmatic action out of anger. 
(Goldie, 2000, p.94) 
 
The paradigmatic feature or features of each step will be different 
depending on the "situational meaning" (which we might also call "the story 
of the situation").  The situational meaning will be identified by the subject 
according to their emotional experience and the range of possible 
interpretations and behavioural responses available to them as a member of 
a given culture.  
 
Elster points out that, as well as their vicarious involvement with the 
emotions of the characters in drama, an audience experiences "aesthetic 
emotions induced by the formal organisation of the work of art.  They 
include wonder, awe, surprise, humour, relief, and release" (Elster 1999, 
p.245).  In the case of dramatic art we can say that these emotions are felt in 
response to the operations at the level of the first order of causal 
determination, in response, that is, to the quality of the design.  
Understandably, the dramatist wants to evoke these feelings about his work.  
However, it is important that these aesthetic responses don't overwhelm the 
cathartic involvement with the causal determinations of the second order; 
the story.  The aesthetics of catharsis are best appreciated after the event.  
 
It would be a mistake to try to draw too direct an analogy between music 
and drama.  However, what it usefully reminds us of is that the composition 
of drama requires more than the writing of dialogue between characters.  It 
is also concerned with the creation of rhythmic patterns of tensions and 
resolutions with virtually unlimited variation. An aesthetics of catharsis   222
might appreciate the quality and beauty of the complexity, valence and 
intensity of the patterns of tension and resolution to be found in the 
cathartic operations of drama.  
 
 
5) Three kinds of emotional action 
 
The notion of emotion as action tendency raises the question whether there 
are actions that are not motivated by emotion. Whether or not there are, 
they are of little concern in the composition of drama. What is of concern is 
the intensity of the emotion arising from the action tendency and the 
influence of that intensity on the resulting action. As we have seen, a desire 
to act and a belief in the likelihood of the anticipated outcome is not 
necessarily a direct road to action. It is important to recognise intentions as 
separate states from beliefs and desires, and to recognise the difference 
between "prior intentions" and "executive representations". Sometimes 
though, under the influence of an intense emotion, these stages between the 
emotion and the act are virtually indiscernible. Different situational 
meanings produce different intensities of motivation to act.  Pacherie 
identifies three categories of action each with a different level of intensity 
and, consequently, different relation/connection between the emotion and 
subsequent action; i) impulsive actions, ii) semi-deliberate actions, iii) fully 
deliberate actions. 
 
i) impulsive actions 
As I mentioned earlier, there are two "levels" of intentional states: prior 
intentions and executive representations. Prior intentions are able to govern 
the executive representations, directing the behaviour of the agent by 
determining what aspects of a given situation are attended to and then 
deciding "which among the available action schemata will be selected and in 
what order" (Pacherie, 2002, p.71).  In some circumstances though, such as 
with routine actions like driving a car or drinking a beverage, action schema 
can be activated without any cognition of prior intentions.  This is also true   223
of impulsive actions, which Goldie calls "actions out of emotion" (Goldie, 
2000), in which emotional reaction is in direct control of the executive 
representations, "without the benefit of a second level of control by prior 
intentions" (Pacherie, 2002, p.76).  As a result, "the first object or feature of 
the environment affording an action that fits the kind of action defined by 
the action tendency of the emotion is the one acted upon" (ibid). Some 
obvious examples of impulsive actions include hitting someone in anger, 
jumping for joy or running in fright.  Pacherie points out that, whereas 
routine actions demand little attention and only take control when prior 
intentions and plans are "not attended to with sufficient force", impulsive 
action tendencies "clamour for attention and for execution, they have the 
feature of control precedence" (ibid, my italics). This "control precedence" of 
impulsive action has important consequences for the dramatist that I will 
discuss in a moment, but first it would be useful to identify the cause of it.   
 
In the absence of cognition, "relational properties" between the agent and 
object of the action are inclined to collapse into one or the other, that is, they 
are taken to be an aspect of either the action or the object.  So, for example, 
properties of oppressiveness or horribleness attributed to a given situation 
(its situational meaning) are also "injunctions to act": danger requires 
escape, offence demands reprisal; "means and goal are not coded 
separately".  So the transition from recognition of situational meaning to 
executive representation of an action is direct: "no need for the conscious 
formulation of a plan for dealing with the situation; panicky flight is directed 
not toward a place of safety; but away from the place of danger" (Frijda, 
1986, p.81: cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.78).  Relational properties can also 
"collapse" into properties of the object, becoming "a mode of appearance of 
the situation".  This means that the emotional response to an object or 
situation is projected directly back onto it.  Thus we experience perception 
of "horrible objects, insupportable people, oppressive events" etc.  They 
contain the relation implicitly: "the 'to me' or 'for me' dissolves into the 
property" (Frijda, 1986, p.188: cited in Pacherie, 2002, p.77).   
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The absence of cognitive prior intentions in impulsive actions has to be 
taken into account by the dramatist in his practice.  Action and emotion in a 
single work of long-form drama usually covers a broad scale of intensity and 
consequence, from the subtle action of quiet moments like sipping a cup of 
tea, to the high risk, "high octane" action of the dramatic climax.  Every one 
of them, from the subtle to the most intense, requires plausible motivation; 
an audience must be able to recognise the "emotional logic" of a character's 
behaviour. If there is inconsistency between action and motivation, if a given 
action seems unjustified or implausible, the verisimilitude shatters and the 
audience suddenly becomes more aware of the "play frame" than they are of 
what's going on inside it.  Actions that are highly consequential and risky 
within the context of a story have a higher risk of breaking verisimilitude 
because "normal people under normal circumstances" aren't normally 
prepared to take such risks.  Such actions are unlikely to be motivated by 
indifferent feelings. To believe in the impulsive action we need to have a 
clear understanding of the relationship between the hero's concerns and his 
or her understanding of the situational meaning.  If the nature of the 
situation has been made clear such that a passionate response and 
impulsive action is plausible, it will be easy for an audience to understand 
and empathise with the hero's action without any explanation necessary 
beyond the situation itself. So it could be said that this kind of drama is 
designed and constructed specifically to explain and demonstrate why, at 
the dramatic climax, the hero is prepared to risk "everything" by 
undertaking the penultimate action to reach his or her goal.  In Taking 
Liberty, by the time Warren Jones discovers that Alan Bond has gambled his 
entire corporation on the winning of the 1983 America's Cup (p.53), the 
audience understands Bond's reckless ambition well enough to consider his 
action quite plausible, although it would seem implausible if it was taken by 
almost anyone else. 
 
Impulsive actions do allow for minimal forms of reasoning, for instance 
"when I'm desperately trying to flee that bear, I may see a crack between 
two rocks and reason that the bear is too big to follow me through the crack"   225
(Pacherie, 2002, p.78).  But this kind of reasoning is always short-sighted 
and can therefore lead to trouble. This has proved quite useful for 
innumerable hero/villain chase sequences.  Whoever is being chased will, 
more often than not, run unthinkingly to a place they can't escape from, thus 
creating the impression that the final dramatic confrontation between them 
is inevitable and therefore plausible. 
 
ii) semi-deliberate actions 
With semi-deliberate emotional actions, action tendency is experienced in 
the mode of self-awareness.  In other words I am aware that my emotional 
response to an object or situation is not only a property of the object or 
situation, but also that my feelings are the result of my own cognitive 
understanding of the object or situation. Semi-deliberate emotional action 
tendencies usually arise because the situation "does not immediately afford 
ways of satisfying the action tendency generated by the emotion" (ibid, 
p.80).  As a result "the action tendency gets converted into a conscious 
intention to pursue a certain goal.  This involves a change in 
representational format" (ibid).  Unlike impulsive emotional action in which 
the recognition/response is directed straight to executive representation 
and the choice of action is limited to whatever the situation immediately 
affords, semi-deliberate emotional actions "presuppose a capacity for a 
partial detachment from the present situation" (ibid, p.81).  The question of 
whether such a thing as "partial detachment" is possible (surely one is either 
attached or not) is not something that Pacherie goes into.  Be that as it may, 
according to Pacherie, both the emotion and the "action tendencies" of semi-
deliberate actions are determined by the response to present situation, but 
the action itself must wait until a situation in which it is conceivable that the 
goal is achievable.  In such a situation we are aware of the need to organise 
an alternative situation in which the action tendency is able to be activated, 
that is, to "exploit my stock of instrumental beliefs in order to form a plan of 
action" (ibid).  Drama is usually framed within the gap between the 
initiating event that provokes an action tendency in the hero, and the final 
completion of the action.     226
 
Semi-deliberate emotional actions can be decided upon by (seemingly) 
rational deliberation but it is important to note that the end or goal to which 
this deliberation is put is defined by, and under the control of, the emotion.  
Hamlet's deliberations and plans are focused on a goal determined by his 
emotional response to the murder of his father.  So the planning and 
deliberation of semi-deliberate emotional actions are "short-sighted in the 
sense that their cognitive integration is only partial" (ibid, p.82).  Thus, since 
we can only see things from a current perspective under the potentially 
prejudicial shadow of an emotional response, we can never be completely 
sure that we are seeing them objectively. The susceptibility of our 
perception of apparent reality to the distorting influence of emotion ("we 
believe easily what we hope and what we fear," goes the Swedish proverb) 
will be a topic of section six.   
 
iii) fully deliberate actions  
It is debatable whether we can describe fully deliberate actions as emotional 
at all. (Goldie probably wouldn't call them emotional; see Goldie, 2000, 
p.38.)  Pacherie points out however that they "exploit the motivational 
potential of emotions" (Pacherie, 2002, p.83). What she is referring to is 
"cases where my becoming aware of an emotion and the action tendency it 
generates gives me some control over it and allows me to exploit and 
possibly redirect its action potential" (ibid).  Pacherie's example is the fear 
of delivering a speech in front of a large audience.  The impulsive action in 
response to the fear would be to run away or perhaps phone the facilitator 
and offer excuses.  However, a fully deliberate emotional action would be to 
use the fear as motivation to work very hard on the speech.  This is what Jon 
Elster calls "technologies of emotional planning" (Elster, 1999; cited in 
Pacherie 2002, p.83).  Other strategies of the same kind might include 
mustering "the courage to go confront one's boss" by "remembering all the 
wrongs one has suffered in order to feel anger" (ibid). One might also 
"whistle a happy tune". De Sousa refers to this kind of practice as "emotional 
boot-strapping" (De Sousa, 1987, p.235-241).  These strategies "presuppose   227
the capacity for truly reflexive emotional awareness, awareness by the 
subject of himself as feeling an emotion" (Pacherie 2002, p.83).  In these 
cases we are able to make "instrumental use of emotions", to use emotions 
for the purpose of achieving a desired end.  To do this one must be 
disengaged from the emotion and able to "encode situations as situations 
eliciting in oneself an emotion of a given kind" (Pacherie, p.84).  However 
any sense of confidence in an objective view of the goal, that is, of perception 
or intention entirely independent of emotional distortion, must be treated 
with some scepticism, as it is in the social comedies of, among others, 
Shakespeare, Moliere and Brecht. 
 
 
 
6) The urgent versus the important 
 
Previously I referred to a perceived divide between theorists of the 
"noncognitive" emotion experience and those who conceive of emotion as a 
"propositional attitude".  Goldie describes it as a debate between the 
"analytic-philosophical theorists and the genetic-psychological theorists; the 
former try to describe cultural explanations for mature human emotional 
experience while the latter examine the biological origins of the 
development of capability for the emotions" (Goldie, 2000, p. 84).  In my 
previous sections I was mainly discussing the "noncognitive" approach, 
which presents emotion as if it is, 
 
... more or less over and done with in 120 milliseconds, the rest being mere 
aftermath and cerebral embellishment (LeDoux 1996, Panksepp 1992, 
Damasio 1999).  Emotion, so understood, is a brief, preconscious, 
precognitive, more or less automatic excitation of an affect program.  
Solomon, 2004, p.78 
 
A dramatist might try to evoke this kind of emotional experience to establish 
or to reignite the engagement of an audience with events and characters in 
the drama.  As I indicated previously, short-form narratives such as   228
television advertisements exploit to great commercial advantage the 
possibility of manipulating our attention by finessing it with brief narratives 
of the primary emotions; desire in concert with pleasure or pain; a 
housewife's desire for pure cleanliness is satisfied and redeemed by a "white 
tornado"; ageing is prevented by lotions with scientifically proven efficacy; 
all your frustrated desires are suddenly satisfied by a winning lottery ticket 
or a friendly bank, and so it goes.  But as I said, such brief narratives tend not 
to be satisfying enough to watch for their own sake; the sort of engagement 
required for an audience to sit uncomplaining for an hour to 90 minutes 
demands a more complex emotional experience. Solomon follows the 
passage quoted above with reasons for his own interest in emotion: 
 
I am interested, not in those brief "irruptive" reactions or responses but 
in the long-term narratives of Othello, Iago...  I am interested in the 
meanings of life, not short-term neurological arousal. 
                Ibid 
     
What is interesting about the debate between the schools of noncognitive 
and cognitive emotion is not whether or which side is right but what else it 
reveals about emotions: how we conceive of them and what we conceive 
them to be.  
 
Spinoza, in his Ethics, suggests that, based on the evidence, "we are in many 
ways driven about by external causes, and... like waves of the sea driven by 
contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate" 
(p.172).  He goes on to point out, however, that "human bondage" isn't 
inevitable.  Our values do not have to be entirely self-oriented; our desire for 
pleasure (and to avoid pain and danger) can be trumped by our desire for 
"the good", should we so choose.  Contemporary emotion theorists of the 
"propositional attitude" school are particularly concerned with this struggle 
between feeling and judgement. Nussbaum, for example, calls emotions 
"intelligent responses to the perception of value" and considers them to be 
an important aspect of ethical reasoning.  She refers to her approach as   229
"neo-stoicism", identifying its origins in the ideas of the Greek Stoics for 
whom,  
 
... emotions are forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe to certain things 
and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the 
person's own flourishing.  Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgements of 
neediness and lack of self-sufficiency. 
              Nussbaum, 2001, p.22 
 
How is the physiological visceral feeling of an emotion related to the 
cognitive, propositional, judgemental aspect of the experience?  The 
question immediately raises further questions about the universality of 
emotional experience.  How much is learnt and how much is pan-cultural? Is 
judgement an innate part of the emotional experience or culturally 
mediated, seeming intrinsic only because of its having been learnt so young?  
Is an emotion a brief and discreet episode which begins and ends with a 
biological response to a situation, or is it part of a longer narrative of the 
individual as a member of a culture and society?  
 
All emotions have a positive or negative valence and therefore make a 
judgement. They are generated according to our interpretation and 
evaluation of a given object or situation as it relates to us: "when we 
appraise something as good for us, we like it, when we appraise something 
as bad for us, we dislike it" (Arnold, 1960, p.194).  My pleasant emotions tell 
me something is desirable and likewise the unpleasant emotions warn me 
against it:  
 
... those internal states - which occur naturally along a range whose poles 
are pain and pleasure, and are caused by either internal or external objects 
and events - become unwitting non-verbal signifiers of the goodness or 
badness of situations relative to the organism's inherent set of values.   
Damasio, 1999, p.30 
 
What is often at issue is the value of pleasure in light of normative cultural 
values. Parkinson et al. suggest that typical emotion sequences (which they   230
refer to as "emotion scripts") involve value judgements about the emotion 
itself:  
 
At minimum, some antecedent event and some response to that event 
are specified.  Commonly, the representation also includes the 
subsequent regulation of the response to the event or an evaluation of 
its appropriateness"  
Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead, 2005, p.39 
 
This question of "appropriateness" brings the concept of emotion as a 
biological experience into the sphere of culture and society.  Unlike other 
animals, humans "elaborate explicit theories of the world... providing a 
framework of understanding within which causal and temporal thinking will 
operate" (Nussbaum, 2001, p.147).  This framework is constituted in part by 
the question, "what is worth caring about?"  The answer is dictated as much 
by cultural norms as by a physical desires or dangers.  Whether or not 
cognition ought to be considered to be part of emotion per se isn't my 
concern here.  What interests me is how the interaction of physiological and 
cultural aspects of emotion informs and affects the emotional experience of 
an audience watching drama or, to put it another way, how the short-form 
narratives of "affect programmes" operate as a function of the "long-form 
narrative" of our emotional life.   
 
LeDoux suggests that "emotion and cognition should be thought of as 
interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting brain 
functions" (in Solomon, 2004, p.36).  Robinson describes how this 
interaction develops into a complex sequence of processes unfolding as 
the emotional experience runs its course, and arousal and appraisal 
become alchemically reconstituted into a single emotional experience:   
 
... there is continuous feedback of various sorts from one event in the process to 
another.  For example, physiological changes may help to fix our attention on 
whatever it is that is important in the situation.  Autonomic arousal may prompt 
us to action.  Subjective feelings may also reinforce attention and in addition can 
serve as a source of information about what I am reacting to and how important   231
it is to me. Cognitive appraisals and reappraisals modify action tendencies, 
physiological changes, and subjective feelings alike.    
Robinson (in Solomon, 2004, p.38) 
 
Robinson concludes that cognitive judgement theorists' explanations of 
human emotions in folk psychological terms (desires and beliefs) aren't 
concerned with "a scientific account of the sequence of events in an emotion 
process," as much as an after-the-fact summary:  
 
What the judgement theorist is doing in "explaining" the nature of "jealousy" 
or "shame" is summarising in terms that the culture understands what kind of 
situation has occurred, what beliefs about it the person had, and which of his 
or her wants, goals, interests and values were at stake. 
Ibid 
 
In the light of such a description it is hardly surprising to find propositional 
attitude theorists also using narrative as a means of understanding the 
emotional life; 
 
The understanding of any single emotion is incomplete unless its narrative 
history is grasped and studied for the light it sheds on the present response.   
Nussbaum, 2001, p.236  
 
So, while narrative is useful to the noncognitive emotion theorist as a step-
by-step structural analogy for an affect programme, to philosophers, like 
Nussbaum, from the "propositional attitude" school, narrative provides a 
way of conveying subjective emotional experience as a recognition and 
response to change over time.   
 
Rorty shows in the following passage how Frijda's insistence that the 
experience of an emotion arises from the relation between "the event and 
the subject’s concerns" is best captured by narrative explanation: 
 
... a set of psychological attitudes - love, joy, perhaps some sort of desire - that are 
individuated by the character of the subject, the character of the object, and the   232
relation between them.... these psychological attitudes are identified by the detail 
of the narrative of the interactions between the subject and the object, 
interactions that also individuate the persons involved.   
Rorty, 1988, p.121 
 
As Goldie points out, "everyday explanation of what we think, feel, and do is 
narrative in form, presenting what happened from a possible multiplicity of 
perspectives" (Goldie in Hatzimoysis, 2003, p.202).  I have already 
established how easy it is to be recruited into another's perspective by an 
almost involuntary empathy and that each new perspective involves its own 
evaluative thoughts, hence Goldie is correct to say that "each perspective 
involved in the narration of a story potentially involves an emotional 
response to value" (ibid p. 211).  All these aspects of subjective emotional 
experience seem to be innate and intrinsic to our experience of the world 
and thus a "natural" part of who and what we are.  However, it is important 
to remember that there is such a thing as an emotional education and 
narrative is an essential part of that as well. 
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, according to de Sousa we learn about 
emotions, both automatic responses and retroactive understanding, by 
means of structured memories or paradigm scenarios “drawn first from our 
daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art and 
culture” (de Sousa, 1987, p.182). Goldie describes what we might call the 
basic structural unit of the paradigm scenario which he refers to as the 
"recognition-response tie":  
 
We can be taught to recognise and to respond emotionally, as part of the same 
education.  For example, we can be taught to recognise things as dangerous and 
to respond, appropriately and proportionately, with fear. 
Goldie, 2000, p.27  
 
There is a difference between an emotion per se and the motivating aspect 
of the object of that emotion.  Goldie calls this the "emotion-invoking 
determinable feature".  The emotion-invoking determinable feature of the   233
bull I referred to earlier (which motivates us to turn and run before we are 
even aware it is a bull) we might call "dangerousness".  It is a property 
"whose recognition merits a certain sort of response" and what is merited is 
not just recognition or judgement (such as "avoidance would be 
appropriate"), but fear; "with all that this emotional experience involves, 
including thought, feeling, and action" (ibid).  Having been taught that things 
which are dangerous merit fear, we also learn when we ought to experience 
this response. Thus, even an emotion as apparently "natural" as fear has a 
normative element to it: 
 
 Recognition and response will feature as part of the narrative structure of 
the person's emotional experience, and when he acts out of the emotion, 
they will serve to explain the action, so that it can be understood as 
intelligible, and appropriate and proportionate from the agent's 
perspective.   
Ibid, p.31 
 
This kind of emotional education is not limited to training us for the highly 
salient "hair-raising" situations of physical danger.  Dangerousness is not 
unique to bulls. Many things invoke a fear response, although they may not 
necessarily be similar kinds of things at all; Goldie reminds us that the class 
of dangerous things has no unifying feature definable by "scientific 
description" because "dangerous things are picked out relative to our 
particular human, or, more locally, cultural interests" (Goldie 2000, p.30).  
Thus the concept of "dangerousness" groups together all sorts of things 
depending on the background of the individual; stoves, lions, peanuts, 
Byron, clifftops, or a little learning.  Dangerousness is, thus, an evaluative 
property, and the dangerousness of the things I just listed demonstrate de 
Sousa's notion of the way we learn from the paradigm scenarios.  They 
might have been learnt from experience, such as burning my hand on a hot 
plate, or from a text, such as a government health warning or a biography of 
Shelley.  These experiences are integrated into the memory and become 
automatic, establishing "somatic markers" influencing the decision-making 
process at a preconscious level.  Paradigm scenarios are formed and   234
categorised according to "their significance in terms of our personal 
narrative" in readiness to respond to the relevant category of a situation. 
These "conceptual categories" are then connected to "the brain apparatus 
used for the triggering of emotions" (ibid).  So when a situation arises that 
fits a particular category "we rapidly and automatically deploy the 
appropriate emotions" (ibid, p.147).  Thus we grasp the meaning of a 
situation by its associated feeling before it has been processed cognitively.  
On the other hand, cognition, as I said, can provide us with a retroactive 
understanding of why we feel a particular way about a situation (see Elster, 
1999).  An emotional education leaves us with a strong sense of the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of emotions, which can in turn cause 
us to alter our feelings, producing meta-emotions.  As Miller points out, it is 
rare for us to experience an emotion unaccompanied by others: 
 
Emotions flood in upon us as we respond emotionally to our own 
emotional states.  We are guilty about our anger, embarrassed by our 
grief, disgusted by our fear. 
Miller, 1997, p.25 
 
In drama the situation of a single character "struggling" between his initial 
emotional responses and the regulatory normative value judgements that 
produce further consequent emotions, can be identified operating in most of 
Hamlet's soliloquies.  In the "… rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy, for 
example, he is disgusted by his perceived failure to feel the appropriate level 
of grief about his father's death.  
 
 
6) Mechanisms of self-deception 
 
In my discussion of impulsive action, I referred to the process whereby the 
emotional response to an object or situation is projected directly back onto 
it so that relational properties "collapse" into properties of the object, 
becoming "a mode of appearance of the situation": for example, my anger in 
response to the frustration of my desire to get to my destination in a hurry   235
will turn any obstruction into a malevolent agent; a "horrible" set of traffic 
lights or a "conspiracy" of Sunday drivers. This collapsing of the relational 
properties of action and object into one or the other is called (by Elster, 
1999) a mechanism.  Its operations have to do with the potential for the 
distortion of apparent reality by the subject/agent under the influence of 
emotion, and its implications can be demonstrated by the narrative of the 
fox and the grapes.  The fox is "famished" and so, under the influence of his 
desperate hunger, wishful thinking leads him to believe in a world in which 
the grapes hanging above him are sweet and within his reach.  His 
perception of the geophysical relationship between himself and the goal of 
his desire (his orienting belief that the grapes are above him and his 
instrumental belief that he can reach them), is distorted by the subjunctive 
"as if body loop" to which his awareness (of his body maps) has been 
redirected by his desire.  However, as soon as his action tendencies have 
resulted in the impulsive act of reaching for the grapes he recognises a 
change in the world; as he discovers that he can't reach the grapes there 
comes the corresponding realisation that they must be sour.  
 
This is a particular instance of Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance" 
which Elster summarises as "whenever a tension among the elements of a 
person's mental set generates psychic discomfort, ‘something has to give’" 
(Elster, 1999, p.20).  In the case of the sour grapes "tension is generated by 
the presence of a desire that X be the case and a belief or suspicion that X is 
not the case" (ibid).  Both "sour grapes" and wishful thinking are escape 
mechanisms governed by the pleasure principle operating at an 
unconscious level. Much drama, including my own play, depends, to an 
extent, on wishful thinking. To take action one must believe in the 
possibility of achieving the intended outcome and the harder it appears to 
be to achieve the outcome, the greater the dramatic tension, so dramatists 
construct situations designed to make the goal seem almost impossible, 
which makes the hero all the braver (or crazier) for pursuing it.  Their belief 
in the possibility of achieving it appears to be deluded.  Until, of course, they   236
do.  The potential for self-deception with regard to the goal (under the 
influence of their deep desire for it) is a danger that every hero must risk.   
 
Our understanding of the meaning of a situation gives it an apparent reality 
that leads to the instrumental and orienting beliefs by which we calibrate 
our next action (were we to take it) and measure what we risk by taking it 
(should we do so); the more urgent and/or important the antecedent goal, 
the greater the risk worth taking to achieve it.  Hence Hollywood's 
preoccupation with situations in which the entire world is threatened with 
extinction.  Such danger has apparent relevance to us all so the consequent 
urgency expressed by the characters is easy for an audience to empathise 
with. The stakes, however, don't need to be so enormous to make us care 
about the outcome of events. As I've said, the relation of the situation and 
the subject's concerns are the most important influence on the emotional 
response, and our concerns are not always entirely with the pursuit of 
satisfying physical pleasure or avoiding the threat of physical danger.  Self-
image and self-esteem are equally important to us. This can be 
demonstrated by comparing the relative value of the stakes in situations 
that evoke social emotions (such as shame, guilt or envy) with situations in 
which the basic emotions such as anger and fear find expression.  Consider, 
for example, the hero of a Jane Austen novel trying to make a good 
impression on the aristocratic relations of her chosen future husband, 
compared with the story of a soldier in the midst of modern warfare; we 
might find, relatively speaking, the dropping of a spoon equally if not more 
emotionally disturbing than the dropping of a bomb. 
 
The intensity of the "psychic discomfort" of dropping a spoon can be 
explained as follows: 
 
The desire of esteem is as real a want of nature as hunger; and the neglect 
and contempt of the world as severe a pain as gout and stone. 
John Adams (cited in Elster, 1999, p.143) 
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Self-image depends to a great extent on the opinion of others and so 
produces the emotions of social life such as guilt, envy, shame and "the 
cluster of emotions related to the pursuit and defence of honour" (Elster, 
1999, p.139).  Some of these social emotions are implicated in the operation 
of social norms.  These are the so-called "moral emotions" influenced by the 
norms prevailing over any given social situation which influence the agent's 
concerns (ibid, 140).  For example, envy is triggered by the belief that 
someone has something that I want.  Envy is an emotion that, as a general 
rule, incurs social disapproval, so not only do I feel bad because I don't have 
the desired object, I also feel the pain of shame and guilt for even feeling this 
way.  On the other hand, I may not feel the social disapproval if I don't realise 
that I am envious (even if it is obvious to others).  However, if and when I do 
realise that I am envious my sense of shame and guilt "induce a rewriting of 
the script" (ibid, p.98).  For example, I can tell myself that "the person who 
has what I want got it (the coveted item) immorally, illegally and probably at 
my expense".  Thus my envy and its concomitant shame are transmuted into 
the pleasurable emotion of righteous indignation (Aristotle suggested that 
indignation is caused by the sight of someone enjoying undeserved fortune).  
Thanks to this psychic mechanism I can now put into place a plan to deprive 
the person who has it of the coveted item while maintaining smug 
confidence in the integrity of my actions.  All of this self-deceptive psychic 
activity takes place below the radar of consciousness, influenced by the two 
conflicting desires: for the pleasure of the goal itself and to maintain self-
esteem. In my first chapter I discussed how this double desire plays out with 
regard to Alan Bond's pursuit of the America's Cup.  These complex 
mechanisms of self-deception provide some of the most interesting material 
by which dramatic narrative produces "gestic music" from the "emotional 
piano player's finger strokes" on Frijda's piano.   
 
The transmutation of envy into self-righteousness is a recognisable pattern 
of behaviour that can produce highly unpredictable outcomes in specific 
instances of dramatic narrative.  As I mentioned in chapter 1, the 
combination of recognisable but unpredictable outcomes is cause for   238
considerable depth of satisfaction experienced by the audience of a drama.  
To recognise, for example, the plausibility of Iago's motivation for hating 
Othello, we need to understand the cathartic mechanisms of envy and shame 
that are played out through the play.  I choose Othello because it is often 
accused of not providing Iago with plausible motivation for his actions 
(Coleridge in Shakespeare, 1963, p.205; Bernard Shaw cited in Wurmser, 
2008, p.34). However, his actions are felt to be plausible when witnessed by 
an audience.  A brief examination of the aesthetics of catharsis in the play 
should reveal how Shakespeare's design of the emotional elements leads us 
to believe Iago’s behaviour is plausible.  
 
The objection appears to be that the cold calculation and ultra lucidity with 
which Iago analyses and manipulates the emotional life of the other major 
characters, as well as being so lucid about his own hatred and contempt for 
Othello, would suggest that he should also be able to identify to himself and 
to us the source of his hatred.  But this is precisely where his blind spot lies.  
Iago is prepared to express his anger at being overlooked for promotion 
behind Othello and Cassio: "I am worth no worse a place".  He is even 
prepared to admit his jealousy: 
 
... I do suspect the lusty Moor 
Hath leapt into my seat, the thought whereof 
Doth, like poisonous mineral, gnaw my innards 
 
What he cannot bear to acknowledge is his humiliation. As Lansky points 
out, Iago's envy arises from "... the sense of diminishment (shame, conscious 
or unconscious) he feels at the flourishing... of those at whom his envy is 
directed" (cited in Wurmser, 2008, p.34). But he is incapable of admitting it 
to himself, let alone us. Instead, the action demonstrates it.  The audience 
feels his humiliation as the primary motivation among his many other 
emotional motivations for the very reason that it is the unspoken emotion; 
they are not told of it, but they are allowed to feel it for themselves. (This   239
may well also raise questions about Shakespeare's inherent racism but here 
I am concerned with his dramaturgical methodology.)  
 
Jane Austen demonstrates similar technique in her dealings with envy.  All of 
her heroines (except for Emma) are poor compared to their relatives but 
none of them either acknowledge or reveal what contemporary writers 
might call "status anxiety".  By resisting this temptation themselves they 
leave us, the reader (or in the case of those watching one of the innumerable 
adaptations, the viewer), to feel it in their stead.  In this way, storytellers like 
Austen and Shakespeare use catharsis to reveal what must, for the sake of 
verisimilitude, remain unspoken. Thus an aesthetics of catharsis might offer 
an appreciation of the artfulness by which an audience is given an 
opportunity to recognise the authenticity of a character’s motivation by 
feeling it on their behalf, even in its apparent absence.   
 
The recognition, understanding and sharing of motive and intention are the 
principal constituents of the empathy that connects an audience to dramatic 
characters, rather than some general quality of the characters themselves: 
action, that is, rather than "characterisation".  When catharsis is operating at 
its best, this motivation will be recognised and understood by an audience 
as shared emotion.  In this instance, catharsis is not simply a pleasurable 
byproduct of the drama but essential to a complete understanding of the 
elements of the story.  This is potentially true of all drama, as should be clear 
from the enormous difference between the two examples of motivational 
envy I presented above; it drives both the sociopathic villainy of Iago and 
the ironic virtue of Elizabeth Bennett.  We find this kind of catharsis 
operating in a similar manner in many of the great narrative dramatists, for 
example; the frustration of Arnolphe in Moliere's School for Wives is never 
stated but, when effectively performed, felt by every sensate member of an 
audience.  Similarly, the prevailing disappointment with life suffered but 
going unacknowledged by so many of the characters of Chekhov's plays, and 
the gradual but implacable growth of the deep but silent feeling of injustice 
that finally drives Nora from The Doll’s House.   240
 
With regard to my own play, the unspoken pursuit, particularly for Bertrand 
and Lexcen, is for self-esteem. Perhaps the closest it comes to being stated 
outright is towards the beginning when all three characters, although each is 
in his own separate theatrical space, each try to answer the same question: 
 
ALAN --  I’m not saying I shouldn’t be here. If they see fit to put me in jail for losing 
shareholders' money so be it.  
BEN – I don’t think I had a choice. 
ALAN -- That's not what I'm pissed off about. I’m talking about my medal!  
JOHN -- When something like that happens,…  
ALAN -- My Order of Australia.  For winning the America's Cup.   
JOHN --... You can't help wondering... 
BEN – It’s what I was born to do. 
ALAN -- They took it back! 
JOHN --... Was it worth it? 
BEN – It nearly killed me. 
ALAN -- As if it never happened. 
JOHN – But it was. 
ALAN - But it did.  
JOHN -- I know it was worth it. 
ALAN -- I won it! 
JOHN -- But how to explain … 
ALAN -- I had what it takes. 
JOHN -- The will... 
ALAN -- The will. 
BEN --   How do I start? 
JOHN -- The drive.... 
ALAN - The drive. 
JOHN --... where it comes from... 
ALAN -- You have to believe in yourself.   
JOHN -- ... the need… 
ALAN -- I always had that.   
 
once this has been established nothing else needs to be said specifically 
about Bertrand and Lexcen’s reasons for wanting to win until the "St 
Crispin's day" speech before the final race: 
 
Lights up on John below deck talking to the crew. 
JOHN -- Apparently, gentlemen, we've been keeping half the population of Australia 
awake these last few nights.  Well, tonight, they'll all be awake.  They will be 
speaking our names in every household in the nation.  And for the rest of their lives 
they will remember the night they watched us win the America's Cup.  Today we 
sail into history, gentlemen, but we also sail together for the very last time.  So 
make this one the best, for yourself and for your shipmates. (p. 85) 
 
Holding back on statements about why winning is important adds deeper 
significance to this speech when it finally comes and further raises the 
stakes for the "final battle".   241
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  Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of the Introduction I mentioned some of the questions I 
wanted my dissertation to answer with regard to the mechanics of the 
seductive capacity of narrative drama:  How is it that, as an audience, we are 
susceptible to the illusion that the dramatic events are somehow "real" 
enough that we should care?  How does the dramatic narrative create and 
sustain the engaged absorption from which the illusion of reality emerges 
and keeps us sitting so still for so long?  
 
The terms engagement and absorption are both often used to describe an 
audience's experience of narrative drama (and narrative generally).  Both 
words are appropriate for different reasons.  Engagement suggests a 
capturing of an audience's attention, while absorption suggests a quality of 
that attention.  Through the course of this essay I have discussed three 
aspects of the way I believe engagement and absorption are brought about.  
In Chapter 1 I discussed from a practical, dramaturgical perspective the way 
the dramatist approaches the construction of two hours of sustained 
engaged absorption.  In Chapter 2 I discussed the reception side of the 
process, suggesting that engaged absorption is a dynamic process and that 
the structure of effective drama is designed to seduce the audience into an 
engagement with the act of creating a mimetic illusion.  I suggested, by way 
of "literary Darwinism" possible evolutionary causes for human 
susceptibility to narrative and then went on discuss various structuralist 
and poststructuralist descriptions of the interactive processes involved in 
the reception of dramatic narrative. I came to the conclusion that there is 
little to be found in reception theory that deals with the emotional 
involvement that drives these processes.  Consequently, in my third chapter   243
I discussed the condition of an audience's engaged absorption with a 
dramatic narrative in light of relatively recent research into the philosophy 
of emotion, which is sometimes referred to as "emotion studies".   
 
What seems to be the cause of our emotional involvement with drama is that 
we somehow believe in the reality of the dramatic situation enough to feel 
the concerns of the characters involved.  However, in the light of research 
into the field of "emotion studies", we find, counterintuitive though it seems, 
that it is our feelings that lead us into a cognitive involvement with the 
action. We don't feel afraid of the Daleks because we believe in their 
existence, we believe in them because we are afraid.  Narrative reception by 
an audience is initiated when recognition of the situational meaning of the 
dilemma of the hero is triggered by an empathetic non-cognitive emotion 
response consisting of action tendencies and subjective feelings.  These 
physiological changes affect enough of a cognitive bias for the audience to 
accept the apparent reality of the dramatic situation. We hope for a positive 
outcome and we dread the negative, enough to continue to make the psychic 
effort necessary to decode the signs and conventions of the form and genre 
in order to assess what might happen next.  Ongoing cognitive appraisals 
modify these initial reactions and a continuous feedback is established as 
the performance and its audience jointly sustain the mimetic illusion.  
 
The involvement of the emotions in the creation of the mimetic illusion 
doesn't end with its role in initiating the illusion.  Ricoeur points out that our 
understanding of time and, indeed, the quality of our temporal existence, 
depends on our narrative comprehension of it.  On the other hand, we 
understand narrative as a temporal string of actions and events with 
followability, that is, the belief that the future holds the key to a 
retrospective cohesion that will tie the entire string into a knot of relevance 
that can be conceived and remembered as a single action. Catharsis is the 
emotional, intuitive "grasping together" of events and actions by recognising 
them as parts of a single story. It is, as Ricoeur describes it, "the integrating 
part of the metaphorical process that conjoins cognition, imagination, and   244
feeling." As the drama continues, expectations are raised and satisfied or 
subverted, creating ongoing shifts of perspective triggering shifts in our 
emotional responses to the value of the hero's short-term and long-term 
goals: wishing and/or dread deepens with a better understanding of the 
importance and significance of potential consequences.  These changes in 
the valence and intensity of the emotional experience are designed by the 
dramatist and constructed in the text to encourage the audience to continue 
to "make imaginary puissance” until they reach an outcome that constitutes 
a satisfactory conclusion to the whole.   
 
I have not tried to suggest that the attention of the audience is dependent on 
an absorption in the world of the story to the exclusion of all else.  Drama is 
quite capable of emotionally involving us in the ‘co-creation’ of an apparent 
reality by the encoding/decoding of dramatic conventions while even at the 
same time technically breaking the illusion, subverting those conventions 
with such techniques as, for example, direct address to the audience.  The 
kind of drama that maintains for the duration of the play the conceit that the 
presence of the audience is entirely unknown to the players ("the fourth 
wall") is a relatively recent development.  The convention of Ancient Greek, 
Roman and Elizabethan drama was for a chorus of one kind or another to 
acknowledge and address the audience. In this the chorus reveals its origins 
in the role of priests and storytellers.  Brecht's plays successfully engage the 
audience by the telling of stories without letting them forget the presence of 
the mechanisms of the theatrical process.  There is no doubt that an 
audience is capable of being emotionally involved with the travails of a hero 
while also being well aware of the act of storytelling taking place.  Nor is this 
capacity limited to people: Bateson's otters are capable of being emotionally 
committed to a fight "to the death" but still conscious of the playful context 
in which the contest takes place. This requires an understanding (and trust) 
that one's opponent is also aware of the "play frame".  People, on the other 
hand, are capable of "multiple-order intentionality", that is, the capacity to 
understand what someone is thinking and feeling about someone else 
thinking and feeling about someone else and so on; and feelings, as De Sousa   245
points out, cannot be hypothesised.  We feel our way into understanding 
someone else's situation by deluding ourselves, for the moment, that we 
share it.  Catharsis is the emotional aspect of "multiple-order intentionality"; 
the intuitive "grasping together" of the attitudes that connect and draw 
together the characters, actions and events by, as Ricoeur describes Kant’s 
concept of judgement, placing "an intuitive manifold under the rule of a 
concept" (cited in Ricoeur, 1983, p.66).  Moral judgements unavoidably 
constitute part of this integrating of cognition, imagination, and feeling into 
a single story because drama involves the symbolic mediation of culture, 
and as I pointed out in my second chapter, this leads us, inevitably, from 
social description to social convention through to moral judgement and to 
questions of what constitutes ethical behaviour. 
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